IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

By JOHN H. HERZ

THE heartbreaking plight in which a bipolarized and atom bomb-blessed world finds itself today is but the extreme manifestation of a dilemma with which human societies have had to grapple since the dawn of history. For it stems from a fundamental social constellation, one where a plurality of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of political life, that is, where groups live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity.

Wherever such anarchic society has existed—and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level—there has arisen what may be called the "security dilemma" of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.

Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a social one. This *homo homini lupus* situation does not preclude social cooperation as another fundamental fact of social life. But even cooperation and solidarity tend to become elements in the conflict situation, part of their function being the consolidation and the strengthening of particular groups in their competition with other groups. The struggle for security, then, is merely raised from the individual or lower-group level to a

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higher-group level. Thus, families and tribes may overcome the power game in their internal relations in order to face other families or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face other classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their internal conflicts in order to face other nations. But ultimately, somewhere, conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among political units of power.

Such findings, one might agree with Henri Bergson, "ont de quoi attrister le moraliste," and men have reacted to them in dissimilar ways. The two major ways of reacting will here be called Political Realism and Political Idealism. Political Realism frankly recognizes the phenomena which are connected with the urge for security and the competition for power, and takes their consequences into consideration. Political Idealism, on the other hand, usually starts from a more "rationalistic" assumption, namely, that a harmony exists, or may eventually be realized, between the individual concern and the general good, between interests, rights, and duties of men and groups in society; further, that power is something easily to be channeled, diffused, utilized for the common good, and that it can ultimately be eliminated altogether from political relationships. The distinction is thus not simply one between thought concerned with the actual and the ideal, "what is" and "what ought to be." It is true that Realism, frequently, is more concerned with description and analysis of what is than with political ideals, while Idealism often neglects factual phenomena for political ideals. But Realism may well, and often does, glorify "realist" trends as the desirable ones, while Idealism may take notice of power phenomena. The distinction is rather one of emphasis: Realist thought is determined by an insight into the overpowering impact of the security factor and the ensuing power-political, oligarchic, authoritarian, and similar trends and tendencies in society and politics, whatever its ultimate conclusion and advocacy. Idealist thought, on the other hand, tends to concentrate on conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes of individuals and groups in favor of considerations beyond mere security and self-interest. It therefore usually appears in one or another form of individualism, humanism, liberalism, pacifism,

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anarchism, internationalism—in short, as one of the ideologies in favor of limiting (or, more radically, eliminating) the power and authority which organized groups claim over men. As one author has expressed it, if "the children of darkness" are realists, pessimists, and cynics, the "children of light" sin through a facile optimism that renders them blind and sentimental.[1]

The distinction here suggested, while frankly inadequate in the realm of more refined political theory, seems to be a fertile one for the study of the great social and political movements of history. Its importance becomes evident when one starts to analyze the characteristic attitude-patterns and emotions of leaders and followers in such movements. Either the approach has been expressive of a utopian and often chiliastic Political Idealism, or—when disillusionment with the ideal's ability to mold the "realist" facts frustrates expectations—it has taken refuge in an equally extreme, power-political and power-glorifying Political Realism. This fatal reversal time and again has constituted the tragedy of Political Idealism, which, paradoxically, has its time of greatness when its ideals are unfulfilled, when it is in opposition to out-dated political systems and the tide of the times swells it toward victory. It degenerates as soon as it attains its final goal; and in victory it dies. One is tempted to sum up the history of the great modern social and political movements as the story of the credos of Political Idealism and their successive failures in the face of the facts observed and acclaimed by Political Realism. Nowhere, perhaps, has this been more striking than in the field of the relations among the "sovereign" units of organization and power, *i.e.*, in modern times, in the "international" realm.[2]

I

There is some typical "Idealism" in the very exclusion, or comparative disregard, of international problems from political thought. Unlike thought regarding form and structure of government, theories in the realm of international relations have traditionally formed a side issue. Systems and theories centered

[1] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense*, New York, Scribner, 1944.

[2] The following, under I through VII, condenses a chapter of a larger manuscript, entitled "Political Realism and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities."

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around units of government were considered in isolation from their international milieu. A state of peace, in which the fact of international relationships could be eliminated from theoretical consideration, was assumed to be "normal." Thus, most of the well-known utopias located their ideal commonwealth upon some island, wilderness, or similarly isolated place, and even less utopian theorists devoted their main attention to problems of internal politics and the internal improvement of the community.

A lover of the paradoxical might say that the absence of theories of international relations constitutes in itself the most typical idealist theory of international relations. It implies, indeed, that with the solution of the internal political problems no other problems remain; interrelations of political units then automatically become harmonious. But with the passing of the relative self-sufficiency of the highest political units, with their increasing interdependence in a world-wide international society, theories of international relations have at last been given more significant expression and have come to constitute the basis of political movements and political action. Among them, nationalism and internationalism will be analyzed here with regard to their basic idealist assumptions and their failure in the world of "realist" phenomena.

II

With the rise of sovereign nation-states there emerged the idea and ideal of a system of equal, free, and self-determining nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living peacefully side by side in harmonious mutual relations. This "idealist" nationalism stands in contrast to the nationalism that developed with the rise of exclusive, aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic national policies, and which will be called here "integral" nationalism. Integral nationalism represents Political Realism in its extreme: a Realism which starts by analyzing political tendencies in order to evaluate them, and which, through their glorification, then becomes the ideological foundation of the resulting movements. Idealist nationalism, on the other hand, has proved to be utopian in its expectation

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of an ideal international society which runs counter to actual tendencies of international politics.

As is well known, nationalism as an "ism" hardly existed prior to the French Revolution. The Revolution established the People as a self-conscious unit; foreign attack upon the Revolution created the nation-in-arms and, thereby, French nationalism, revolutionary, missionary, and visionary; resistance to French Caesarism on the part of subjugated countries created a love of nationality in these countries; and in the Wars of Liberation the revolutionary principle of national self-determination was victor over the very nation which had made the Revolution.

Idealist nationalism as a system of thought amalgamated pacifist-humanitarian with liberal-democratic elements. The doctrine of national self-determination had as its source the same ideology that produced the idea of the right of individual self-determination. Rationalistic individualism was opposed not only to restrictions enforced upon the individual but also to "cabinet politics" that disposed of populations without their consent. Thus, the "fundamental" rights of nationalities were considered to be the same as those of man, namely, freedom from interference and oppression. Once such freedom had been achieved in a system of self-determining nation-states, there would no longer be any reason or justification for international friction and war. Freedom of nations was to be the common concern of all humanity; witness the famous decree of November 19, 1792, in which the French National Convention declared that France would "come to the aid of all peoples who are seeking to recover their liberty." But the most significant spokesmen of humanitarian nationalism came from nationalities which were still seeking unification. Because of the later transformation of Germany and Italy from nationalities seeking redemption in a world-wide humanitarian nationalism to power states that were violently aggressive and authoritarian, early nationalists such as Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini, have been widely misrepresented as forerunners of integral nationalism; this obviously does them great injustice. Yet in a deeper sense it may not be without significance that the countries whose early aspirations expressed themselves in these authors

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later produced a Treitschke and a Hitler, a Corradini and a Mussolini. In both countries it reflects the transformation of idealist utopianism in the realm of theory into the stark reality of power politics for which integral nationalists like Treitschke merely shaped the ideology and the apologetics.

Although in Herder's concept of nationality, nationalism was mixed with elements of romanticism (each nationality having its peculiar "soul" and worth among the "flowers in God's garden"), the emphasis put on the necessity of political freedom was as strong as the expectation that self-determination would make for peace and harmony: It is the cabinets that make wars upon each other, but not so the *Vaterlaender.*[3] One and a half centuries later, with the history of the coexistence of these *Vaterlaender* in mind, a French author, sadder but wiser, could speak of them as "these merciless fatherlands, full of greed and pride."[4] But it was Fichte in whose political philosophy the idea of peculiar "missions" of nations assumed a central importance. In conformity with his philosophy of history, which conceived that an age of utilitarian individualism was being succeeded by one of rational freedom under law and moral norms, Fichte ascribed to Germany a mission to become the model of a *Kulturnation,* a country which for the first time in history would combine political liberty with that social and economic equality without which the dignity of man as a rational being cannot be realized. Patriotism was still the means toward the higher end of the realization of free man and free humanity. To Mazzini, likewise, nationality was not only the natural unit in an association of free peoples, but also the only unit in which the internal task of emancipation from tyranny and exploitation could be performed. God, he maintained, has, in a kind of preestablished harmony, divided humanity into distinct groups on the basis of language. This natural division has been disfigured by the arbitrary boundaries of the "countries of Kings and privileged classes." National unification thus simply means restoration of preordained harmony; and between nations so established "there will be harmony and brotherhood."[5] The

[3] See *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit,* Riga and Leipzig, 1784, Book IX, Chapter IV.

[4] Georges Bernanos, *Journal d'un curé de campagne,* Paris, 1936, p. 300.

[5] *The Duties of Man,* New York, Everyman's Library, Dutton, 1907 p. 52.

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battle symbol, so often applied by Political Realists for their own purposes, is utilized by Mazzini for such harmonizing conclusions:

> Humanity is a great army moving to the conquests of unknown lands, against powerful and wary enemies. The Peoples are the different corps and divisions of that army. Each . . . has a special operation to perform, and the common victory depends on the exactness with which the different operations are carried out. Do not disturb the order of battle.[6]

The unanswered question as to whom these divisions were to do battle with was soon to be answered by history itself: not perceiving a common enemy, they would turn against each other.

This turning against each other had as one of its major reasons the security dilemma of politically unintegrated units, and their ensuing competition for power. Nationalities inevitably became competing units after having abandoned their state of innocence and established themselves as nation-states. Nationalism in the major nation-states now became allied with ideas of national or racial inequality and superiority; liberal-humanitarian nationalism wandered to the East. Theories of integral nationalism, which now blossomed, had forerunners in certain earlier theories, especially political romanticism, which had ridiculed the concepts of "man" and "humanity" as mere abstractions. Thus the same author who had opposed Rousseau's ideology of the spontaneous formation of the general will with an emphasis on an elite's capacity for "instilling the right prejudices" opined: "I have seen, in my time, Frenchmen, Italians, and Russians; I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one may be a Persian; but as for Man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my knowledge."[7] It was through this elimination of the concept of humanity that the universalist ideology was taken out of nationalism.

What remained was either pseudo-Realism, such as that found in theories of racialism (of white, or Nordic, or Aryan

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[7] Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France*, Lyon, 1843, p. 88.

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superiority, etc.), or genuine Political Realism with a recognition of the inevitabilities of power politics in an age of sovereign states. How did it happen that earlier nationalism, with its vision of international peace and harmony, could have so completely overlooked this central phenomenon? Some explanation may be found in the chiliastic character of all Political Idealism, its inclination to expect the millennium, the "totally and radically different situation" on the other side of the great divide which in such thought separates the present evil world from the brave new world of the future. Thus, the "heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers" (which turned out to be the bourgeois revolution) was expected to follow the abolition of feudalism and absolutism. Socialism expected, and still expects, the "altogether different" to become real, once the capitalistic regime is overthrown. And humanitarian nationalism expected the golden age of international brotherhood to come true once nationalities were set free to determine their fate in liberty. Final victory over the power policies of "kings and privileged classes" was supposed to constitute these nations' "leap into the realm of freedom." But in some respects the mechanical balance-of-power politics of the absolutist cabinets, which nationalists blamed for most international evils, was more suitable for safeguarding peaceful, if not permanently stable, relations than was a policy based on the more emotional impulses, aims, and claims of nation-states whose foreign policy was influenced by the nationalism of the masses.

III

Among movements expressive of idealist internationalism we may count those revolutionary movements which were genuinely universalist, those which, in the conception and programs of their leaders as well as during the early stages of their implementation, tended to bring about a general transformation of society. In the cases of the French or the Bolshevik Revolutions, birthplace and actual theater of the movement were regarded as merely accidental starting points of what was conceived as a world-embracing development; such movements were thus world-revolutionary in the strict sense.

The Puritan revolution in England did not, in the main,

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conceive of itself as a world-revolutionary movement aimed at changing feudal-monarchical institutions all over the world. Similar ideological isolationism characterized the American Revolution, where even the appeal to "the opinions of mankind" was made for what was considered the cause of one single nation. But world-revolutionary appeal and propaganda were of the essence of the French Revolution. It is true that, except for some radical cosmopolitans like Anacharsis Clootz, neither Girondists nor Jacobins advocated internationalization of world society in the sense of blotting out countries and peoples; but they all foresaw an impending expansion of the revolutionary ideas over the world; it was France's mission to help other nations to achieve their freedom and to join with France in a society of free nations. "The Revolution is a universal religion which it is France's mission to impose upon humanity."[8]

This religious fervor was characterized by two convictions: one, that the revolutionary ideas, being the expression of undoubted truth, were bound to prevail, so to speak, by themselves, by the sheer force of their truth and reason; the other, that the total transformation of society, which these ideas were bound to bring about, was imminent. This belief in the absolute truth of the gospel and the imminence of the coming of the Savior puts French revolutionary enthusiasm alongside similar universalist-idealistic movements of chiliastic utopianism. This attitude, in the first stage of the Revolution, was common to all groups, leaders, and factions. Said Brissot: "The American Revolution engendered the French Revolution; the latter one will constitute the sacred spot whence will spring the spark that shall put all nations to fire."[9] And Lebrun wrote to Noel: "It is without doubt that our principles will spread everywhere by themselves sooner or later, simply because they are principles of pure reason for which the major part of Europe is now ripe."[10] Robespierre, in the Convention, exclaimed: "What! You have an entire nation behind you, reason as your aid, and you have not yet revolutionized the

[8] Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, Paris, 1889, Vol. II, p. 109.

[9] July 10, 1791, quoted in F. Laurent, *Histoire du droit des gens*, Paris, 1868, Vol. XV, p. 24.

[10] November 11, 1792, quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 165.

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world? . . . In England, the party of freedom awaits you . . . If only France starts marching, the republicans of England will reach out their hands to you, and the world will be free."[11] Adherents of the revolutionary gospel in other countries were imbued with the same chiliasm. An address of English republicans to the Convention contained this statement:

> Frenchmen, you are already free; the Britons expect to be free soon. The Triple Alliance, not of crowned heads, but of the peoples of America, France, and Great Britain, will bring liberty to Europe and peace to the world. After the example set by France, revolutions will be easy. We should not be surprised if very soon an English National Convention will likewise receive congratulations.[12]

In the unhistoric fashion characteristic of chiliastic movements, conditions prevailing elsewhere were considered as mere replicas of those in France, hence bound to undergo the same development. While overestimating fantastically the importance of revolutionary movements and sympathizing groups abroad, however insignificant or isolated, one vastly underestimated the hostile reaction the Revolution was bound to evoke in a Europe still largely feudal and monarchist. The war against the coalition thus appeared as a fight against toppling old powers, while appeals to the masses of the people would suffice to win them as allies on the side of the Revolution. The war would thus become one of propaganda:

> Let us tell all Europe . . . that the battles which the people fight at the orders of the despots resemble blows which two friends, incited by a mean instigator, exchange in the dark; as soon as they see the light, they will drop their arms, embrace each other, and punish their deceivers. So the peoples, when suddenly at the moment of the battle between the enemy armies and ours the light of philosophy strikes their eyes, will embrace each other before deposed kings and a satisfied heaven.[13]

And Robespierre, in 1793, intoned: "Might heaven at this moment allow us to have our voice heard by all peoples: Immediately the flames of war would be extinguished and all peoples would form a nation of brothers."[14]

Thus the Dutch, the Belgians, the Germans were addressed as potential allies. The war against the tyrants was to be the

[11] March 10, 1793, *ibid.*, p. 344.
[12] November 7, 1792, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 214.
[13] Isnard, quoted in Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
[14] Quoted in Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

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last war. But until ultimate victory was won, there could be no neutrals: "The Republic recognizes only friends or enemies!"[15] Ideological movements carry their own idea of legitimacy, and the established order appears as mere brute force, without foundation in law or morals.

The new movement claimed a "legitimate" right to carry the war to those whose only title was force. Then, when the peoples of Europe failed to respond to the message, disillusioned revolutionaries claimed the right to force them to be free. Expectation of universal revolution was postponed: "Prejudice, unfortunately, spreads like a torrent, while truth arrives at a snail's pace."[16] Napoleon had to report from Italy: "Love of the people for liberty and equality has not been my ally . . . All this is good for proclamations and speeches but it is imaginary."[17] Propaganda was now used as a weapon of national warfare, a sure sign that the stage of universalist idealism was over and *Realpolitik* had taken its place.

The rejection of the principle of revolutionary intervention by the declaration of the National Convention of April 17, 1793 —a declaration which stated that France "will not interfere in any way in the government of other powers"[18]—marked the real end of the world-revolutionary period and the beginning of national *Realpolitik*. Nothing makes clearer this transformation than Danton's explanation of the new policy:

> It is time that the Convention makes known to Europe that it knows how to ally political wisdom with Republican virtues. In a moment of enthusiasm, you issued a decree whose motive was no doubt beautiful, and which obliged you to assist peoples desirous of resisting the oppression of their tyrants. This decree would have involved you if some patriots had wanted to make a revolution in China. But we must think above all of the preservation of our own body politic and of laying the foundation for French greatness.[19]

Genet now was instructed, in the typical terms of classical diplomacy ("government," "party," etc., as compared with the

[15] Kersaint, January 1, 1793, quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 244.

[16] Baraillon, January 13, 1793, quoted in Albert Mathiez, *La révolution et les étrangers*, Paris, 1918, p. 88.

[17] Quoted in Laurent, *op cit.*, p. 268.

[18] See Vernon Dyke, "The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XXXIV, (Jan. 1940), p. 61.

[19] Jules Basdevant, *La révolution française et le droit de la guerre continentale*, Paris, 1901, p. 164.

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revolutionary vocabulary of "sovereign peoples," "tyrants," etc.) "to treat with the government, and not with a faction of the people; and to be the representative of the French Republic at the [American] Congress, not the head of an American Party."[20] The Revolution had now become the "revolution in one single country," and, with Bonaparte's appearance quite definitely "le jour de gloire est arrivé," with the glory and might of one's own country as the aim. Napoleon coolly denied that the French Republic had ever "adopted the principle of making war for other peoples. I would like to know what philosophical or moral rule demands the sacrifice of 40,000 Frenchmen against the well-understood interest of the Republic."[21] With the establishment of French hegemony over Europe, propaganda became of the well-known "co-prosperity sphere" type, as when it spoke of France's mission to unify Europe in "one family," where "civic dissensions constitute attacks on the common weal."[22] The oppressed nations, on the other hand, having started a war of conservative intervention, ended by taking over much of the original French revolutionary ideology, which they now were able to turn against its creator. A Prussian general could now appeal to the people in the name of the liberties of 1789: "It is for Germany's freedom that we shall win or die. . . . Any distinction of rank, birth, or origin is banned from our ranks. We are all free men."[23] The circle had become complete.

IV

The history of the Workers' Internationals is yet another confirmation of the prevalence of power-political, "realist" phenomena over too facile assumptions of a utopian Political Idealism. The idea of a classless society, which was to result from the concerted international action of the proletarians of *all* countries, combined internal and international utopianism in one comprehensive structure. The Second International conceived the task of the different Socialist parties as one of opposing "capitalistic" wars or of turning them into struggles for the overthrow of the capitalistic system:

[20] Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 431.
[21] *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 66.
[22] Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 467.

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> If war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class in the countries concerned, and of their parliamentary representatives, with the aid of the International Socialist Bureau, to do all in their power to prevent war by all means which seem to them appropriate, and which naturally vary according to the sharpness of the class struggle and the general political situation. Should war, nevertheless, break out, it is their duty to cooperate to bring it promptly to a close and to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to arouse the masses of the people and to precipitate the downfall of capitalist domination.[24]

But despite its apparent strength on the eve of the World War, the Second International, with its millions of well-organized adherents, proved impotent in 1914. The great majority of workers' representatives in practically every country concerned, with only feeble and scattered resistance, voted for war. Even if it were true that this *volte-face* was engineered by bureaucratized and "treacherous" leaders against the will of the masses, this would only prove the impotence of "party democracy" in the face of oligarchic tendencies in the organization. But such an explanation is of doubtful adequacy. What Socialist party could, in good conscience, have assumed the responsibility of paralyzing the war effort in its own country, unless it could be sure that its "opposite number" in the enemy country would be equally successful? Might not the outcome then simply have been the sacrifice of the independence of one's own country, including its proletariat, in favor, not of the cause of international revolution, but of the capitalists of the enemy country? The allegation of self-defense was certainly more than a mere fraud. It was indicative of the profound dilemma connected with the security factor.[25]

While the realities connected with the security and power factors led the Second International to founder in impotence, they eventually turned the Third International, and the movement it carried, into instrumentalities of power politics. There is a striking similarity between the structure and fate of the world-revolutionary ideology of the French revolutionaries and that of its counterpart, the Bolshevik ideology. Even prior to the October Revolution this ideology had been fully established.

[24] Resolution adopted by the Congress of the Second International at Stuttgart, 1907; see Lewis L. Lorwin, *Labor and Internationalism*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 91 ff.

[25] Nowhere, perhaps, has the tragic situation confronting internationalists during those days been more poignantly portrayed than in Martin du Gard's *Les Thibaults*.

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In April, 1917, Lenin declared that, owing merely to historical accident, the Russian proletariat would be chosen to be the "skirmishers of the world proletariat," and that its action would be only a "prelude to and a step towards the socialist world revolution." World-wide expansion of the revolution he considered as imminent, the preconditions for its outbreak being present in all countries, and the responsibility of the Russians for the fate of the oppressed everywhere was stressed.[26] In striking parallel to the French decree of November 19, 1792, a Bolshevist party resolution of August 1917, stated that "with the liquidation of imperialist domination the workers of that country which will first set up a dictatorship of proletarians and semi-proletarians will have the duty to render assistance, armed, if necessary, to the fighting proletariat of the other countries."[27] Even more striking is the fact that the revolution itself was undertaken only because world-wide revolution was considered a certainty,[28] a fascinating example of how ideologies, by the very fact of being accepted by leaders of a movement, create world-historic events. Even after the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, the interest of the Bolshevist Party was considered as subordinate to that of the world-proletariat. Indeed, it was thought the duty of any particular revolutionary movement or party to sacrifice its specific interests if and whenever broader international interests demanded such sacrifice.

Inevitability as well as imminence of world revolution were taken for granted even when events seemed to shatter such belief. The slightest indications became proofs; some strikes in Germany and Austria in early 1918, were taken as sure signs of imminent revolution, not only in these countries, but in England, France, and Spain. The year 1919 constituted the peak of utopian enthusiasm. Following events in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Lenin predicted the imminent birth of an "All-World Federative Soviet Republic"; in July he promised that that month would be the last of the "difficult" July's, and that July 1920 would witness the final victory of the Communist Inter-

[26] See V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, London, 1936, Vol. VI, pp. 17 f., 230, 288, 297.

[27] Resolution on "The Present Situation and the War," adopted by the Sixth Party Congress. I owe this and the following references to Ossip K. Flechtheim, who kindly made available to me a manuscript entitled "The Struggle of Bolshevism for World Dominion."

[28] Cf. resolution of the Central Committee of the Party of October 23, 1917.

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national. About the same time an article by Zinoviev expressed the chiliastic hopes of that period:

> As these lines are being written, there exist already three Soviet Republics as the main basis of the Third International: Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria. Nobody will be surprised if, when these lines are published, there will be not three, but six or even a greater number of Soviet Republics. With dizzying speed Old Europe rushes toward the proletarian revolution.[29]

When the article appeared the number of Soviet Republics had been reduced to one. But its author, not to be discouraged, now predicted a development of such speed and dimensions that "a year hence we shall already begin to forget that Europe once witnessed a fight for Communism; for a year hence all Europe will be Communist, and the fight for Communism will have begun to extend to America and perhaps also Asia and other continents."[30] It took about thirty years, and the transformation of the regime into the autocratic rulership of a country which now had become one of the two poles of world-power, to bring this prediction to a beginning of truth, though in a very different sense. Stalinism adapted the international ideology of Bolshevism to the "realist" fact that the one country in which the revolution had succeeded was forced to live in the same world with its non- or counter-revolutionary neighbors. Realistic appraisal of power phenomena led the regime to abandon its world-revolutionary ideology, except for propaganda purposes. As a unit in international affairs the Soviet Union now acts with at least the same degree of insistence on self-preservation, "sovereignty," security, and power considerations as do other countries. Whereas world-revolutionary ideology upheld the primacy of international over "national" proletarian considerations, Stalinism acts on the assumption that no interest anywhere can possibly be above the existence and maintenance of Soviet rule in Russia. Whatever appears today as Soviet internationalism has in reality become subservient to a primarily "national" cause, or rather, the maintenance of the regime of one specific "big power." From the point of view of genuine internationalism, this attitude, with its cynical and unabashed misuse of internationalist idealism, constitutes Po-

[29] Quoted in Flechtheim MS cited above.
[30] *Ibid.*

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litical Realism in the extreme. Moreover, the facts and the struggle connected with the phenomenon of "Titoism" tend to refute the allegation that this Realism is going to last only as long as the entire globe is not yet Communist, and that with the transformation of all countries into Soviet or "popular-democratic" republics, genuine federation on the basis of equality will replace insistence on Russian predominance. The Political Idealism contained in this "federalistic" ideology seemingly is foundering upon the rock of realities inherent even in a system of plural Communist entities. Such questions as "Who will be industrialized first and at whose cost in regard to living standard of the masses?" or "Who will form the 'colonial' raw material basis for exploitation by a more 'advanced' comrade-republic?"—questions which are at the very basis of the Tito conflict—show that the security and power dilemma would have its impact on actual policies in a collectivized world as it has had in capitalistic and pre-capitalistic aeons.

V

Besides the universalism of "world-revolutionary" ideologies, internationalism in the field of political thought has even more commonly taken the form of a general idealism, which has been relatively independent of specific social-political creeds and movements and has centered around what may be broadly described as pacifism. Arising in an age that witnessed an increasing international integration of society in a wide variety of fields, such as communications, trade, finance, this type of Political Idealism had the same traces of rationalist utopianism as were characteristic of humanitarian nationalism. Its chiliastic nature is apparent from its assumption that international integration in certain fields of society will inevitably be followed and implemented by the socio-political integration of mankind into one community. All the more radical among the well-known recent schemes for world government assume the "directedness" of history, as progress toward internally ever more democratic, internationally ever more comprehensive societies, which will eventually constitute one great community. Belief in the desirability of the political oneness of the world leads to the assumption of its virtual oneness in fact. All that remains to be done is to lay technical-organizational founda-

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tions. Wars and power politics are considered as anachronisms. The philosophy of this school is perhaps nowhere more neatly expressed than in a resolution passed by the North Carolina legislature in 1941:

> Just as feudalism served its purpose in human history and was superseded by nationalism, so has nationalism reached its apogee in this generation and yielded its hegemony in the body politic to internationalism. . . . The organic life of the human race is at last indissolubly unified and can never be severed, but it must be politically ordained and made subject to law."[31]

This was said at the time of the greatest and most "total" war in history, a war which resulted in the polarization and concentration of power in "super-powers" to an extent never witnessed before. The theory of the anachronism of state and sovereignty, of wars and power politics, simply overlooks the opposite tendency growing out of the technical interdependence of the sovereign units in the world: Faced with this growing interdependence but also with the security dilemma, their attempted way-out is to expand their *individual* power, economically (in order to be self-sufficient in war), strategically (in order to safeguard its defense requirements), etc. This may be international provincialism, but it is hard to see how to escape it in a still anarchic international world. The facile proposal of the world federalists that all that is needed is to abolish sovereignty by *fiat* of international law, simply "takes legal symbols for social realities."[32] Such an unrealistic attitude is responsible for what has been aptly called "the unreality of international law and the unlawfulness of international reality."[33] In view of the security dilemma of competing powers, attempts to reduce power by mutual agreement, for instance through disarmament, were bound to fail, even if there had not been additional, economic factors driving them into the direction of imperialism. If Marxism maintains that political relations and developments form the "superstructure" over the systems and developments of the means of *production,* for the sphere of international relations it might rather be said that political developments have constituted a superstructure over the developments of the means of *destruction.*

[31] Text in *International Conciliation*, No. 371, June 1941, pp. 585 ff.
[32] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government," *Nation*, March 16, 1946.
[33] Gerhard Niemeyer, *Law Without Force*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941.

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VI

It was partly these additional factors driving states in the direction of imperialism that accounted for the failure of yet another type of idealistic internationalism, the one connected with economic, or laissez-faire liberalism. Whenever and wherever the trading class with its commercial interests came to the fore in competition with feudal groups, it developed an internationalist-pacifist ideology based on the assumption that once the "irrational" monopolistic, militaristic, and nationalist obstacles to free exchange of goods among nations were eliminated, all nations would readily realize their common interest in peace. We hear even before 1400 from a contemporary observer of Florentine policies that these policies were "not determined by ambitions, which are typical of the nobility, but by the interests of trade; and since nothing is more hostile and detrimental to merchants and artisans than the disturbance and confusion of war, certainly the merchants and artisans who rule us love peace and hate the waste of war."[34] England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was filled with the pacifist ideology of commercialism; and similar enthusiasm was expanded, in the work of an early poet of a nation whose very origin was a fight for freedom of trade, into the vision of a world federation "by commerce joined":

> Each land shall imitate, each nation join
> The well-based brotherhood, the league divine,
> Extend its empire with the circling sun,
> And band the peopled globe within its federal zone.
>
> Till each remotest clan, by commerce join'd,
> Links in the chain that binds all humankind,
> Their bloody banners sink in darkness furl'd
> And one white flag of peace triumphant walks the world.[35]

While philosophers such as Comte and Spencer later developed this ideology into a more general philosophy of history —according to which an age of science, technology, industrialism, and peace would follow upon eras of more warlike traditionalism, militarism, and aristocracy—it found its more fac-

[34] Salutati, quoted by Felix Gilbert in his chapter "Machiavelli," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. by Edward M. Earle, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 21.

[35] From Joel Barlow's "Columbiad," as quoted in Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, Macmillan, 1944, p. 299.

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tual-economic, though more pedestrian, elaboration in the theories of economic internationalism of the Manchester School. Thus Cobden was an active protagonist of the peace movement, which he tried to ally with his anti-colonial free trade crusade: "The efforts of the Peace Societies, however laudable, can never be successful as long as the nations maintain their present system of isolation. . . . The Colonial System of Europe has been the chief source of war for the last 150 years." "I see in the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the Universe—drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed and language, and uniting us in the bonds of peace."[36]

The reality was imperialism and world war. The economic system of industrial capitalism, while internationalist in its early theory, was put into practice in national economic units: "Economic theory is cosmopolitan, but political fact is nationalistic."[37] But it was in the economic as well as in the political realm that the "realist" obstacles to the implementation of the laissez-faire gospel were found. Exactly as in internal economies accumulation of economic power by monopolies, etc. has prevented a genuinely "free enterprise" system from functioning, so in the international realm complete freedom of interchange of goods, of migration, etc. could not prevail over the tendencies of monopoly and exclusiveness. Thus tariffs (while at first perhaps justified in certain countries in order to protect rising industries from older ones in other countries—such as England, which otherwise might have frozen the economic status quo in her exclusive favor just by utilizing the free trade principle) became powerful instruments for the preservation of vested economic interests. Also, liberal economic theory overlooked the fact that, side by side with trades and industries interested in peace, such as export or investment banking, there are powerful interests in actual war or at least in conditions under which war always threatens, such as those of the armaments manufacturer. Even with regard to foreign investments, which apparently flourish better in peace than in war, need for protection and desire for better exploitation have often resulted in conflicts

[36] From addresses in 1842 and 1846, quoted in Lorwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 f.

[37] Frank D. Graham, "Economics and Peace," in *The Second Chance: America and the Peace*, ed. by John B. Whitton, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 126.

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among countries backing the respective interests. Political and economic causes here are inextricably intertwined. Just as economic interests would induce governments to intervene on behalf of business, alleged business interests would be used by governments as a pretext for power politics, for instance for strategic aims.[38] For, even if capitalism had not developed inherent oligarchic and imperialistic trends, the security dilemma inherent in the system of sovereign nation-states as such would have prevented capitalism from forming a genuinely free-enterprise system on an international basis. It seems unnecessary to enumerate all of the different power-political factors connected with "security," "defense," etc. which have borne upon the national economic policies of the various nation-states.

VII

If the theory of economic liberalism in its international aspects proved to be utopian, one might assume that its opposite, the theory of economic collectivism, with its strong and realistic criticism of liberal fallacies, would be expressive of Political Realism. But an analysis of collectivist assumptions shows that, as in the case of nationalism and internationalism, opposed ideologies may *each* partake of realist and idealist elements. Realistic in their criticism of the opponent, they turn utopian-idealist when their own positive program is involved. Thus a laissez-faire liberal like Hayek criticizes the collectivist for believing that in a system of planned economies the causes of international friction and wars would be eliminated, pointing with good reason to the fact that "if the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as wholes . . . they inevitably become the source of friction and envy between whole nations. . . . Class strife would become a struggle between the working classes of the different countries."[39] Positively, however, his brother-in-arms among latter-day specimens of "classical" liberalism, von Mises, asserts that "within

[38] While liberal economic theory has tended to play down the economic factor, Marxist criticism of "finance capitalism" and imperialism has tended to overlook the power factor. Both are realistic in their critique but reveal the harmonistic tendencies of their general doctrines by their respective de-emphasis. Cf., e.g., the writings of Eugene Staley, notably his *War and the Private Investor,* New York, Doubleday, 1935, and Wolfgang Hallgarten's book *Vorkriegsimperialismus,* Paris, 1935.

[39] Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, p. 221.

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a world of pure, perfect, and unhampered capitalism" there are "no incentives for aggression and conquest."[40] To this the collectivist, Laski, retorts, also with good reason, that "in any capitalist society which has reached the period of contraction every vested interest must be aggressive if it wishes to maintain its ground," and yet he simultaneously denies that the same factor can play a role in a system of planned economy: "The motive of aggression, except on grounds of external security, is ruled out by the nature of the Russian system."[41] This, of course, is begging the question; for it is plain that the "exception" embodies the very problem, that of the impact of security and competition factors on the policies of collectivist societies. It has been observed above (section IV) that, in view of recent development within the Soviet "sphere" itself, there is no reason to assume that even in a system of socialist commonwealths all causes for friction among the units of the system would suddenly disappear. But those among the ideologists of collectivism who now bewail the unbrotherly power politics of a socialist fellow-nation,[42] may take some consolation in the fact that even in classical antiquity the representative of economic materialism had been color-blind with respect to the power and security factor facing a Communist state, an omission for which he was criticized by no less a critic than Aristotle.[43]

VIII

The foregoing may have created the impression that the two extremes—utopian idealism, with its chiliastic approach and its failure in practice, on the one hand, and cynical realism, with its cool acceptance or even idealization of power, on the other hand—were the only existing and possible approaches to

[40] Ludwig von Mises, *Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 5.

[41] Harold J. Laski, *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, New York, Viking, 1943, p. 245.

[42] Thus Moshe Piyade, of the Yugoslav Politbureau, complains: "They have betrayed socialism . . . They accuse us of meddling in their internal affairs, but they have brought back their diplomacy . . . to the line that existed in Russia before the October Revolution . . . We have learned that even the great principles of Socialism and international Socialist solidarity can become business phrases in the mouths of Socialist statesmen. We have learned that behind the phrases of Socialist internationalism there can be hidden the most selfish interests of the great powers toward the small." (From a speech made July 7, 1949, as reported in *New York Times*, July 9, 1949.)

[43] Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Chapter 7, with regard to the theories of Phaleas the Chalcedonian.

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the problem of politics. If so, a corrective statement in a however brief paragraph is called for. True, time and again these approaches and corresponding movements have been recurring in the history of the last few centuries, or even millenia, one leading to, and provoking, the other in what appears as an endless chain or a vicious circle. But there have also been possibilities and actualities of synthesis, of a combination of Political Realism and Political Idealism in the sense that the given facts and phenomena were recognized which Realism has stressed, coupled with an attempt to counteract such forces within the realm of the possible on the basis of the ideals of Political Idealism. We suggest to call such an approach, and the policies based upon it, Realist Liberalism. The term "Realist" indicates that the system or policy in question must start from, and accept, the factual insights of Political Realism as its firm basis and foundation, lest it turn into unrealizable utopianism. The term "Liberalism," on the other hand, points to the type of aims or ideals which are to be the guiding stars of such an attitude. As proposed here, the term "Liberalism" is broader than the liberalism of the nineteenth-century free traders and constitutionalists. It includes all socialism that is not totalitarianism, all conservatism that is not authoritarianism or mere defense of some status quo. It is not pledged to any specific economic theory, nor to any particular theory of the "best" form of government. It is derived from the ideal of freedom that underlies the major idealistic theories, thus accepting the age-old ideals that center around terms such as "liberal," "democratic," "humanitarian," "socialist." Negatively it tends to combat all use of power that is not put into the service of the liberal ideal but serves to establish or maintain privilege and oligarchism, exploitation and the infliction of violence; in short, it opposes all the natural forces and trends which are the direct or indirect consequence of the security and power dilemma.

In order to avoid mere eclecticism in the juxtaposition of the "realist" insights and the aims of Idealism it is very necessary to keep this basic difficulty in mind. Liberalism in this sense is, to quote Ortega y Gasset, "paradoxical," "acrobatic," "antinatural."[44] It partakes of the general antinomy between ethical

[44] Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, London, 1932, p. 83.

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ideals and natural trends and forces which was already clearly perceived at the heyday of Darwinism (both biological and social):

> The practice of that which is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. . . . The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.[45]

In following this advice, Realist Liberalism must, above all, be conscious of the limits which the "gladiatorial" facts put to its endeavors. Realist Liberalism is the theory and practice of the *realizable* ideal. As Koestler once put it, "the difference between utopia and a working concern is to know one's limits." Such policy is the most difficult of arts, and to formulate its principles the most difficult of sciences. But if successful, Realist Liberalism will prove to be more lastingly rewarding than utopian idealism or crude power-realism. While less glamorous than Political Idealism, it is also less utopian; while less emotional, it is more sober; while less likely ever to become the battleground of great political movements which stir the imagination of the masses, it has more of a chance to contribute to lasting achievements for human freedom. Even though it will be attacked from both sides—for it can say, with Ibsen, "I have within me both the Right and the Left"—it may be able to lend to both Realism and Idealism some measure of attenuation, thus rendering the former more humane and the latter less chimerical. A kind of "second liberalism," it emerges as synthesis from the "thesis" of utopian idealism and the "antithesis" of cynical realism.

While it is impossible here to convey a more precise impression of the great variety of approaches, devices, and institutions which Realist Liberalism would suggest for the realm of internal government and politics, it may be remarked in conclusion that in international relations the mitigation, channeling, balancing,

[45] Thomas H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, New York, Appleton, 1896, pp. 81 ff.

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or control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power politics would lead one to believe. Thus, a conscious balance-of-power policy, despite the opprobrium attached to the term, has in modern times maintained a system of major and smaller nations which, while not able to prevent wars, injustice, or even the independence of *all* units in the system, at least preserved many of them from total subjugation at the hands of one hegemonial power. A system of collective security, as rationalization of the balance principle (automatic formation of the "Grand Alliance" whenever a member turns aggressor), perhaps came closer to practical realization in the interwar period than debunking of the League-of-Nations experiment would have us assume. Concessions, even if made out of "enlightened self-interest" (such as made by the British in respect to the Dominions and now India) may substitute relations of cooperation and comparative equality for those of enforced domination. Today, it is true, any such devices seem to incur even greater difficulties in view of the bipolarity of the present power-system, which, lacking the traditional balancing power or group of powers, renders the maintenance of the balance more precarious and excludes collective security; for, while one may have collective security with ten, or five, or possibly even three units of power, it cannot be achieved with two. The use of a terminology of collective action then becomes mere ideology and subterfuge in order to provide bloc-building with a semblance of legality; thus, collective self-defense becomes a pretext, however understandable and justified such regionalism may be, in East or West, from the standpoint of security. For the security dilemma today is perhaps more clear-cut than it ever was before. It would appear that from the point which concentration of power has now achieved, it can only either proceed to actual global domination by one power-unit or recede into diffusion and disintegration. But the greater the difficulties, the greater is the task of a policy of restraint and the merit of those who, as Realist Liberals, would know how to forego the "easy" solution, the "Gordian knot" solution of force, in favor of a peace that would be neither appeasement and abdication nor the Carthaginian result of a war which might spell the destruction of our civilization.

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H. G. WELLS, BRITISH PATRIOT IN SEARCH OF A WORLD STATE*

By EDWARD MEAD EARLE

H. G. WELLS exercised an almost unique influence on the generation which reached maturity during the decade 1910-20. Only Bernard Shaw among men of letters and Woodrow Wilson among men in public life approached Wells in capturing the imagination of that generation and winning it to a particular point of view.[1] There was a flippancy and irresponsibility about Shaw, however, which debased his great abilities; to some, he was a cleverer Oscar Wilde—a court jester for the Fabians and other intellectuals, as Wilde previously had been for salon and café society.[2] Wilson, almost a Messiah during the years 1917-18, was a tragic casualty of the postwar era of disillusion and cynicism. But Wells continued throughout the 'twenties to command its attention and respect.[3]

Wells and Wilson had this in common—that they were idealists and crusaders. Each visualized a better social order—

* This title is suggested by one of Wells's lesser works, *Travels of a Republican Radical in Search of Hot Water*, London, 1939.

[1] Of course we read Kipling, too, but the intellectual climate of the United States was less congenial to Kipling's imperialism than it was in Great Britain. Among academic personalities, the Webbs occupied an especially conspicuous place in our scheme of things but a lesser place than they held among our British contemporaries. Sinclair Lewis, a disciple of Wells, has recalled vividly how much Wells "meant to us from 1910 to 1930 in Greenwich Village or Pekin or Sauk Centre or Twitterton-on-Twit" ("A Generation Nourished on H. G. Wells," in the *New York Herald Tribune*, Book Review Section, October 20, 1946.) See also four articles in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, August 31, 1946: Clifton Fadiman, "The Passing of a Prophet"; Elmer Davis, "Notes on the Failure of a Mission"; Waldemar Kaempffert, "Evangelist of Utopia"; H. S. Canby, "The Superjournalist."

[2] For an evaluation of Shaw's views see William Irvine, "Shaw, War and Peace," in *Foreign Affairs, XXV* (1947), 314-27.

[3] European writers have dealt more seriously and more ponderously with Wells than have Americans or his fellow-countrymen. See, for example, Ullrich Sonnemann, *Der sociale Gedanke im Werk von H. G. Wells*, Berlin, 1935; Wolfgang Simon, *Die englische Utopie im Lichte der Entwicklungslehre*, Breslau, 1937; H.W.G. Halfmann, "H. G. Wells' Vereinigung von Pazifismus und Imperialismus," *Englische Studien*, Leipzig, 1921, LIX, 193-259; H. Matlick, *H. G. Wells als Sozialreformer*, Leipzig, 1935; Georges Connes, *Étude sur la pensée de Wells*, Paris, 1926. A discriminating American study is Van Wyck Brooks, *The World of H. G. Wells*, New York, Kennerly, 1915. Interesting, too, are E. E. Slosson, *Six Major Prophets*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1917, Chap. II; and Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias*, New York, Boni and Liveright, 1922, Chap. IX.

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Wells's New Republic and Wilson's New Freedom. Each believed, too, in the possibility of an ordered international society —perhaps a warless world—to be brought about through a league of free nations or some similar instrumentality. Wells regarded the World War of 1914-18 as "a war to end war"; Wilson saw it as a war to "make the world safe for democracy." Both were cruelly disappointed that their high hopes of 1918 failed of realization. Wilson was tumbled from his exalted place because, it was unjustly adjudged, he had betrayed his cause or compromised it away. But Wells, having no political responsibility and no power other than his pen, lived to fight another day. He advanced far beyond advocacy of the League of Nations and became a fervid, uncompromising evangelist of a world state.

I

Wells himself was not much concerned with winning a place among the immortals. He had short-term objectives which seemed to him of greater moment. He always was driven by a sense of urgency—a feeling that the world was headed for disaster, from which it could be diverted only by the most heroic measures, taken at the earliest possible moment. In former times "ideas trickled . . . in our times they jet." "Modern civilisation is like an aeroplane in mid-air, an aeroplane with one sole, imperfect engine which is popping and showing many signs of distress. It may win to an aerodrome and repairs and replacements. Or it may make a very unpleasant forced landing presently with little hope of immediate recovery."[4] Wells felt disaster breathing down his neck. Time was running out. The world must find answers and find them soon; hence he was less concerned than he should have been with balanced and reasonable discussion.

To Wells the most urgent, the clearly inescapable, problem of our civilization was the problem of war. But the problem of war was only part of a larger problem. It grew out of the fact that science and technology had brought about a state of affairs no longer consonant with the political and social institutions devised for an earlier age. It was imperative, therefore, that

[4] *The World of William Clissold* (hereafter cited as *William Clissold*), 2 vols., New York, Doran, 1926, I, 59, 211-12.

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every preconception of politics—above all, belief in the national state—must be subjected to exacting scrutiny and, where necessary, must be modified or replaced. Failing this, our civilization must surely perish. No one can hope to understand Wells who does not understand and sympathize with the "dominant and enduring passion" of his life. In his youth

> he became obsessed with the thought that scientific invention was putting into the hands of mankind the power which, with suitable direction, could make an ordered society with a life of happiness and varied richness of activity for all—or without that direction bring universal ruin. The need of the time was to adapt government and organized society to the new power and means of communication, to the new economic and political needs of the scientific age. The framework of society, within and beyond the range of political government, was still that of the horse-and-buggy stage of transport, the pre-invention stage of industry. Adaptation was hopelessly outpaced by modern scientific discovery; and it was retarded by obsolete ideas, loyalties and prejudices which only education, at every stage from school to adult politics, could remove and replace. He therefore devoted himself to the task of educating the public, and to this task he subordinated every other purpose in life, with unrelaxing energy, for half a century.[5]

On the other hand, there is much that is paradoxical and volatile in Wells. For example, although he hated war and distrusted the military profession, he became a keen and discriminating student of war and confessed that it held an absorbing fascination for him. He believed that violence must ultimately be banished from human affairs, but he had little sympathy or patience with pacifism or pacifists. He was a Socialist, but he was an acid critic of Socialism and lampooned all varieties of Socialists from the "proletariat" (he doubted that there was any such thing) to Fabians and other left-wing intellectuals. He was a liberal—in the broadest sense of the word—but he was skeptical of democracy and parliamentary government. He had a passionate, perhaps naïve, faith in education as a way of salvation, but he held the teaching profession in contempt and regarded most educational institutions as citadels

[5] Sir Arthur Salter, *Personality in Politics*, London, 1947, pp. 121-22. The chapter on "H. G. Wells, Apostle of a World Society" in this altogether delightful volume is the best essay I know on Wells. I had started this present paper long before Sir Arthur's book came my way, but I have nevertheless profited enormously from having read his sympathetic and discriminating critique of Wells's political views and attitudes.

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of medieval superstition.[6] He believed in progress and in the capacity of mankind to achieve a higher destiny, but he railed at the stupidity of the human race; toward the end of his life, ill and disillusioned, he considered the world a vast asylum inhabited by men mistakenly supposed sane. He was unremittingly critical of things British and, more especially, of the casual, smug British way in politics; but he loved England and affirmed that he had always been "intensely, affectionately, and profoundly English."[7] He distrusted imperialism as such, and as a manifestation of jingoism and militarism, but he believed that the British Empire was something "to be rescued, not destroyed."[8] He regarded nationalism as a dangerous form of megalomania which held the peace of the world in constant jeopardy, but he was proud to call himself an "undisguisedly patriotic Englishman," conscious of the fact that his people, the English, "have created mighty nations, lived valiantly for freedom and fair play through many sturdy generations, and fertilized the whole world with their adventurous dead."[9]

Some of these contradictions are more dialectical than real. Wells was a brilliant conversationalist, and the art of lively conversation is not always constricted by consistency. He used the Socratic dialogue and similar rhetorical devices for explanation and argument. He frequently stated a point of view more effectively than its own proponents, even though he concluded by demolishing it.[10] His prejudices[11] frequently did violence to his better judgment, and his adolescent desire to shock—less pronounced than that of Shaw—was unworthy of his basic

[6] Wells said of himself that "he was indeed so much of an educator that quite early he found it imperative to abandon schoolmastering." If the Empire is lost, it will be lost "if not precisely on the playing fields of Eton, in the mental and moral quality of the men who staff its public schools." "A time must come when Oxford and Cambridge will signify no more in the current intellectual field of the world than the monastery of Mount Athos or the lamaseries of Tibet do now." *William Clissold,* II, 627-60; quotations from pp. 627, 633, 660.

[7] Wells, *The Way the World is Going,* Garden City, Doubleday, 1929, p. 78.

[8] *Ibid.,* Chap. X, "What is the Empire Worth to Mankind?"

[9] Wells, *What is Coming?,* New York, Macmillan, 1916, p. 225; *The Way the World is Going,* pp. 78-79.

[10] "One of the least satisfactory features of the intellectual atmosphere of the present time is the absence of good controversy," wrote Wells at the beginning of the century. "We no longer fight obnoxious views but assassinate them." *Anticipations,* New York, Harper, 1902, p. 295.

[11] Some of these prejudices seem petty, such as those which concerned professionals of the Foreign Office, the Armed Forces, the schools, and the universities.

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tolerance. But when all this is said, and even deplored, it remains that Wells was no irresponsible jester or intellectual nihilist. On behalf of the things he believed he fought intelligently and valiantly for half a century. Even during the cynical postwar era, he was not ashamed of having a cause or of nailing his colors to the mast.

Is there a clue to the beliefs of this versatile and mercurial genius? There are more than one. But if we were to pick a single clue more revealing than others it would be this: Wells believed passionately that "reason"—with its corollary "order"—was the guiding principle for the building of a better world. Perhaps more than anything in life he cherished his scientific training,[12] not only for itself, but because he saw in the scientific method a way of shaping the future of mankind.[13] Conversely, the irrational, the chaotic, the sham, the shoddy were the implacable enemies of a good society (the New Republic) and a warless world (the inevitable world community). Injustice, he believed, grows more out of stupidity than of malice; hence the superstitious, the indifferent, the merely conventional are a threat to the good and the true. "Muddle is the enemy," he wrote in 1911.

> Clearness and order, light and foresight, these things I know for Good. It was muddle [which has] just given us all the still freshly painful disasters of the [Boer] war, muddle that gives us the visibly sprawling disorder of our cities and industrial country-side, muddle that gives us the waste of life, the limitations, wretchedness and unemployment of the poor. Muddle! I remember myself quoting Kipling—
>
> "All along o' dirtiness, all along o' mess,
> All along o' doin' things rather-more-or-less."

He was a Socialist, he said, because Individualism meant muddle, "undisciplined people all obstinately and ignorantly doing things jarringly, each in his own way." Devotion and

[12] Wells studied biology and and zoology for two years under the great Huxley and others at the Normal School (now the Royal College) of Science at Kensington. In *Love and Mr. Lewisham* (1900) he left a vivid record of the life of a young scientist. See also Geoffrey West, *H. G. Wells, A Sketch for a Portrait*, London, 1930, Chap. III; and Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography* (hereafter cited as *Autobiography*), New York, Macmillan, 1934, Chap. V.

[13] Wells believed that science and the scientific method could not only diagnose the present but foretell the future. See his memorable address "The Discovery of the Future" to the Royal Society in London, January 24, 1902, first published in *Nature* and in the *Report of the Smithsonian Institution*, Washington, 1902. See also *What is Coming?*, Chap. I, "Forecasting the Future."

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order were the very essence of Socialism; its goal was "an organized state as confident and powerful as modern science, as balanced and beautiful as a body, as beneficent as sunshine, the organized state that should end muddle for ever."[14]

II

It was his faith in reason and order that made nationalism anathema to Wells. Even the most sympathetic critic of nationalism will concede that it is a heady wine compounded partly of irrationality. Wells said he "loathed" it for its parochialism, its egocentricity, its intolerance. It "trumpets and waves its flags, obtrudes its tawdry loyalties, exaggerates the splendors of the past, and fights to sustain the ancient hallucinations."[15] Nationalism tends to subvert the school, the press, the pulpit, and other organs of opinion and propaganda, with the result that issues (domestic as well as foreign) become difficult, if not impossible, of rational judgment or settlement.[16] Nationalism became an exacerbating factor in politics only in relatively recent times. However, it is atavistic since it raises nations to the status of tribal gods.

> All men are by nature partisans and patriots, but the natural tribalism of men in the nineteenth century was unnaturally exaggerated, it was fretted and over-stimulated and inflamed and forced into the nationalist mould. . . . Men were brought to feel that they were as improper without a nationality as without their clothes in a crowded assembly. Oriental peoples who had never heard of nationality before, took to it

[14] *The New Machiavelli*, Chap. IV, Sections 9-10; quotation is from the Penguin edition, pp. 107-109. Wells was one of the earliest advocates of social planning, and he never lost his faith in its possibilities. "We live in a planning world," he wrote in 1939. "Everything we do is becoming preparatory and anticipatory. Today has vanished almost completely in our enormous preoccupation with tomorrow. I suppose I have responded as much as anyone in my generation to this mental rotation." *The Fate of Man*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1939, p. 67.

[15] *William Clissold*, II, 572; *The Way the World is Going*, Chap. VI, "The Absurdity of British Politics." Wells was that rare phenomenon, a British republican. One of his reasons for distrusting and opposing the Crown was his conviction that it lent authority and respectability to "a sort of false England that veils the realities of jingoism." "While he [the King] remains, the old army system remains, Society remains, the militant tradition remains. They are all bound up together, inseparably. The people cannot apprehend themselves in relation to the world while, at every turn and crisis of the collective life, the national king, the national uniforms, the national flags and bands, thrust blare and bunting across the realities. . . . How else can a monarchy work considering how monarchs are made and trained and flattered?" *William Clissold*, I, 282-83.

[16] Wells made this fundamental point as early as 1901. See the eloquent statement in *Anticipations*, pp. 182-83.

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as they took to the cigarettes and bowler hats of the west. India, a galaxy of contrasted races, religions, and cultures . . . became a "nation."[17]

It is necessary, too, in considering Wells's attitudes toward nationalism, to remember what Sir Arthur Salter called "the dominant and enduring passion" of his life—the desire to have political and social institutions conform to the scientific and technological realities of the modern world. There was a time in the history of Europe when nationalism may have been a progressive, unifying force giving vitality to our civilization. But latter-day nationalism was separatist, disruptive, centrifugal, dividing mankind at the very time that powerful forces of science and technology were working in the opposite direction. These latter non-political forces were not so noisy as nationalism; they worked "mutely, because the world of thought was unprepared for them." Nevertheless, "unprecedented advances in technical and scientific knowledge were occurring, and human cooperation . . . was being made enormously more effective than it had ever been before." On the one hand these advances "render possible such a reasoned coordination of human affairs as has never hitherto been conceivable" and, on the other hand, "they so enlarge and intensify the scope and evil of war and of international hostility as to give what was formerly a generous aspiration [toward world unification and a world community] more and more of the aspect of an imperative necessity."[18] New methods of communication by land, sea, and air; new methods of education, journalism, and propaganda; new and

[17] *The Outline of History*, 4 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1920, II, 433. Wells, like so many others, was not too sharp in drawing distinctions as among nationalism, patriotism, chauvinism, jingoism, and related phenomena. He was descending to frivolity when he defined a nation as "any assembly, mixture, or confusion of people which is either afflicted by or wishes to be afflicted by a foreign office of its own." (*Ibid.*) To Wells the most crushing indictment of anything was to call it a bore. The following is not very helpful, even if true: "Patriots are bores; nationalists are bores; kings and princes are *ex officio* terrible bores." (*William Clissold*, II, 573.)

[18] *The Idea of a League of Nations*, Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919, pp. 5-6. Although Wells was writing twenty-five years before the development of atomic weapons, one is struck by the similarity of much of his argument to that of the Federation of Atomic Scientists and others since Hiroshima. But Wells was not unmindful of the fact that there would be still more terrible weapons than those used during the War of 1914-18. Wells was a close student of physics and had foreseen the development of the atomic bomb. In *The World Set Free* (New York, Dutton, 1914) he made some truly remarkable prophecies concerning atomic weapons and their impact upon international politics.

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more terrible weapons of war; the rise of the heavy industries and, more especially, of the chemical industries—all these things and more put at the disposal of nationalism greater powers of destruction than ever before, while, at the same time, they put at the disposal of mankind unprecedented opportunities for banishing misery, poverty, and war from the face of the earth. Colossal increases in production—resulting from the industrial revolution and the advance of science and technology—have brought into being a new world economy. Industry is said to be national and trade inter-national. But in truth, industry, trade, and finance are cosmopolitan and can be effectively carried on only in virtual disregard of political boundaries and organizations.[19]

Imperialism and protectionism, like the nationalism which gave them birth, likewise are to Wells irrational and anachronistic. In its earlier phases European imperialism may have been a cohesive, civilizing factor in human affairs. Even now—provided the obligation of trusteeship takes precedence over the urge to exploit—imperialism may be in accord with the broad interests of mankind.[20] But the British Empire cannot be regarded as a preserve, to be run on mercenary, acquisitive, selfish, nationalistic lines. Tariff reform, imperial preference, and similar restrictive practices advocated by Joseph Chamberlain and others would bring Britain "into conflict with every other people under the sun."[21] This New Imperialism, said Wells, was born in Germany; the best that could be said for it is that it was based on the *Zollverein*. "It was invented by professors of Weltpolitik. Milner has grafted it upon us at

[19] These ideas are so fundamental to Wells's thinking that it is probably unwise to document them in detail. They appear, of course, in *Anticipations* and, in much greater detail, in *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind* (London, 1932). They are dealt with at length in *The New Machiavelli* and in *William Clissold*. As we shall presently see, they gave Wells the idea of a world state which, in its early phases at least, might by-pass political methods and build its foundations on international economic activities.

[20] For eloquent statements to this general effect see *An Englishman Looks at the World*, London, 1914, especially pp. 37-38; *Joan and Peter*, New York, Macmillan, 1918, especially pp. 222-24, 242-43; *What is Coming?*, Chap. XI; *In the Fourth Year*, New York, Macmillan, 1918, Chap. V. For a favorable view of certain of the British imperialists—Cromer, Milner, and others—see *The New Machiavelli*, pp. 268, 342; *Autobiography*, pp. 650-55; *The Way the World Is Going*, p. 123.

[21] *Joan and Peter*, pp. 223-24. Chamberlain is here referred to as a "demagogue ironmonger" and "nail trust organizer."

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Balliol."[22] But Britain is not Germany. "Germany is a fist—by geographical necessity. The British Empire is like an open hand. We are an open people—or we are nothing. We are a liberalizing power or we are the most pretentious sham in history."[23] Tariffs—whether in the guise of imperial preference or other monopolistic practices— are "foolish barriers that cut up the comity of mankind." In fact, they are a form of war: "White War, the chronic as distinguished from the acute form." Unless the civilized peoples of the world stop quarreling over colonies and colonial trade, there presently won't be anything left for them to quarrel over.[24]

As might be expected, Wells rejected *in toto* all the pseudo-science which went along with nationalism and racialism. "People who believe in this sort of thing," he wrote, "are not the sort of people that one attempts to convert by a set argument. One need only say that the thing is not so; there is no Teutonic race, and there never has been. . . This nonsense about Keltic and Teutonic is no more science than Lombroso's extraordinary assertions about criminals, or palmistry, or the development of religion from a solar myth."[25] But this belief in nationalistic or racial superiorities is not mere nonsense; it is dangerous and pernicious nonsense. Nationalism and patriotism rarely function in and of themselves; they require active suspicion and hatred of foreigners or minorities if they are to thrive. The vilest form of nationalistic and racial prejudice is anti-Semitism. "The Jew," said Wells, "is not merely a rightful member of the community, but he gives the lie to all our yapping 'nationalism,' and sketches in his dispersed sympathies the coming of the world state."[26]

Wells was convinced that there was no "insurmountable bar-

[22] On the curious and unfounded legend that Milner had established an imperialist cult at Balliol College, Oxford, see J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, *Life of Herbert Henry Asquith*, London, 1932, I, 146-48.

[23] The quotation is from *Joan and Peter*, pp. 223-24; the tenses have been changed from past to present to conform with my text. The idea of the Open Hand was a favorite of Wells and appears in *The New Machiavelli* and *Autobiography*, as well as elsewhere.

[24] *William Clissold*, II, 582; *Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*, p. 607; *What Is Coming?*, Chap. XI.

[25] *Anticipations*, pp. 237-38. See also Chap. X of *A Modern Utopia* (London, 1905), an exceedingly effective answer to the aberrations of racial and nationalistic "superiority" prevalent in our time.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 340-42.

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rier" to a "common citizenship" of all peoples, races, and nationalities in "a world republic." The negro is, perhaps, "the hardest case."

> But the negro has hardly ever had a dog's chance of getting civilised in considerable numbers, and yet his race has produced brilliant musicians, writers, and men of scientific distinction. In the eighteenth century he was the backbone of the British navy. I refuse to consider even the black patches of the world as a gangrene in the body of mankind . . . I do not propose to write any formal reply to the many preposterous volumes of incitement to race jealousy and conflict that have been published in the last few years, books about the Yellow Peril, the Rising Tide of Colour, the Passing of the Great Race, and so forth. Even the titles are banners and aggressions. . . . There has never been any Great Race, but a continual integration, dispersal, and even reintegration of active peoples drawn from the most diverse sources, and there is hardly a people which has not contributed some important release or achievement to the common progress.[27]

Wells considered himself a liberal, and he was aware that one of the postulates of liberalism was an acceptance of the principle of nationality and national self-determination. Nevertheless, he believed that application of the principle would fragmentize the political structure of the world. Nationalism meant, almost by definition, an increasing number of international rivalries, exasperations, and suspicions. Advocacy of freedom for insurgent peoples made British liberalism "a champion of nationalities and the instigator of pseudo-liberal nationalism in Germany and Italy. That pseudo-liberal nationalism has brought forward thorns of swords and bayonets and bitterly unattractive fruits."[28] How could it have been otherwise? "The

[27] *William Clissold,* II, 613-15. A German comment on Wells is W. Simon, *Die englische Utopie* (cited in footnote 3 above), Part II, Sec. 10, "Wells gegen dem Rassenstandpunkt." But Wells didn't like Jewish nationalism, either. He regarded the Old Testament as one of the most shocking instances of nationalistic history and tribal incitation. In this sense the "German National Socialist movement is essentially Jewish in spirit and origin, it is Bible-born, an imitation of Old Testament nationalism," with all "its barbaric cunning and barbaric racialism." "Only a Bible-saturated people . . . could take so easily to national egotism, to systematic xenophobia, to self-righteous ideas of conquest and extermination. The German mind, never a very subtle or critical one, the copious abounding German mind, was poisoned in the Lutheran schools," where the Bible was regarded "as a book sacred beyond criticism." *The Anatomy of Frustration,* New York, Macmillan, 1936, pp. 135-43; quotation from p. 141.

[28] *William Clissold,* II, 662. Wells thought liberals frequently were confused by universal application of dogma. "You will find a Labour paper like the *Daily Herald* scolding vigorously at the private ownership of land and minerals in one column and insisting in the

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essential idea of nineteenth-century nationalism was the 'legitimate claim' of every nation to complete sovereignty, the claim of every nation to manage all its affairs within its own territory, regardless of any other nation." But, since "the affairs and interests of every modern community extend to the uttermost parts of the earth" it follows that "a world of independent sovereign states means a world of perpetual injuries, a world of states constantly preparing for or waging war."[29]

The idea that the sovereign state "is essentially and incurably a war-making state"[30] lay at the foundation of all Wells's thinking on world affairs. As early as 1901 he had become convinced that nationalism would set in motion forces which a democratic state might find it impossible to control. "Consequently, the final development of the democratic system, so far as intrinsic forces go, will be, not the rule of the boss, nor the rule of the trust, nor the rule of the newspaper; no rule, indeed, but international rivalry, international competition, international exasperation and hostility, and at last—irresistible and overwhelming—the definite establishment of the rule of that most stern and educational of all masters—War."[31]

In short, Wells regarded nationalism as perhaps the basic cause of war. He blamed it in part for the war of 1914, for the bitterness with which that war was waged, and for the failure of the subsequent peace. He was skeptical of national self-determination as a war aim or as a peace program, unless the newly-created national states could be linked in an effective form of federalism or federal union on the model of the United States or Switzerland.[32] He castigated Wilson for "his obsession by the idea of the sovereignty of 'nationalities' and his inca-

next upon the 'right' of some little barbaric nationality to hold its territories and its natural resources, however vast they may happen to be, against the needs of all mankind. It would wrench the northern coalfields from the Duke of Northumberland and leave all the mines of the Riff to Abd-el-Krim." (*Ibid.*, I, 183.) Again, "One of the most human and interesting things to watch at the present time is the struggle of the Labor parties in the European democracies against their ingrained nationalist feelings and their belligerent patriotism. And still more edifying are the fluctuations of the Labor movement in such countries as Australia and South Africa with regard to yellow and brown immigration and the black vote." (*The Way the World Is Going*, p. 63.)

[29] *The Outline of History*, II, 435.

[30] *Autobiography*, p. 570.

[31] *Anticipations*, p. 183.

[32] *What Is Coming?* (1916), Chap. IX, "The New Map of Europe"; *In the Fourth Year* (1918).

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pacity to think out what he meant by a nationality." "He thought only of nations struggling to be free. He never thought of man struggling to be free of nationality."[33]

In a brilliant and deeply moving address to the Reichstag, April 15, 1929, Wells made it clear that problems of nationalism, and of the political, economic, and psychological aspects of nationalism were the heart of all proposals looking toward the limitation of war. "I am suggesting," he said, "that something very fundamental, something very difficult, important and formidable, is being shirked and evaded in all this peace discussion and all these permanent peace proposals [such as the Kellogg Pact]. This difficulty is the *sovereign independence of states*. That is the cardinal difficulty before us, and until we tackle it instead of walking round it, we shall not make much further progress towards the organized peace of the world. We shall go on wasting our virtuous emotions on Peace Pacts and our substance upon war preparation, just as we are doing at the present time."[34]

III

Despite his deprecation of nationalism, Wells himself was a nationalist and a patriot. He was not only intensely and proudly English, but he was cockney English.[35] To be sure, he was perennially engaged in "that favourite topic of all intelligent Englishmen, the adverse criticism [and even the abuse] of things British." He tended in his more tolerant moments to regard England as "the amiable summation of a grotesque assembly of faults." [36] He detested the drabness, the poverty, and (as he

[33] *The Way the World Is Going*, p. 82; *The Common Sense of World Peace*, London, 1929, p. 32. An earlier judgment of Wilson had been more charitable, although still captious (*The Outline of History*, II, 543-55). For other vignettes of Wilson see *William Clissold*, I, 294, 325-26; *Autobiography*, 604. Wells's views on Wilson were colored by J. M. Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1920).

[34] *The Common Sense of World Peace* (an address delivered in the Reichstag, Berlin, April 15, 1929), London, 1929, pp. 11-12. International law was not one of the subjects in which Wells claimed competence. But on this question of national sovereignty he finds support among the experts. See, for example, Philip Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, New York, Macmillan, 1946, especially Introductory Chapter and pp. 40-42. "Sovereignty," says Professor Jessup, "in its meaning of an absolute, uncontrolled state will, ultimately free to resort to the final arbitrament of war, is the quicksand on which the foundations of traditional international law are built." (p. 40.)

[35] Salter, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

[36] *Mr. Britling Sees It Through* (hereafter cited as *Mr. Britling*), New York, Macmillan, 1916, pp. 15-16, 35.

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saw it) the planlessness and chaos of British industrial society; no one has written better analyses of the London slums—the "vast dirtiness" of London—or of the tragedy which is British coal-mining.[37] He hated British provincialism and has painted some devastating portraits of the "average" Englishman.[38] He detested the "clumsy, crawling, snobbish, comfort-loving caterpillar" which was Victorian England, as well as the smug, inert, undisciplined England of Edwardian and Georgian days. "In England everybody talks of changes, but nothing ever changes. Unless something tumbles down here, we never think of altering it. And even then we just shore it up."[39] Nevertheless, Wells had visions of another England—"England as our country might be, with no wretched poor, no wretched rich, a nation armed and ordered, trained and purposeful amidst its vales and rivers." When he contemplated this England, he was resolved, above all else, "to leave England and the empire better ordered than I found it, to organize and discipline, to build up a constructive and controlling state . . . to suffuse education with public intention . . . to link now chaotic activities in every human affair . . . to bring [industry and finance] back to the service of the general good."[40]

Wells's reaction to the stirring events of the summer of 1914 best revealed his fundamental patriotism. If he was to leave England and the Empire better than he found it, England would first have to survive. "In those first days of August," wrote Mr. Philip Guedalla, "when the War swept across Europe like the wind out of Africa, there was an ugly rush of innumerable pilots to weather the storm. Mr. Wells hurried into his oilskins, Mr. Arnold Bennett jumped into his sea-boots, and

[37] *Autobiography*, pp. 224-25; *William Clissold*, II, 456-58, e.g.

[38] See, for example, *The New Machiavelli*, pp. 130-31, for a description of a smug, self-satisfied businessman who "knew no language but Staffordshire, hated all foreigners because he was English, and all foreign ways because they were not his ways. Also he hated particularly, and in this order, Londoners, Yorkshiremen, Scotch, Welsh and Irish because they were not 'reet Staffordshire,' and he hated all other Staffordshire men as insufficiently 'reet'." See also the *Autobiography*, p. 582, for an upperclass Englishman who "was a curious mixture of sixth-form Anglican sentimentality (about dear old horses, dearer old doggies, brave women, real gentlemen, the old school, the old country and sound stock: Galsworthyissimus in fact) with an adventurous intelligence." All British professional army officers, *ipso facto*, become Colonel Blimps at a very early age.

[39] *Mr. Britling*, pp. 53-54, 120.

[40] *The New Machiavelli*, pp. 111, 149.

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the Poet Laureate heaved a melodious but archaic lead. . . . The mast was almost invisible under the mass of colours that had been nailed to it."[41] Bernard Shaw said that in the first febrile excitement of war the average British patriot not only lost his head but insisted on kicking it around the streets as well. It is easy, of course, to be wise, calm and collected after the event. It is easy to forget how surprised, how profoundly shocked, we were by the mere fact of the war. It is perhaps natural that we should forget, too, how ominous German power appeared to be when it had crossed the Marne and was thundering at the very gates of Paris. (In this respect, at least, the experience of 1940 repeated that of 1914!)

Long after the war, Wells was quite willing to admit that his emotions swept away his judgment in the terrible days of August and September 1914.

> As I reassemble all that I can of my hasty, discursive and copious writings during the early stages of the war, and do my utmost to recover my actual states of mind, it becomes plain to me that for a time —in spite of my intellectual previsions—the world disaster, now that it had come, so overwhelmed my mind that I was obliged to thrust this false interpretation upon it, and assert, in spite of my deep and at first unformulated misgivings, that here and now, the new world order was in conflict with the old . . . that the old traditional system [was] falling to pieces, and the world state coming into being.

He identified Germany with the evil of the sovereign state, above any law other than its will, prepared to back that will with ruthless militarized might. He saw the Allies as the emerging World State, seeking to sweep away "not simply the Hohenzollerns but the whole of the current political system, the militant state and its symbols."[42] To put it another way, he hoped that "the culminating explosion of the age of armament had arrived, that the essential futility of the prevailing ideas of militant nationalism was to be demonstrated beyond dispute."[43]

Although Wells said and did some foolish things during the first six months of 1914, he did not altogether lose his head. He had a better comprehension than most other journalists, and even most statesmen, of the basic causes of the war. He had long

[41] Cited by West, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-04.
[42] *Autobiography*, pp. 569-71.
[43] *The Common Sense of World Peace*, p. 6.

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foreseen the possibility, even the probability, that a general European war would be the inevitable consequence of the existing rival nationalisms, competitive armaments, and dynamic imperialisms of the years after 1890. As early as 1901 he had put his finger on German imperial policy as the explosive element in the international situation. But as of the spring of 1914 he doubted that the war, which he had so long foreseen and so often prophesied, would actually occur. The political temperature, which had been above normal since the Agadir Crisis of 1911, seemed to fall in mid-June 1914. Perhaps, after all, the threat of war was like the proverbial cry of "wolf, wolf," and the war, like the wolf, would not come just now.[44] Finally, it seemed impossible to an optimist like Wells that in this kind of world—a civilized world, committed to broad ideals of liberalism and progress—the monstrosity of a war, however threatening and even imminent, could actually materialize. Wells could have accepted without substantial change the views of an American historian, surveying the international scene in the autumn of 1914 with amazement and incredulity:

> To most of us it had seemed a fine civilization, too noble and too beneficent, too charged with the spirit of 'self-improvement' and of 'progress,' to have admitted of any war. Yet out of this very civilization—out of its very elements on which chief emphasis had been put—proceeds war of a magnitude without parallel in the world's recorded history.[45]

Amazement and incredulity—these were the first reactions of Britain and the British people during the last terrible week of July 1914 and the fateful first week of August. Wells, more than almost any other contemporary writer, caught the spirit of shocked surprise which the war caused in Britain. From the beginning, the threat of war had seemed unreal. The Serajevo plot was "like something out of the *Prisoner of Zenda*."[46] Eng-

[44] In the spring of 1914 Wells had said, indeed, that war with Germany was not imminent and that, if it could be avoided for, say, twenty years, it would never occur (*An Englishman Looks at the World*, pp. 143-44). On the other hand, in a futuristic tale published early in 1914, Wells foretold the collapse of the social structure in a war which ended with the use of atomic bombs. The war began, prophetically enough, with a German attack on France by way of Belgium (*The World Set Free*).

[45] C. J. H. Hayes, "The War of the Nations," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIX (1914), 687.

[46] *Mr. Britling*, p. 91.

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land was thinking of Ireland, not of Austria and Germany, during the summer of 1914. Not until the first shots were fired between France and Germany did war seem an inescapable fact.[47] The mood of surprise then gave way to an outburst of anger against Germany — "all England was furiously indignant against the Germans."[48] "The armament of Germany, the hostility of Germany, the consistent assertion of Germany, the world-wide clash of British and German interests, had been facts in the consciousness of Englishmen for more than a quarter of a century. A whole generation had been born and brought up in the threat of this German war." But no one believed it would come—except, perhaps, the Navy and Colonel Rendezvous (Wells's equivalent of Colonel Blimp). The threat of war was a bore, a nuisance, a stupidity, a gigantic waste. But it wasn't real. And now war had come![49] And the Germans were responsible for it. And there must be no peace until the militarism which they represented had been banished from the earth. "War and the preparation for war, the taxes, the drilling, the interference with every free activity, the arrest and stiffening up of life, the obedience to third-rate people in uniform, of which Berlin-struck Germans have been the implacable exponents, have become an intolerable nuisance to all humanity." And now on the battlefields of Europe the Germans are "spending and making the world spend the comfort, the luxury and the progress of the next quarter-century." This must be the last war, the war to end war.[50]

Wells was a superb reporter of the British scene during the war years.[51] If he was a patriot, so were forty-five million other

[47] Most of this paragraph and the immediately succeeding paragraphs are based upon *Mr. Britling, Joan and Peter, The Bulpington of Blup,* and *William Clissold.* These novels, especially the first two, tell more about wartime Britain than do most histories.

[48] *William Clissold,* I, 99.

[49] *Mr. Britling,* pp. 125-26.

[50] *The War That Will End War,* London, 1914, p. 99; *What Is Coming?,* p. 7.

[51] Take, for example, his keen appreciation of the cruel dilemma in which the war placed British youth. "These youngsters had grown up with an almost unchallenged assumption of their right to self-development. They had come into what had seemed a world of happy opportunity. They had met with little discipline and less punishment. People had asked them, with intimations of unlimited choice: 'What would you like to do?' 'What would you like to be?' Suddenly they were confronted with an immense, a universal compulsion. The picture of human happiness and world amplitude was withdrawn and the real situation revealed. Abandon whatever you are doing, it said, cease to be whatever you had proposed to be, and come into the war. Come into the war. The war is everything and you are

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residents of the United Kingdom. If he was inclined to hold the Germans principally or even solely responsible for the war, so were almost all other Englishmen. If he understood something of the complicated character of the circumstances which brought the war about, he was perhaps better informed than most of his fellow countrymen. If he came, in time, to feel that the Great War was not very different in purpose from many earlier wars, he was merely reflecting the growing disillusionment of all ranks and classes of British society as the blood flowed more freely and the list of dead grew longer. And if, finally, he came to put his faith in a league of nations as a way out of future catastrophe, he was here again reflecting the best opinion of the English-speaking peoples the world over. No one can read *Mr. Britling* and Wells's other war novels without feeling that here was a highly sensitive and civilized human being, trying to work his way through doubt and confusion to some sort of rational philosophy for the future. If Wells said some very bitter things about the Germans,[52] they were not altogether unjustified. On the other hand, some of his judgments of the Germans were fairer and more sympathetic than those of most other wartime writers.[53]

In a sense, Wells's patriotism could be measured in terms of his attitudes toward the German people, in whom he had been continuously interested for twenty years before the Great War. He saw in them, on the one hand, models of efficiency, discipline, and order, as well as of superior education, science, and technology. In most of these respects the Germans were what he would have liked his fellow countrymen to be. But he saw in them, on the other hand also, exemplars of exaggerated na-

nothing, nothing whatever, except what you are in relation to the war." *The Bulpington of Blup,* New York, Macmillan, 1933 p. 216; see also *Joan and Peter,* pp. 443-44.

[52] See, as an extreme example, the following bitter passage which constitutes the final paragraph of *What Is Coming?* (1916): "My reason insists upon the inevitableness and necessity of this ultimate reconciliation [between the Allied and the German peoples]. I will do no more than I must to injure Germany further, and I will do all that I can to restore the unity of mankind. None the less is it true that for me for all the rest of my life the Germans I shall meet, the German things I shall see, will be smeared with the blood of my people and my friends that the willfulness of Germany has spilt." This seems less extreme after World War II than it may have seemed during World War I.

[53] Herr Heinrich, the German tutor in *Mr. Britling,* is portrayed sympathetically and affectionately (see e.g., pp. 50-52, 64-66, 67-69, 167-68). And the final chapter of *Mr. Britling,* consisting of Mr. Britling's letter to Herr Heinrich's parents, is certainly not the work of an unbalanced Germanophobe.

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tionalism, truculent militarism, reactionary monarchism, and "preposterous ambitions"—all of which, he was convinced, were anachronistic and dangerous to the peace of the world. He thought that the Germans, more than any other Western people, stood in the way of establishing a genuine community of interest in Europe, despite the fact that they had the greatest stake in an orderly Europe. They were achieving a peaceful conquest of the world before 1914. It seemed impossible, had the war not supervened, that they should have been other than the greatest industrial and commercial power of Europe, rivaled elsewhere in the world only by the United States. For Germany to become involved in a war, therefore, seemed to Wells colossally stupid as well as vicious.[54]

No other popular writer before 1914 had been so shrewd and so farsighted as Wells in interpreting the meaning to Europe of German history and politics under William II. Writing in 1901, at a time when British opinion viewed France and Russia, rather than Germany, as the potential enemy, Wells saw clearly that conditions existed in Imperial Germany which were ominous for the future. Here were the Germans, said Wells, with the most efficient middle class in the world; with a record of economic progress which was a triumph of intelligence and organization; which possessed military services unparalleled elsewhere; an efficient people, educated and disciplined.

> But the very efficiency of the German as a German today, and the habits and traditions of victory he has accumulated for nearly forty years, may prove a very doubtful blessing to Europe as a whole, or even to his grandchildren . . . The Germanic idea is deeply interwoven with the traditional empire and with the martinet methods of the Prussian monarchy. The intellectual development of the Germans is defined to a very large extent by a court-directed officialdom.

All these things undoubtedly create a formidable efficiency. But energetic and capable people are likely to be intolerant and, "on the under side of their egotism to be jealous, assertive, and aggressive." The system represented by the Kaiser and the Prussian aristocracy meant that freedom and self-criticism were "steadily fading in the heat and blaze of the imperial sunshine.

[54] *An Englishman Looks at the World*, pp. 36-37, 143-45; *Anticipations*, pp. 274-81; *Mr. Britling*, p. 436; *Joan and Peter*, pp. 216, 390-94; *What Is Coming?*, pp. 64-66, 97-100, 274-81.

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Discipline and education have carried Germany far; they are essential things, but an equally essential need for the coming time is a free play for men of initiative and imagination." Wells thought that freedom in Germany was being stifled by autocratic institutions. Even at that early date he was convinced that sooner or later German ambitions would precipitate a general European war in which the English-speaking peoples would be found on the side of France.[55] This was either clairvoyance or political analysis of a very high order. It hardly, at that time, could have been the result of nationalistic prejudice alone.

IV

From the very onset of the war of 1914 Wells hoped and believed that it would lead to a better political organization of all mankind, that it would be the first necessary step toward a world state. Otherwise the war would be the "most tragic and dreadful thing that has ever happened."[56] He was aware, of course, that the new order of things would not come of its own accord, and beginning in 1916 he devoted himself in large part to propaganda for a league of nations. Wells was not, of course, first in the field, as he was only too glad to admit,[57] but he brought to the support of the league idea his great energy, the mighty power of his pen, and his considerable personal prestige. Along with Lord Grey, Lord Bryce, Gilbert Murray, Lionel Curtis, and others, he formed the League of Free Nations Association, which late in 1918 produced a memorable booklet, *The Idea of a League of Nations*. This statement of the case for a league of free nations is unsurpassed, perhaps, by anything else of its kind. And it bore the Wellsian imprint in its final paragraph, which made it plain that the proposed league would be merely preliminary to a much more ambitious, truly world state.

> The League of Nations cannot be a little thing: it is either to be a great thing in the world, an overriding idea of a greater state, or nothing.

[55] *Anticipations*, pp. 274-80. As will be noted, Wells anticipated much of the argument in Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1915.

[56] *Mr. Britling*, pp. 427-29. Much later, Wells said that "the war did no more for mankind than the Black Death or a forest fire." (*William Clissold*, I, 293.)

[57] *Autobiography*, pp. 592-94. For some earlier British and American propaganda on behalf of a league of nations see a review article by C.J.H. Hayes," "The Peace of the Nations," *Columbia University Quarterly*, XIX (1916), 163-82.

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> . . . it is an idle and a wasteful diplomacy, a pandering to timidities and shams, to pretend that the World-League of Nations is not ultimately a state aiming at that ennobled individual whose city is the world.[58]

But as the framers of the Covenant at the Paris Peace Conference had no intention of making the League anything even remotely resembling a world state, Wells was destined to be bitterly disappointed. By 1920 he began to speak disparagingly of the League, which compromised with the twin devils nationalism and national sovereignty. It seemed to him, in the words of his biographer, "a diplomat's device for shelving every constructive proposal."[59]

In rejecting the League of Nations, Wells was conforming to everything he had thought, taught, and believed for twenty years before the League was founded. In 1899, in *What I Believe,* he had given the first indications of his belief in a genuine world community. Two years later, in *Anticipations,* he committed himself firmly and irrevocably to the idea of a world state. Thereafter, he was tenacious and uncompromising in his determination to have a world state, an untrammeled world state, and nothing but a world state. He had accepted the League of Nations—reluctantly for a time—because of a faint hope that it might be a first step toward his ultimate objective. When he found it wasn't moving in his direction—or at least was not moving fast enough—he abandoned his support of the League, became one of its most severe critics, and resumed his original course. He knew what he wanted, says his biographer, and like the baby in the advertisement couldn't be satisfied until he got it. In supporting the League in the first instance he was like a passenger who gets aboard a bus marked, say, Bromley. When he finds the bus isn't going to Bromley, or is going there only by a circuitous route, he gets off. "Unhappily the omnibus service to the World State is as limited as that to Mandalay." But Wells was prepared to start walking rather than to stay on a bus which was going in a different direction.[60]

The argument which Wells made for a world state in 1901

[58] *The Idea of a League of Nations,* p. 44. This little volume was almost entirely from Wells's pen. For earlier writings on the League see *In The Fourth Year.*

[59] West, *op. cit.,* p. 231.

[60] West, *op. cit.,* p. 243.

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was, in essence, the same argument which he continued to make for it throughout the rest of his life. The world state is inevitable, he said; indeed, in some respects it already is here.

> Out of the growth of science and mechanism, and more particularly out of the still developing new facilities of locomotion and communication [which] science has afforded, is the deliquescence of the social organizations of the past, and the synthesis of ampler and still ampler and more complicated and still more complicated social unities. The suggestion is powerful, the conclusion is hard to resist, that, through whatever disorders of danger and conflict, whatever centuries of misunderstanding and bloodshed, men may still have to pass, this process nevertheless aims finally, and will attain to the establishment of one world-state at peace within itself.

National lines and national barriers already show signs of becoming obsolete. "We have ignored the boundaries of language that are flung athwart the great lines of modern communication." Whatever we may say to the contrary, trade is cosmopolitan and largely defies customs barriers; investment leaps across frontiers—"in the economic sense, indeed, a world-state already is established." In the political and cultural spheres, Anglo-Saxonism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Latin-Americanism—despite their irrelevancies and excrescences—are moving in the direction of larger regionalisms and away from the exclusiveness of the national state.

> The nations and boundaries of today do no more than mark claims to exemptions, privileges, and corners in the market—claims valid enough to those whose minds and souls are turned towards the past, but absurdities to those who look to the future. . . . Against all these old isolations, these obsolescent particularisms, the forces of mechanical and scientific development fight, and fight irresistibly.

The process which leads to a world state is now going on,

> . . . at times almost imperceptibly, as some huge secular movement in Nature, the raising of a continent, the crumbling of a mountain-chain, goes on to its appointed culmination. Or one may compare the process to a net that has surrounded, and that is drawn continually closer and closer upon, a great and varied multitude of men. We may cherish animosities, we may declare imperishable distances, we may plot and counter-plot, make war and "fight to a finish"; the net tightens for us all.

Democracy and representative government tend to impede our progress toward the inevitable because democracy, from

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the days of the French Revolution, has been committed to nationalism and national sovereignty. Government by the people may impede, but it cannot frustrate, the formation of a single world community, since "a really functional social body of engineering, managing men, scientifically trained and having common ideals and interests, is likely to segregate and disentangle itself from our present confusion of aimless and ill-directed lives."[61] These were the elite, the Samurai—composed of technicians, creative-minded industrialists and financiers, scientists, journalists and other writers, a specially educated group of intellectuals, and the like—who would by-pass the national state and bring the world state into being without regard to political obstacles.[62] These were the groups who would engage in an Open Conspiracy—"a sort of outspoken secret society . . . an informal and open freemasonry"—a revolutionary force designed not "to overthrow existing governments but to supersede them by disregard."[63] In the modern world, politics is obsolete.[64]

"The chief problem before the progressive revolutionary [working for the world state] . . . is to bend, break, evade, minimize, get around or over or through the political institutions

[61] The foregoing summary and quotations are from *Anticipations*, pp. 267 *et seq.* (dealing with "The Larger Synthesis"), pp. 157-64 (principally concerning democracy).

[62] Concerning the Samurai see *A Modern Utopia*, Chap. IX. On an intellectual and technical aristocracy in general see *The New Machiavelli*, especially pp. 243-45; *Autobiography*, pp. 196-97; *The New World Order*, London, 1940, Chaps. III and X; *William Clissold*, II, 547-77.

[63] *Anticipations*, pp. 298-300; *The Open Conspiracy*, London, 1928; *William Clissold*, II, pp. 557 *et seq.* It is perhaps interesting to note that Wells rejected the international socialist and labor movements as participants in the Open Conspiracy. The (Second) International is without real influence or significance in the forces of the world. "It is so of necessity because of the limited outlook of the common worker," who is "ill-informed and easily misled" and "has feelings in the place of ideas. His International is a mere community of resentful sentiment directed against the general order of the world and against employers," who, in reality, are more internationally-minded than the workers. The labor leader of today is "vacuously emotional and unsound" and is a transitory type in human affairs. The real revolutionary will "keep to the right now and not try the left." He will travel by the Blue Train to the end of his journey; he will come from America rather than from Moscow. (*William Clissold*, II, pp. 555-59.) As to Soviet Communism, "it is as intellectually bankrupt as any 'capitalist' government." (*Ibid.*, p. 447.)

[64] *William Clissold*, II, 447-48. "You could steal and hide Washington away for weeks and, if the newspapers made no fuss, the average citizen of the United States would be unaware of his loss." (*Ibid.*, p. 578.) Wells's contempt for democracy—perhaps contempt is too strong a word—is disturbing but cannot be overlooked. It recurs often in his writings but can be summarized in the sentence: "Muddle isn't ended by transferring power from the muddle-headed few to the muddle-headed many." (*The New Machiavelli*, p. 255.)

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of the present time." Above all, he must circumvent the national state, since "each sovereignty is an implicit repudiation of his purpose." The legal, political way is "a way of highly improbable issue. In the end it might, under the most helpful conditions, give the world a sort of super-Washington, a Supreme Court of international law and a confederated world government with a limited liability to call upon national armies and navies to enforce its decisions." But this would not be an effective political instrumentality able to "perform the chief functions of an adequate world control." All such compromises are not only useless, they are vicious, since they frustrate the desirable and postpone the inevitable. The League of Nations was "a complete recognition of the unalienable sovereignty of states," which permitted the continuance of all the "nonsense" of foreign offices and embassies. Since the League was "a repudiation of the idea of an over-riding commonweal of mankind," it was worse than no league at all; hence the best thing about the Covenant was the fact that it was unworkable.[65] The Kellogg Pact

> was contrived by men who either do not realize at all, or who find it advisable at present not to admit that they realize, the possibility of the world being arranged in any way other than as a sort of patchwork quilt of independent sovereign states with their boundaries fixed forever. . . . We may sign Kellogg Pacts and Kelloggesque Pacts in Europe until there is a shortage of parchment and gold pens, and we shall have done nothing real for the peace of the world.

Indeed, by their very innocuousness such pacts may "destroy the general belief in the honesty and good intentions of the governments that make them."[66] Peace pledges and pacifism are completely ineffective politically and are dangerous forms of self-deception. European federalism, "Union Now," and similar half-way measures are, at best, other forms of the League of Nations; at the worst they are puerile.[67]

[65] *Outline of History,* II, 558-59. Wells, reluctant to give up all hope for the League made several trips to Geneva, the last in the mid-twenties. He came away with all his prejudices confirmed; he disliked the official, bureaucratic atmosphere, on the one hand, and the dilettantism of the League hangers-on and evangelists, on the other. Cf. *William Clissold,* II, 511-15; Salter, *op. cit.,* pp. 132-33.

[66] *The Common Sense of World Peace,* pp. 12, 15, 21.

[67] "Federation," Chap. VII of *The New World Order;* "The Puerility of Current Federal Union Schemes," Chap. IX of *The Common Sense of War and Peace: World Revolution or*

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Wells cared desperately about the world state.[68] It was an obsession with him. He regarded it as imperatively, critically urgent that the world state be brought about now, before our civilization had wrought its own destruction. In two remarkably prophetic books—*The War in the Air* (1908), published before Bleriot's flight across the Channel, and *The World Set Free* (1914), published more than thirty years before the Bomb was dropped on Hiroshima—Wells foretold that the advancing techniques of war threatened social disintegration, as well as appalling destruction of life and property. As early as 1901, in *Anticipations,* Wells had forecast the mechanization of war and had prophesied that military aviation, in particular, would revolutionize war and revolutionize the social consequences of war. Thereafter a constant theme with him was the argument that the political institutions which were adequate to the 'seventies—the era of *Around the World in Eighty Days*—were totally and tragically inadequate to the twentieth century, when every important capital and every industrial city in Europe lay at the mercy of bombing planes operating from bases only hours, or even minutes, away from their targets. Air war, he said, was perforce a "universal guerilla war, a war inextricably involving civilians and homes and all the apparatus of social life." It would be prepared in secret and launched without warning. It would be incalculably destructive; hence it alters "not only the methods of war but the consequences of war." War, with such winged weapons at its disposal, makes a mockery of civilization.[69]

But air war is raised to the ultimate power by atomic bombs. In *The World Set Free* Wells recounted the story of the bomb long before its development was even thought of in military

War Unending, London, 1940; *The Anatomy of Frustration,* New York, Macmillan, 1936, Chap. XII.

[68] See an eloquent passage in *William Clissold,* II, 668-72, in which Wells asks and answers the question, "Why should I care? . . . Why should I become almost miserly with my days and hours in order to work for ends I can never live to see?"

[69] On this phase of Wells see *The War in the Air,* New York, Macmillan, 1908, especially pp. 249-57; and E. M. Earle, "The Influence of Air Power Upon History," *Yale Review,* XXXV (1946), 577-93. Wells had been clairvoyant, too, as regards both trench warfare and tanks as the means of breaking the deadlock of trench warfare. An article "The Land Ironclads" in the *Strand Magazine* for January 1904 (Vol. 26, pp. 661-74) makes extraordinary reading in the light of events thirteen years later and, again, thirty-six years later. I hope before very long to write a study of Wells as a student of war.

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circles. He discussed atomic problems which are commonplace: the fission of uranium; the effects of blast, fire, residual radioactivity—each destroyed city "a flaming center of radiant destruction that only time could quench"—the towering column of flame and smoke arising from the first flash; the feasibility of underwater explosions. He foresaw, also, the potentialities of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the necessity for placing it under international controls. In the face of such weapons and such obliteration of life and property, "war manifestly has to stop." If crowns and flags are in the way, "manifestly they must go, too." If outworn political and legal institutions constitute obstacles to a new world order, they must be ignored, reformed, circumvented, or replaced. "Necessities bury rights. And create them."[70]

> . . . The old tendencies of human nature, suspicion, jealousy, particularism and belligerency, were incompatible with the monstrous destructive power of the new appliances the inhuman logic of science had produced. The equilibrium could be restored only by civilization destroying itself down to a level at which modern apparatus could no longer be produced, or by human nature adapting itself in its institutions to the new conditions. . . . Sooner or later this choice would have confronted mankind. The sudden development of atomic science did but precipitate and render rapid and dramatic a clash between the new and the customary that had been gathering since ever the first flint was chipped or the first fire built together.[71]

Two world wars only confirmed Wells's opinions concerning the necessity, the urgency, and the inevitability of a world state. He was impatient with all those who said it was impracticable. He asserted, on the contrary, that it was the only practicable and "the only sane objective for a reasonable man; it towers high over the times, challenging indeed but rationally accessible; the way is indicated and the urgency to take that way gathers force."[72] No one can place limits to the possible political achievements of even a small body of really determined, de-

[70] *The World Set Free*, pp. 152, 154.

[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93. These words, it must be remembered, were in print before the first shots were fired in 1914 and three decades before the test at Alamogordo!

[72] *Autobiography*, pp. 642-43; *The Common Sense of World Peace*, pp. 22-24. "My reply to anyone who charges me with visionary Utopianism in my demand for the world federation of the common interests of mankind is that it is he who dreams. He is sleeping in a cramped position called patriotism, which can produce nothing for him but a series of . . . nightmares."

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voted, and inspired men. Just think of what already has been done for civilization by a "little straggling, incidental, undisciplined, and uncoordinated minority of inventors, experimenters, educators, writers and organizers!"[73] We can take hope, too, from the story of flying. For two thousand years or more, men dreamed of flying and sought to fly. "But for a wearisome sequence of centuries they got nowhere . . . the general wisdom remained quite sure that flying was forever denied to man. There is a long list of names of solitary men, who announced that they were discovering or had discovered flying. They achieved nothing; they left nothing to their successors but broken bodies, broken wings, and discouragement. Only when a convergence of tendencies stimulated the general imagination to believe in the possibility of flying was there a sufficient and interlocking continuity and multitudinousness of effort for a real advance. Then in scarcely a dozen years the problem of flying was solved. By whom? You do not know, for the simple reason that it was done by a multitude of men working in correlation."[74] Is it too much, said Wells, to hope that similar miracles can be worked in the field of politics?

"Thirty-four years ago," wrote Wells in 1934, "the world state loomed mistily across a gulf in dreamland. My arch of work has bridged the gulf for me and my swinging bridge of ropes and planks and all the other ropes and wires that are being flung across, are plainly only the precursors of a viaduct and a common highway."[75] It was not much more than a decade later that Wells died, a bitterly disillusioned man, the viaduct and highway to Utopia still in the realm of fantasy. One of the very last things he wrote was almost a surrender of his ideals and hopes: "Our universe is not merely bankrupt; there remains no dividend at all; it has not simply liquidated; it is going clean out of existence, leaving not a wrack behind. The attempt to trace a pattern of any sort is absolutely futile." No longer did it seem possible to him "that Man could pull out of his entanglements and start a new creative phase of living. . . That optimism

[73] *The New Machiavelli*, p. 11.
[74] *The Anatomy of Frustration*, p. 116.
[75] *Autobiography*, pp. 642-43.

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has given place to a stoic cynicism . . . Ordinary man is at the end of his tether."[76]

V

"If mankind does after all achieve an ordered world society, there must for ever be high in the list of its prophets and pioneers the man who, in the Gethsemane of his last moments, cried bitterly that he—and mankind—had failed."[77] But in a larger sense Wells did not fail. For he aroused a whole generation to an understanding of one of the fundamental facts upon which the structure of modern politics must be built—that the advance of science and technology has created a new world, in which the old truths may still be true but only relatively true. Science can create a new world. It can create weapons which threaten the destruction of the world of its creation. But science cannot contribute much to the problem of adjusting political and social institutions to the new order of things. This is a problem for the guile and art of the student and practitioner of politics.

And this is the point at which Wells—who liked to think of himself as a scientist—went wrong. He thought it possible to by-pass, even to ignore, political institutions and political processes. He was under the illusion that an elite of scientists, intellectuals, and others could build a world independent of politics, in which the national state and other political forms would be immaterial and irrelevant. If democracy stood in the way, democracy, too, must be circumvented and perhaps discarded. This is the approach of the technician, as, during the past few years, it has been the approach of some American and British scientists, shocked into political consciousness by the awful consequences and the foreboding potentialities of the weapons they have brought into being. But the problem of military weapons is a political problem, which must be solved by political methods in the political arena. Impatience with politics will only produce a second state of affairs worse than the first.

> The Dictatorships and wars of our time, and the demonstration they have afforded of the State's power for evil, should be sufficient com-

[76] *Mind at the End of Its Tether*, London, 1945, pp. 17, 30. This is a depressing book, black with pessimism. It is a mitigating circumstance that at the time he wrote it Wells was not only old but mortally ill.

[77] Salter, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

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> ment upon these dangerous fallacies [of the non-political mind]. The imperfections of political government can be cured only by reform, and not by replacement. The dangers of national sovereignty may be overcome by its expansion into a true system of world government. There is no short cut.[78]

Meanwhile one must admit that progress is discouragingly small, almost imperceptible.

In 1914, when the First World War burst upon an incredulous Europe, the American people thought they were safe behind the barriers of the broad Atlantic. They agreed, in the large, with Woodrow Wilson that the causes and objectives of the war were of no concern to them. Although *Mr. Britling* had a tremendous reading public in the United States, and although it won wide sympathy for the British cause in American hearts, it is doubtful if it changed in any marked degree the desire of the American nation to remain aloof from the conflict in Europe. It was rather the submarine, a new weapon of war born of the new science and technology, that sent two million young Americans to Europe to participate in the "war to end war," the war to "make the world safe for democracy." Less than a quarter-century later, the thud of bombs on Pearl Harbor gave the people of the United States their second unforgettable lesson in world politics. Now, it seems, they are quite prepared to subscribe to a principle enunciated by H. G. Wells in 1916:

> This is one world and bayonets are a crop that spreads. Let them gather and seed, it matters not how far from you, and a time will come when they will be sticking up under your nose. There is no real peace but the peace of the whole world, and that is only to be kept by the whole world resisting and suppressing aggression wherever it arises.[79]

[78] Salter, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Wells was on unsound ground, too, in proposing to ignore or by-pass the national state. "Whatever academic reflections may be indulged on the relative merits of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, it is the latter, and not the former, which will appeal to the practical realist of the present generation as the possible and desirable antidote to the poison of nationalism. To go from nationalism to cosmopolitanism is to hurdle from a familiar path and start off in an opposite direction along a path that is strange and choked with underbrush. To go from nationalism to internationalism is merely to take a well-marked turn on the very highway on which the modern world is traveling." C.J.H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, New York, Macmillan, 1926, p. 271.

[79] *What Is Coming?*, p. 217.

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THE FRANCO-GERMAN BOUNDARY OF 1871

By RICHARD HARTSHORNE *

IN the history of wars and diplomacy in the Western state system of the past several centuries, the most important single boundary is surely that of northeastern France. Since the unification of both Germany and Italy in the last century, the one territorial problem within western Europe that has most seriously endangered the peace of Europe and the world is that of Alsace-Lorraine. While the Germans regarded the annexation of 1871 as a restoration of areas once a part of Germany, they did not return to any previously established boundary, but rather created one that was newly drawn for the purpose. What factors influenced them to place the boundary—the international boundary from 1871 to 1919—precisely where they did place it?

One simple explanation of this boundary, and one that seems plausible in terms of present-day economy and psychology of national power, at least in the Lorraine sector, is to be found in the mineral resources. It is alleged that the German leaders of 1871 sought control of the iron resources of Lorraine, on the basis of which they were to develop the Lorraine-Ruhr steel combine as the implement with which they would conquer Europe. As stated in a description of the boundary that has often been quoted in the French literature: "This line of capricious appearance . . . had as its object to confiscate to the profit of the conqueror all that appeared to have any value in the metallurgical region. At most, it left us a few crumbs fallen from the table."[1] Discussions of the iron-ore area by German geologists have tended to confirm this French view, and to give justification to the statement of an American geologist in a government publication: " . . . the Germans were very careful

* The author expresses appreciation to Professor Lawrence Steefel of the Department of History, University of Minnesota, and Professor Chester V. Easum, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, who offered valuable suggestions.

[1] Paul Vidal de la Blache, in *La France de l'Est* (*Lorraine-Alsace*), Paris, 1901, p. 152.

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to take away from France all ore bodies in Lorraine that appeared to have any value."[2] Only the discovery, in 1878 by the Englishmen Thomas and Gilchrist, of a successful method of converting highly-phosphorus pig iron into steel permitted, we are told, the development of important iron mining and smelting in the portion of Lorraine remaining to France before 1918.

On the other hand, many historians, considering the question primarily in terms of the personal character of Bismarck, find the answer primarily, if not exclusively, in the strategic gain to Germany. The factor of iron is either ignored or dismissed on the grounds that before 1878 none of the Lorraine ores were of importance—or, as some writers assert, their value was known only to a few geologists who had no access to the policy-makers.

Since we are concerned with the reasons why a group of men came after long series of discussions and tentative decisions to a particular final decision, it would be well to assume at the outset the possibility of some degree of effect of a wide variety of factors—including nationalism, strategy, economic resources, public opinion, fear of revenge, and heroic sentiment. Only from such an all-inclusive start can we hope to determine why the states concerned acted as they did.

The pertinent evidence is unusually voluminous and is such that the combined application of historical and geographical techniques is essential to securing a conclusive answer to the question: what was the relative importance of the different factors involved in the determination of the Franco-German boundary of 1871?

Steps in the Determination of the Boundary

The problem is somewhat simplified by the fact that the boundary was determined almost exclusively by the Prussian leaders. Representatives of the other German states had only a minor opportunity to influence the decision, and the defeat of the French armies left the French leaders little chance to oppose effective resistance to the Prussian demands.

During the course of the war and the armistice period, the

[2] Max Roesler, *The Iron-ore Resources of Europe*, U. S. Geological Survey Bulletin 706, 1921, p. 56.

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Prussian leaders made several minor changes in their plans for the new boundary with France. In an area such as the iron-ore region, even minor changes may be highly significant. It is necessary therefore to keep in mind the several phases in the determination of the boundary.

1. Whether the Prussian leaders had definite plans for territorial annexation in entering into war with France in July 1870 is not known. But as early as August 7, following major German victories in Alsace, Bismarck let it be known that he intended to annex Alsace and Metz—*i.e.*, approximately the area that was annexed.[3] Two weeks later, when the German armies had overrun much of eastern France, a royal decree issued from the field on August 21, 1870, outlined more definitely and openly the approximate area that was to be annexed to Germany: "Alsace with the line Thionville-Metz."[4] (See Fig. 1.)

Called at first the General Government of Alsace, and referred to at times as the "General Government of Alsace and German Lorraine" or simply "the government area of Strassburg," this area was approximately that which was ultimately annexed and known thereafter in history as "Alsace-Lorraine." Actually it included most of the former province of Alsace, but only about one-third of the province of Lorraine.[5] Ore deposits

[3] Heinrich Poschinger, *Bismarck Portefeuille*, Stuttgart, 1898-1900, III, 24.

[4] This decree of the King of Prussia, as leader of the North German Confederation, was agreed upon at a Council of War held at Pont-à-Mousson immediately following the great battles in the environs of Metz, but still twelve days before the decisive surrender at Sedan.

In form, the decree merely revised the areas of the two military governments that had been announced during the previous week, one for Alsace and one for Lorraine (though Strasbourg and Metz were still in French hands): five arrondissements (administrative districts) in northern Lorraine were detached from the general government of Lorraine and added to that of Alsace. The purpose of the change was to put under one administration the area that the Germans intended to annex. The population of the area concerned was told by the *Official News for Alsace* on September 27, "on the basis of decisions recently resolved upon in Headquarters," that "Prussia and the allied German states will under all conditions insist upon the annexation of this area with Germany as a defensive zone against future French attacks." (Quoted in *Petermann's Mitteilungen*, XVI [1870], 433; cf. also Gaston May, *La Traité de Francfort*, Paris, 1909, pp. 87-100.)

[5] In the decree of August 21, 1870, it was defined simply in terms of the French political subdivisions of the time—*i.e.*, those drawn up during the Revolution with little reference to the historic past. It consisted of the two (Alsatian) departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine; three of the four arrondissements of the department of Moselle, namely, Sarreguemines, Thionville, and Metz; and two of the five arrondissements of the department of Meurthe: Sarrebourg and Chateau-Salins. The reader should not be confused by the subsequent change in names of the French departments. The portions of both departments

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

FIG. 1. German claims for annexation in Alsace and Lorraine, as announced in August 1870, and modified in the "green line" presented for the Preliminary Treaty in February, 1871.

1. Iron ore areas (as now known). 2. German-French linguistic boundary (as based on the language boundary of the previous century, after Boeckh and Kiepert). 3. The "green line" on the map presented for the Preliminary Treaty; this became the final boundary, 1871-1919, except for the changes at Belfort and in western Lorraine. 4. The limits following existing administrative boundaries, previously stated as the approximate extent of the area to be annexed, by the decree of August 21, 1870. 5. Line determined later, May 1871, as the final boundary in the Belfort area. 6. International boundaries

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in 1870. 7. Boundaries of the French departments. 8. Boundaries of the arrondissements. The names of the arrondissements are indicated by the names of their administrative centers: C-S, Chateau-Salins; Sb, Sarrebourg; Sg, Sarregemines. The changes made by the "green line" as compared with the line following administrative boundaries were: the exchange of two salients in the boundary between Briey and Metz; return of southern strips of Chateau-Salins and Sarrebourg; and the addition of the Bruche Valley (B).

were located in the extreme northwestern portion of this area, in the arrondissements of Metz and, especially, of Thionville.

There seems to have been no record made of the discussions that led to this critical decision, but from subsequent statements it appears to have represented a compromise between the desire of the military leaders for more far-reaching demands and the more conservative views of Bismarck.

2. A few months later the Prussian leaders made one significant change in the area of the General Government by adding the Bruche Valley, a district just west of Strasbourg which, though located on the Rhine side of the Vosges Mountains, had not been included in the department of Bas-Rhin but in that of Vosges.

3. When the Germans met the French representatives to negotiate the Preliminary Treaty of Peace at Versailles in February 1871, they presented a precise statement of the area to be annexed. This was defined in the first article of the treaty (February 26, 1871) and marked in, in green, by hand, on two copies of an attached map.[6] The line showed relatively minor changes as compared with the boundary of the General Government.

4. The French found themselves forced to accept the German demand almost completely. They were however able to secure one major concession, which was specifically stated as an exception to the line on the accompanying map—namely that the city and fortifications of Belfort remained to France,

that remained to France after 1871 were united in the single department of Meurthe-et-Moselle which has not since been altered. When Lorraine Annexée was regained after the first World War, it was established without territorial change as the department of Moselle.

[6] A. Laussedat, *La Delimitation de la Frontière Franco-Allemande*, Paris, 1901, p. 24. This famous "green line" had apparently been tentatively agreed upon by the Prussian authorities in the previous fall, but had been subject to repeated debates since then which were finally settled just before the meeting with the French representatives. Certainly it is an error to conclude, as have various students, both French and German, from the phraseology in the treaty that the "green line" was printed and published in September 1870; the meaning is clear that the line had been added, presumably by hand, to two copies of a map previously published.

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"with a radius to be determined later." In return, two small "villages" (later recognized to mean communes), west of Metz, were added to Germany.

5. The final determination of the boundary, in the Treaty of Frankfort, May 10, 1871, established the boundary around Belfort and made a minor but significant change at the northwestern end of the line, west of Thionville.

France secured a larger area around Belfort than the Germans claimed had been intended by the term "radius" in the preliminary treaty, and in return Germany secured a small strip of land in the northwest corner from the Luxemburg frontier south to the Orne Valley—an area of approximately 10,000 hectares or 39 square miles in the area of iron ore deposits.

6. In the process of demarcation of the boundary in the field during the following months, various minor changes were made, including settlement of a dispute concerning three communes in the Vosges.[7] Apparently no significant changes were made in the iron-ore area.

The "green line" of the Preliminary Treaty represented, as we will see, the consistent definition of the purposes reflected by the decree of August 21, 1870, whereas in the following months before the signing of the Final Treaty of Peace, a new factor became of some significance. It will be convenient therefore to consider the factors influencing the German leaders in these two periods, before and after the signing of the Preliminary Treaty.

Factors Determining the Boundary in the Preliminary Treaty

The Nationality Factor

Public opinion in Germany regarded the annexation provided for in the Preliminary Treaty as the restoration of areas that ought by right to be parts of the newly unified German state because of their historical associations with the former German Reich over many centuries, and more particularly because of their German culture.

[7] May, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-23.

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A large part of the popular enthusiasm for a unified Germany, a major objective of the war, was based on the nineteenth-century movement for nationalism based on common language and culture. The conquests of former German areas by Louis XIV and his successors were regarded as violations of the principle of nationalism that called for atonement. Though Bismarck himself was given to deriding this view, it is particularly well expressed by one of his own aides as:

> the necessity of satisfying the moral feeling of the people through the return of these old parts of Germany. It would be a crime against the moral world order if the robbery which France committed against these provinces were not atoned; it would be a crime against these lost children themselves if one did not lead them back, even against their will, to the true mother, the old home, if we decided to give them back again to the French step-mother and her corrupting influences. Not only our descendants, still more their descendants will thank us for it, their children even, if we bring them up as Germans and start out right with it.[8]

More briefly, the Crown Prince, then about fifty years old, in a memorandum to Bismarck on August 14, called for the regaining of German Alsace as a matter of the heart (*Herzenssache*) of the German people.[9] On the same day a statement from Headquarters declared that "Alsace and, so far as it is German, Lorraine also must be taken."[10] When Bismarck in November discussed the proposed annexation with the ministers of the other German states he showed them a map of France on which the German-French language boundary was marked, and no one had any objection to raise against the separation of "Alsace and German Lorraine."[11]

It was probably unfortunate for France, as it turned out, that the French government had not taken count of language in its census taking. The various studies of the language boundary that had been made by German students—not all of whom were motivated by political purposes—tended to maximize the evidence of German character and minimize the evidence of

[8] Heinrich Abeken, *Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit, aus Briefen zusammengestellt*, Berlin, 1898, letter of November 29, 1870.

[9] Bismarck, "Politische Schriften," *Die gesammelten Werke*, Berlin, 1931, Bd. 6b, p. 448.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 450.

[11] Bismarck, *"Gespräche," Die gesammelten Werke*, Band 7-8, Berlin, 1924, 1926, I, 393.

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French character. The most thorough and influential study that had been made was that of an official in the Prussian statistical office, Richard Boeckh, whose extremely detailed examination of German areas in the European States was published six months or more before the outbreak of the war.[12]

German writers generally considered as "German land" the area that had been German-speaking up to the time of the French conquests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Previous to that time the linguistic boundary had remained fixed in spite of the many political vicissitudes during the centuries in which the area had been included in the Holy Roman Empire. But during the century or two of French rule a narrow zone of formerly German speech had become predominantly French-speaking; this zone was recognized—though somewhat understimated—by the German students, but was included as fundamentally "German."[13]

Regardless of these minor differences, one must agree with the claims made by the German geographers of the time: (1) with certain major exceptions, the area indicated in August 1870 as the approximate area to be annexed included primarily German-speaking territories; (2) the "green line" drawn presumably late in October was a closer approximation to the language divide; and (3) the line established by the preliminary treaty at Versailles still further reduced the area of French language to be included.[14]

[12] Richard Boeckh, *Der deutschen Volkszahl und Sprachgebiet in den Europäischen Staaten*, Berlin, 1869, pp. 17 f. The sections covering Alsace and Lorraine constitute 20 pages of text and 14 pages of tables. Boeckh introduced his study with a significant exposition of the "principle of nationality," not as a necessary criterion of the limits of a state, but as a right of every folk-group to full freedom in the use and development of its own language and culture, even though that be different from the major language of the state in which the group was included. Since, however, the Germans were convinced that the French government had used every means possible to repress the use of German in Alsace and Lorraine, this exposition did not deter them from using his data in 1870-71 to measure the area of Lorraine that should be added to Germany.

[13] Petermann, using Boeckh's data, showed these newer French districts as "mixed" in language in marking the language boundary on the map of the General Government of Alsace (*Petermann's Mitteilungen*, XVI [1870], Tafel 22). The official count subsequently taken in the region in December 1871, showed that this zone in which French had replaced German was somewhat wider than either Boeckh or Kiepert had supposed, as the latter frankly recognized in "Der Sprachgrenze in Elsass-Lothringen," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, IX (1874), 307-20, with map.

[14] In the Vosges highlands, the green line, drawn evidently along the drainage divide, was believed to coincide roughly with the linguistic divide—though subsequent information

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The major area of non-German land to be annexed was of course the arrondissement of Metz, together with the larger part of that of Chateau-Salins. There were not a few in Germany who questioned whether Metz should be included. Arguments for and against its annexation recurred repeatedly during the period from August to February—and were to continue for many decades thereafter in the German literature.

The Strategic Factor

For the military staff, the all-important purpose was of course strategic. The protection of South Germany seemed to require control of the Upper Rhine Plain and eastern slopes of the Vosges in Alsace—in particular the fortress of Strasbourg commanding the easier routes over the lower section of the Vosges and, in lesser degree, the fortress of Belfort in the open gap between the Vosges and the Swiss Jura. Further, to guard routes to the middle and lower Rhine, they demanded the lowland of the Moselle, from Thionville to Metz.

This long narrow plain, extending from south of Metz northward into Luxemburg, together with the higher land bordering it on both sides, is the key to an understanding of the interest of the Germany military staff in the location of the boundary

demonstrated that a narrow strip of French-speaking territory was to be found east of the drainage divide and one or two small districts of German language west of the crest were left in France. Where the boundary turned to the west opposite Strasbourg, the Bruche valley was believed to be German in its lower portion, French in the higher part, whereas in fact it had become largely French throughout. As a part of the department of Vosges, rather than Bas-Rhin, this area had not been originally included in the General Government of Alsace but was added to it in November of 1870, and was annexed entirely to Germany. Controlling routes to Strasbourg across a broad easy saddle in the Vosges, it would no doubt have been included for strategic reasons regardless of language. At the southern end of the Vosges, the lowland around Belfort was recognized as French, but, presumably because of its strategic importance no change was made here until the negotiations at Versailles, when Bismarck granted to the French the city of Belfort and a part of the surrounding French area.

West of the Vosges, the green line as adopted at Versailles followed for some distance the drainage divide between the Saar and the Meurthe, which was also approximately the linguistic divide, but from Avricourt west and northwest it departed radically from that to include the greater part of the predominantly French-speaking arrondissements of Chateau-Salins and Metz. By cutting off minor parts of the French-speaking portions of these arrondissements, the green line of February 1871 decreased to some extent the area of French language that had been included in the decree of the previous August.

On the northwest corner, near Thionville, no change was made in the line that had been proclaimed in August, even though that left in France a strip of seven or eight formerly German-speaking communes, some of which were believed to be still predominantly German.

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

FIG. 2. Changes in the western boundary of Lorraine, August 1870 to May 1871.

1. Steep wooded bluffs of the Côtes de Moselle facing generally east or north, with exposures of iron ore as far south as the Rapt de Mad; and similar bluffs of the less clearly marked cuesta east of the Moselle. 2. Limit of the area regarded as "formerly German" in language. 3. International boundaries in 1870. 4. The "green line" presented for the Preliminary Treaty, Feb. 1870. 5. The previous limit following the arrondissement boundaries, of August 21, 1870. 6. Battlefield communes added to Germany in the Preliminary Treaty of Feb. 1871. 7. Line first proposed by Bismarck for the Final Treaty in May, 1871. 8. Boundary as fixed by the Final Treaty, May 10, 1871. A, Aumetz; F, Fontoy; L, Luxemburg; M, Moyeuvre le Grand; V, Villerupt.

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in Lorraine (Fig. 2). From Verdun on the west, or from Toul and Nancy on the south, major routes follow this lowland strip northward to the opening of the Moselle gorge which leads through the Rhine highlands to the Rhine valley itself.[15] Farther south, opposite Metz, the ridge bordering the plain on the east breaks down into rolling country offering a wide gateway leading to the Saar valley from which several relatively easy routes lead to the upper Rhine plain.

Paralleling the plain on the west, from south of Metz to the Luxemburg border, is the commanding escarpment of the Côtes de Moselle. This formation is a typical cuesta,[16] rising gently from the west to present an abrupt escarpment to the east. The forested slopes of this line of bluffs, rising some 600 feet above the Moselle lowland and etched by many ravines and a few narrow V-shaped valleys of larger tributaries of the Moselle, present a belt of extremely difficult terrain guarding the narrow plain throughout its entire extent (Fig. 3). To secure the



FIG. 3. Profile across the Côtes de Moselle and the Moselle Valley, showing the forested slopes and the position of the minette ore beds. Cross-section from west to east, crossing the Moselle River (M), about four miles south of Thionville (see Fig. 2). The deep cuts in the Côtes de Moselle represent short ravines cut by northern tributaries of the Orne; that in the ridge on the east is the longitudinal trench of the Canner River (C).

strategic advantages offered by the Metz-Thionville route, it was obviously essential to attain control of this eastern margin of the Côte de Moselle. This rampart is particularly strong above (south of) Metz, where the main river is not in the plain east of the cuesta but has cut a deeply entrenched valley in the

[15] From Thionville north there are two alternative routes: one follows the Moselle itself which cuts a wide gap through the ridge bordering the plain on the east; the other continues along the plain to the city of Luxemburg, thence eastward to rejoin the Moselle route at Treves, above the beginning of the gorge.

[16] A "cuesta" is defined as an asymmetrical hill, steep on one side and gently sloping on the other.

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cuesta a few miles west of its face. Along this valley, scarcely half a mile wide and bordered by steep bluffs rising 600 to 650 feet on both sides, pass two major roads and the major railroad from south to north. A few miles to the east, the open lowland offers an alternative, parallel route. Six miles downstream from the point where the Moselle emerges from its entrenched valley into the wider lowland, stood the fortress of Metz, commanding both routes. Five miles up the narrows—*i.e.*, eleven miles south of Metz—was the boundary of the arrondissement of Metz, chosen by the German military staff for the new international boundary.

The immediate tactical position of Metz is also very strong. The Moselle flows here at the base of the escarpment on the west. A line of lower hills on the east, rising 200 to 275 feet above the river, restricts the immediate valley to a flood plain two and a half miles wide, guarded by fortifications on the steep hills on either side. On the flats, the Moselle together with cut-off meanders, the parallel tributary of the Seille, and the Moselle canal present a series of local defense lines.

One can therefore well understand the comment of the general who was chief of staff to the Crown Prince: "It would turn the heart in your body to give up Metz."[17] The military, in general, regarded Metz as indispensable in any future war with France. At the Council meeting in August, following two of the bloodiest battles of the war fought in the environs of Metz, while the city itself—16 miles downstream from where the Council was meeting—was under a siege that was to last nearly two months, Moltke estimated Metz to be worth 120,000 men.[18]

From the military point of view, the desired area of annexation could most simply be expressed in the following terms: Alsace to the crest of the Vosges, with Strasbourg and Belfort, and northern Lorraine as far west as to include the Côtes de Moselle commanding the line from Thionville to Metz. This formula had in fact its approximate expression in the area established for the General Government.[19]

[17] Quoted by Ottkar Lorenz in *Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begrundung des Reiches*, Jena, 1902, p. 523.

[18] Moritz Busch, *Tagebuchblätter*, Leipzig, 1899, entry for September 6, 1870.

[19] The inclusion of Chateau-Salins served to cover the routes across the open country southeast of Metz toward the Saar.

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Moltke's "green line," as drawn some months later and incorporated in the Preliminary Treaty, made two changes in the western boundary of the area to be annexed in Lorraine and thereby presented a sharper definition of the military purpose. The boundary following the former arrondissement limits of Metz showed two marked salients, extending in opposite directions. These were in whole or major part eliminated, in one case in favor of Germany, in the other of France. The result not only considerably shortened the boundary in this sector, but in particular eliminated the former projection of the upland arrondissement of Briey (remaining to France) beyond the escarpment into the valley of the Orne and into that of the Moselle itself. The new boundary as thus corrected was located throughout its extent, save for one minor exception apparently overlooked at the time, a few miles back of the edge of the escarpment.

The Factor of Iron

In all the records of discussions of the German leaders during the period before the signing of the Preliminary Treaty, no mention is found of the iron resources of Lorraine. Nevertheless, in demanding the arrondissements of Thionville and Metz, the Germans were in fact demanding a considerable part of these properties. For the ore deposits are found in beds underlying the Côtes de Moselle; mines had been developed where the ore outcropped in the eastward facing escarpment, and blast furnaces and mills were located in stream valleys at the base, or farther out on the Moselle.

Before drawing any conclusion from this situation it is necessary, first, to determine whether the German leaders were aware of the value and location of the iron properties and, second, to consider not merely what they obtained by the annexation but also the extent to which the ore area as then known was *not* included.

Although the iron area of Lorraine had not at that time attained the outstanding position it was later to occupy in the iron and steel industry of continental Europe, it was none the less the major iron-producing area of France and was rapidly increasing in both absolute and relative importance. The official

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statistics of mineral production for France in 1864, which we know were available to the Germans, showed that about one-fifth of the iron production of France (as measured by iron content) came from the two departments of Moselle (which contained the larger, northern portion of the field) and Meurthe (which contained the smaller portion around Nancy). The proportion reached one-third just before the war. Though these "minette" ores were low in per cent of iron content, that was offset by the relatively cheap costs of mining. On the other hand, the phosphorous content rendered the iron smelted from them unsuitable at that time for steelmaking; Lorraine in 1864 produced but 6 per cent of the steel in France.[20] Metallurgists in Lorraine and at the School of Mines in Paris were experimenting just before the war with methods which, it was claimed, would solve the problem created by the phosphorous content, but it was not until 1878 that Thomas and Gilchrist found the final solution.[21]

German industrialists must certainly have been aware of the growing importance of the Lorraine iron. German iron works in the Saar, closely related to coal mines owned and operated by the Prussian state, depended on receipts of iron ore both from the Luxemburg portion of the field, which was included in the German Customs Union, and from Lorraine itself and shipped coal in return to the iron works in the ore-field. Certain industrial firms of the Saar were in the process of constructing blast furnaces in Luxemburg and had taken out mining concessions in Lorraine.

Since German newspapers from the outbreak of the war in July 1870, were constantly discussing proposed annexations of territory in Alsace and Lorraine, one can hardly believe that

[20] The detailed information on the iron industry is taken largely from two contemporaneous reports: the manuscript report prepared in August 1870 by the German mining engineer, Wilhelm Hauchecorne, as translated and published many years later by Fernand Engerand in *Les Frontières Lorraine et la Force Allemande*, Paris, 1916, pp. 289-305; and an article originally published in *Moniteur des intérêts matériels*, April 23 and 30, 1871, extracted as "Influence de la cession de l'Alsace-Lorraine á l'Allemagne sur l'industrie métallurgique," in *Revue Universelle des Mines, de la Métallurgie*, etc., 1871, pp. 241-250. The production data for 1869, which apparently were not published until 1872, are given by Engerand, *op. cit.*, pp. 171 ff.

[21] Fernand Engerand, *Le Fer sur une frontière: la politique métallurgique de l'Etat allemand*, Paris, 1919, pp. 129, 145.

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the government officials and private industrialists of the Saar would not have brought the pertinent data to the attention of the German authorities.[22] Certainly they must have examined with special interest the map showing the approximate area to be annexed, which was published widely in Germany in September,[23] and which would have told them at a glance that certain well-developed portions of the ore area were not included.

Specifically we know that at least one major attempt was made to impress upon those in power the value of the whole mining and industrial area and to present in detail the specific location of the ore beds and ironworks. On August 18, Wilhelm Hauchecorne, the Director of the Mining Academy in Berlin, and formerly mining inspector for the Prussian state in the Saar, submitted a fully detailed report on "The Exploitation of the Mines, Factories, and Saltworks in the Parts of France formerly German."[24] We do not know whether of his own volition he had prepared the report or whether he had been asked by someone in authority to do so. It is not clear to whom he submitted it, though we know that it came into the hands of the Civil Commissioner for Alsace. It is barely possible, though improbable, that this report of August 18 could have reached Bismarck or the Military Staff at Pont-à-Mousson before the decision of August 21.[25]

[22] It is perfectly possible, as some French writers have suggested, that the Ruhr industrialists may have taken an opposing position. The Ruhr-Lorraine connections that were to become of such transcendant importance had not yet developed, and the Ruhr industrialists may have regarded a Saar-Lorraine combination as undesirable competition.

[23] Cf. the map in *Petermann's Mitteilungen*, 1870, Tafel 22.

[24] See footnote 20.

[25] It seems more likely that the Civil Commissioner received it subsequently and one would suppose that he would have shown it to his military superior, the Governor-General of Alsace, since much of the area it discussed had been included in that General Government, or that, as a document significant for the question of determining the ultimate boundary of Germany, he would have called it to the attention of his civilian superior, Bismarck. No reference to it however has been found in any of the German literature.

Our knowledge of this report, and even of the mere fact that it was made, is based solely on a copy (or possibly the original after a copy had been made) which the Civil Commissioner for Alsace had transmitted on September 11 to the military governor of Lorraine at Nancy, and which the French officials found there after the departure of the Germans and retained in the prefectural archives. The map which Hauchecorne made to accompany his original report was unfortunately not found—it may possibly not have been transmitted to Nancy. May, who first noted the existence of the report in 1909, assumed that someone in authority had assigned Hauchecorne the task of preparing it (*op. cit.*, p. 111); Engerand concluded that he did it of his own volition (*Les Frontières Lorraine*, p. 288).

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This negative evidence however does not prove that the report failed to reach anyone in high authority. That such individuals may have seen but ignored it is in no sense surprising unless one starts with the assumption that they were primarily concerned about the iron. On the contrary, the fact that such a detailed authoritative report on the iron industry of Lorraine was presented to official authorities (at least as early as September 1870), but subsequently disappeared without trace in the German records, points very strongly to the conclusion that the Prussian authorities were not preoccupied with the question of iron in Lorraine.

The report contained all the information necessary to enable one to determine a boundary that would include either the whole of the ore field or the more valuable portions of it. Because the report so completely refutes the arguments frequently made concerning the lack of knowledge in 1870 of the value of the Lorraine iron ores, certain of its major statements are quoted here in full:

> The mineral beds of the department of Moselle, called by the French engineers, "minerais oolithiques" . . . constitute the most important iron ores of France. . . . This formation extends under a great jurassic plateau which forms the western part of the department from Longwy near the Luxemburg frontier, as far as Pont-St. Vincent, south of Nancy [in the department of Meurthe]. Thus, on a length of 100 km, the bed outcrops on the edge of the plateau, along the frontier of Luxemburg and in the valleys of the Chiers, the Mortaine,[26] the Alsitz, the Orne, thence on the left bank of the Moselle as far as Liverdun, the two sides of the valley of the Meurthe as far as Nancy and finally in the upper Moselle valley [also in Meurthe].[27]

The report concluded:

> It is certain that the factories situated in the basin of the Saar and its tributaries will utilize more and more the ores of the Moselle, just as the metallurgical factories of Moselle and of Meurthe will use the coal of the Saar.[28]

[26] Evidently the Moulaine, a small tributary valley of the Chiers, southeast of Longwy.

[27] Hauchecorne's report, *loc. cit.*, p. 292. Similar description of the development of that time is given in "Influence de la cession de l'Alsace-Lorraine . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[28] Hauchecorne's report, *loc. cit.*, p. 295. The report recognized that the mines were concentrated near the margins on the north and east, using shallow pits or horizontal tunnels cut back from the outcrops in the bluffs, and that few shaft-mines had been dug farther back where the beds were deeper. But it did not mention a theory which is said to have

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Even though we assume that this report could not have reached the hands of the Prussian leaders who made the basic decision at Pont-à-Mousson in August 1870, the essential facts included in it could readily have been ascertained in Berlin during the previous weeks, if the Prussian leaders had been primarily concerned in securing the iron area of Lorraine. Official French statistics made clear the importance of both the Nancy and Longwy basins. These areas could have been included in the original definition of the area to be annexed if, instead of specifying which arrondissements of Moselle and Meurthe were to be included, one had simply named the whole of the two departments (Fig. 1). This would not only have given Germany all the Lorraine ores known to be of major value but also would have assured her complete possession of the beds that were known to underlie the plateau on the west but whose metallurgical value was at that time debatable.

In fact, however, the Germans went to some trouble, in the original decree of August 21, 1870, to separate certain portions of each department as excluded from their plans for annexation. These arrondissements were almost purely French in language and were not essential to the control of the Moselle route from Metz to Thionville or the lowland route from Metz to Saarbrücken. But these arrondissements thus implicitly omitted included all of the ore field in Meurthe—*i.e.*, the smaller field around Nancy—and an important part of the known ore field in Moselle. The Nancy basin in the south, which had produced about a fourth of the total iron of Lorraine in the years before the war and whose production had been increasing rapidly, was at no time included in the German claims. Bismarck, to be sure, in insisting to the French leader Thiers that Germany must have Metz, sought to demonstrate his moderation—or perhaps to convey a veiled threat—by telling him: "I will give you back Nancy [occupied at the time by German troops] although the minister of war wishes to keep it."[29] Obviously the inclusion of

been current at the time, that only those ores found within two kilometers of the outcrop were worth working. Neither did it discuss the problem of using the high-phosphorous ores for steelmaking.

[29] From Thiers' report as quoted by Karl Jacob in *Bismarck und die Erwerbung Elsass-Lothringen, 1870-71*, Strassburg, 1905, notes on p. 25; cf. also May, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

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the strongly fortified center of Nancy would have notably strengthened the German strategic position.

Likewise the German claims included but a very minor part of the most intensively developed section of the larger northern ore field—that along the northern face of the escarpment. In the valleys of the Alsitz and Chiers and the ravines of their southern tributaries were many iron mines and nearly half of the total number of blast furnaces of the entire northern field. But this Longwy district was a part of the arrondissement of Briey, the one arrondissement of the department of Moselle that was not included in the area named for annexation in August 1870. A relatively minor alteration in the boundary here would have given Germany all the northern field that was in active production.[30]

Nevertheless the "green line" presented for the Preliminary Treaty introduced no changes in this section of the line. The changes made to eliminate the salients in the line west of Metz added a much less important bit of ore land to Germany.

Finally, during the negotiations over the Preliminary Treaty, in February 1871, the German leaders appear to have made no effort to utilize the French insistence on retaining Belfort as a means for securing additional concessions in the ore fields. Bismarck was prepared to give up Belfort but required compensation in the form of a German victory march through Paris and the cession of two battlefield communes west of Metz[31] which were not then known to contain iron ore and in fact proved to have but minor amounts.

In sum, while we cannot tell whether Hauchecorne's report ever reached either Moltke or Bismarck, it is clear that no use whatever was made of it. Furthermore, in all the discussions of the annexation among the German leaders during the months before the Preliminary Treaty, we find no suggestions for

[30] The inclusion of the entire arrondissement of Briey would have added only 8 per cent in area and 4 per cent in population to the total territory claimed by the original decree, as calculated from the data given by Hermann Wagner in "Das Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen nach den definitiven Bestimmungen des Friedensvertrages von 10 Mai, 1871," *Petermann's Mitteilungen*, XVII, (1871), 299-306.

[31] Vionville and Ste. Marie aux Chênes, sites of two of the heaviest battles of the war witnessed personally by the Emperor, who was anxious that the cemeteries of the German soldiers and officers who had fallen there should be included in Germany (Abeken, *op. cit.*, letters of February 24 and 26, 1871; Busch., *op. cit.*, entries for February 22 and 23, 1871).

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changes in the boundary where it cut through the district of maximum development of the iron industry—west of Thionville. On the contrary, the great debate of that period concerned the city of Metz, whose arrondissement included on its western margin a much less important portion of the iron area.

The Question of the Annexation of Metz

Had Metz been left to France, we would no doubt be led to conclude that the major factor influencing the location of the international boundary was the language boundary. Many in Germany were opposed to the annexation of Metz on principle of nationality, presuming that to be defined by language: "In the thinking of the nation, stood first the thought that we wished to reclaim only German land. What lay beyond that might better be left to the French."[32] The Minister-President of Bavaria expressed himself, privately at least, as opposed to the annexation of Metz, or any French area.[33] Similar views were repeatedly expressed by the Crown Prince.[34]

The military consistently insisted on the annexation of Metz for the strategic reasons previously discussed. The uncertain factor at the time was the position of Bismarck and that has remained uncertain in the subsequent writings of historians, whether German or foreign. The inclusion of Metz, as we have seen, necessarily brought to Germany an important share of the iron area that would have been left out if the principle of the language division had been followed. To what extent was Bismarck's decision on Metz influenced by the fact that its inclusion would add to the German share of the iron area?

Although we have a large number of records of Bismarck's

[32] Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[33] Count Bray, according to a later statement paraphrased in Bismarck, "Gespräche," I, 393.

[34] The views of the Crown Prince are mentioned because they were believed to reflect those of a number of others close to the court, rather than because of his position. For in spite of that, and of his mature years, he was frequently excluded from discussions of state matters, both because of fear that information might leak out through his English wife and because of doubts about the stability of his thinking. In a diary entry of February 25, 1871, he noted, "as usual no one thought it necessary to tell me anything." On the question of Metz, his views show considerable vacillation (though no more so than those of Bismarck). Extracts from his diary of this period were published after his death in *Deutschen Rundschau*, September 1888, and re-published, as *Aus Kaiser Friedrichs Tagebuch, 1870-1871*, in New York, 1888; cf. Eugen Wolbe, *Kaiser Friedrich: die Tragödie des Uebergangen*, Hellerau bei Dresden, 1931, pp. 199-200.

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statements of his purposes in annexing Alsace and Lorraine we cannot be certain of any of them as reliable representations of his motivations.[35] Nevertheless, the consistency with which he expressed certain purposes, in contrast to his inconsistency on specific decisions, justifies us in stating, within a high degree of probability, his fundamental purpose in the annexation and the major factors affecting his thinking. His essential purpose, he repeated at the time and in later years in every discussion of the question, was the need to strengthen Germany's defensive position in the face of attacks from France, such as those that had so often been made during the past two centuries. Unless the fortress of Strasbourg were included, the South German states, as he had learned from the King of Württemberg in 1855, would not feel it safe to join the north German confederation. "The wedge," Bismarck repeatedly declared, "that the corner of Alsace at Weissenburg pushes into Germany divides South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political line of the Main."[36]

Second only to Strasbourg as a danger to Germany was the fortress of Metz. Bismarck, in part of his thinking, was in fundamental agreement with the military. At the same time he took account of political factors which they did not take into their reckoning. For reasons of internal politics he did not wish to add to the number of permanently unwilling subjects in the new German state—no doubt he had in mind the recalcitrant Poles in eastern Prussia, as well as the Danes in North Schleswig. Metz was entirely French in population, both in the city and surrounding country.

[35] Bismarck did not keep a diary and his later reminiscences of this period, as Haller has shown, cannot be taken as accurate (*Bismarck's Friedenschlusse*, Munich, 1916, pp. 77 f.). Statements made to the French representatives or to his German colleagues must be regarded as arguments in negotiations which did not necessarily represent what the speaker was thinking. Even his own immediate staff were not taken into his confidence, as his aide, Abeken, observes (*op. cit.*, letter of January 24, 1871). Earlier students of this particular question did not have available all the evidence collected in the *Gesammelte Werke*, published in the 1920's and 1930's.

[36] Quoted in this instance from Ludwig Hahn, *Fürst Bismarck: Sein politisches Leben und Wirken, urkundlich in Thatsachen und des Fürsten eignenen Kundgebungen*, Berlin, 1878, II, 328. Johannes Haller, who analyzes in detail the factors influencing Bismarck's thinking on the problem of Metz (*op. cit.*, pp. 67-72), finds in this statement a demonstration of Bismarck's characteristic manner "of treating political questions above all geographically."

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Further, Bismarck wished to convince the other powers that the German confederation did not make war for the sake of conquest but would take only what was essential for its security, and hence, he indicated, for the security of Europe in general. Consequently he resisted all suggestions of the military that the favorable situation should be exploited to the utmost by taking much larger areas of France, not to mention French colonies.[37]

Just what resultant these factors produced in Bismarck's mind on the question of Metz is a subject on which subsequent students are divided, and with good reason. For he appears to have argued at different times on either side of the fence and never to have committed himself definitely either way.

Looking back on the events at a later date, Bismarck claimed that he had originally favored the language boundary.[38] But as early as August 7, according to the publicist Bamberger, whom he was accustomed to use as means of propaganda within Germany, Bismarck told him that in case of victory he desired Alsace and also Metz, as a *Reichsland*.[39] At the Council of War held at Pont-à-Mousson on August 20, it was decided that "in case of ultimate victory, we will hold Alsace and Metz with its surrounding area." Bismarck's instructions to his press officer during the following weeks emphasized that it was the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz that Germany required. At first he included the observation that the area was formerly German and in large part still German in language, but later he asserted that the purpose was not "to bring back" Alsace and Lorraine to Germany; emphasis on the German past and the German language of the Alsatians was "Professorenidee." The winning of Lorraine was for him "politically undesirable" but the generals held Metz to be "indispensable."[40]

In preliminary negotiations with the French representative, Favre, late in September of 1870, Bismarck indicated that Germany would demand essentially the territory decided upon in August although he recognized that it would be a political bur-

[37] Haller, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 f.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[39] In Poschinger, *op. cit.*, III, 24.
[40] Busch, *op. cit.*, entries of August 22 and 28, and September 4, 6, and 30, 1870.

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den, but one which was necessary for strategic reasons since he had every expectation that France would again attack Germany.[41]

In November, Bismarck discussed the territorial terms of the future peace treaty with ministers of the allied German states and found no opposition to the annexation of Alsace and German Lorraine, but very probably noted some opposition to the addition of French-speaking territory, including Metz.[42] In discussing peace terms with Thiers that month he gave him reason to hope that Metz might be returned to France,[43] but this suggestion if intended seriously may have been due simply to his anxiety to bring the war quickly to an end.[44]

With the failure of negotiations with the French in the fall, the question of territorial terms for peace does not appear to have been a major issue at German headquarters until the results of the national election held in France on February 8 forced the Germans to reconsider their terms for peace.

The election returns in Alsace and Lorraine, held in the presence of the German military government, brought clear proof of the opposition of the population, both German and French, to annexation to Germany. Clearly "the inclusion of those provinces would make great difficulties," and the representatives elected from those provinces to the Assembly would oppose separation from France and work for the continuation of the war to prevent it. The organization of the National As-

[41] Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Bismarck, "Politische Schriften," pp. 519 f. The possibility that if Germany voluntarily limited herself to the annexation of areas actually German in culture, France would ultimately accept the settlement as permanent, thus making unnecessary the consideration of military strategy of the next war, was evidently viewed as completely unrealistic by all those associated with the German supreme council, with the possible exception of the Crown Prince. France had bitterly opposed the unification of Germany, had resented the Prussian victories over Austria, and would be expected to seek revenge for the humiliating defeat in the current war; and the public expression of loyalty to France by the German-speaking population of the provinces to be annexed would keep alive in France the conviction that these provinces should be recovered, even if the population concerned was ultimately won over to loyalty to Germany.

[42] Bismarck, "Gespräche," I, 393.

[43] At least this was Thiers' understanding of the conversation, according to Gabriel Hanotaux (*Contemporary France*, tr. by J. C. Tarver, New York, Putnam's, 1903, I, 21; and Jacob, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 69 f. and 16*.

[44] Bismarck repeatedly expressed his concern that once the military victory had been established the war should be brought promptly to an end and he was ready to make considerable concessions if necessary to reach the definitive treaty of peace. Cf. Haller, *op. cit.*, p. 76; and Jacob, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 69 f., 70, 74 f. and 16*.

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sembly at Bordeaux had eliminated the threat that Bismarck had previously held over the French of getting Napoleon III, then a prisoner of war, to sign a peace treaty in the name of France; France was now clearly united behind Thiers. The German leaders at Versailles therefore "came to the involuntary agreement that they would not be able to carry through their entire program of peace terms, especially the territorial terms."[45]

On February 10, Bismarck let it be known to other German leaders that he did not think he would be able to secure Metz. Questioning the arguments of the military that the possession of the fortress was necessary, he returned to his former idea of requiring its destruction and building a new fortress somewhere else.[46]

In the council, however, the view of the military prevailed with the Emperor. Bismarck was instructed to open the negotiations with the French with the demand for Metz included.[47] That he was still uncertain in his own mind seems clear from the remarks made to his staff at dinner following the first meeting with the French on February 21:

> If they would give us a billion more [indemnity], one could perhaps let them have Metz. We could then take 800 million and build us a fortress a few miles farther back, perhaps at Falkenberg [the first definitely German-speaking city on the route to the Saar] or at Saarbrücken—there must be a suitable place there. Then we could still profit by 200 million. I certainly do not want so many Frenchmen in our house who do not wish to be there. It is the same with Belfort, there also everything is French. The military, however, will not be willing to give up Metz, and perhaps they are right.[48]

However one may interpret this oft-quoted statement, it is difficult to deny Jacob's conclusion: "One thing in any case comes out of these words in all clarity, that up to this day, up to the beginning of the actual peace negotiations, over this question, nothing had yet been definitely decided [on the German

[45] Lorenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 516, 520.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 516. He also sought the support of others to persuade the Emperor (title of the King of Prussia after the proclamation of January 18, 1871) to acquiesce in giving up Metz (Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 80; *Aus Kaiser Freidrichs Tagebuch*, entry of February 21, 1871).

[47] Haller, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[48] As quoted by Busch, *op. cit.*, entry of February 22, 1871.

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side], and that Bismarck himself on this point was as yet in no way fully clear."[49]

Further, we know that Bismarck's associates took his expressions of doubts seriously. One member of his staff, Abeken, wrote his wife when it was all over that it had been his "secret worry that the voices of those who wished to give up Metz would even at the very end prevail."[50] The Crown Prince was both surprised and disappointed when he learned that Bismarck had held out for Metz to the end because of "his great dread of justifying to our military the giving up of . . . this fortress."[51] The emperor was greatly distressed to hear, as late as February 23, that it might not be possible to get Metz.[52]

That same day, however, Bismarck had perceived that the long-winded harangues of Thiers and Favre in refusing to give up Metz did not represent a serious threat to continue the war —in short that Metz could be had at the cost, at most, of the lesser concession of Belfort as *Schmerzensgeld*.[53] He immediately sent word around that it was important not to let the French representatives know of the German mood to yield on Metz.[54] Later the same day he told his staff that it was certain that "we keep Metz."[55]

The final statement—and perhaps the only one that Bismarck made without concern for its political effect—was that which he wrote his wife: "Yesterday we finally signed (and)

[49] Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[50] Abeken, *op. cit.*, letter of February 26.

[51] *Aus Kaiser Friedrichs Tagebuch*, entry for February 26.

[52] Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

[53] Abeken, *op. cit.*, letter of February 26, 1871; Bismarck, "Politische Schriften," p. 706; cf. Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, I, 123.

In Paris on the evening of the same day, Thiers told the advisory committee of representatives of the National Assembly that "Metz was lost" but that he planned to put up a battle for Belfort (Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 85).

[54] Lorenz, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

[55] The statements that Busch adds as presumably paraphrases of Bismarck's commentary are significant in their discussion of points previously never mentioned: "One would otherwise have had to give up large parts of Lorraine that one had in mind to secure. These parts had perhaps a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, were very fruitful, especially the Moselle Valley, and contained magnificent beds of iron ore." (Busch, *op. cit.*, entry for February 23, 1871). Whether these were points that the military urged on the Emperor we do not know, but they are not mentioned by any of the others present at headquarters who recorded their impressions of the debate. Judging from the population figure given, the statement quoted refers only to the arrondissement of Metz where the iron ore deposits were of minor importance; the great gain in iron was in the arondissement of Thionville, about which there had been no question.

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attained more than I, in my own political calculation, regard useful. But I must consider attitudes both above and below that just do *not* calculate. We take Alsace and German Lorraine, and with them also Metz, with very indigestible elements, and over 1300 million *Thaler*."[56]

For the purposes of the present study, however, it is not necessary to attempt a judgment as to what was Bismarck's final view on the desirability of annexing Metz, or whether he ever definitely made up his mind.[57]

What is certain is that through the whole period and in all the discussions, Bismarck, aside from his constantly pressing desire to bring the war to a successful end as quickly as possible, was primarily influenced by two conflicting factors: the need to strengthen the strategic position of Germany against any future French attack, and the need to keep to the minimum the number of anti-German inhabitants to be included in Germany. While he had no illusions concerning the attitude of the German-speaking inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine he shared the common view that it would be possible to win them over in time, but had little hope that this could be done with the French population.[58]

If at the end he did mention the iron ore beds as one of the advantages gained, there is no other evidence to indicate that he regarded them as important. In contrast, in every discussion of the annexation, at the time and in later years, he emphasized the need to strengthen Germany's defensive position.

Summary of the Factors Determining the Boundary in the Preliminary Treaty

It was clearly the intention of the German leaders, and the understanding of the French, that while various non-territorial

[56] Bismarck, "Briefe," *Die gesammelten Werke*, Band 14, II, 1862-1898, Berlin, 1933, p. 816.

[57] Beust, the chancellor of Austria-Hungary, quotes Bismarck as telling him that he "had personally been opposed to the annexation of Metz in view of its French population and had agreed to it only on the determined demand of the military authorities." (Bismarck, "Gespräche," II, 16.) But this was after the event, and Bismarck may have had political reasons for wishing the Austrian government to believe that this was his view.

[58] Haller states that experience showed the opposite, that the German-speaking population proved the more difficult, but he recognizes that Bismarck could not have been expected to foresee that (*op. cit.*, pp. 82 f.).

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problems remained to be negotiated after the signing of the Preliminary Treaty, the boundary line established by that treaty was to be definitive and final. A Mixed Boundary Commission was set up at once to undertake the work of demarcation in the field and was prevented from proceeding at once to that work only because of major disagreement over the meaning of a critical word in the article that had been added to the treaty to provide for the return of Belfort. Had the French accepted the German interpretation of this word, the boundary line of February 26, 1871, would in fact have been the final boundary in Lorraine.

It is therefore appropriate to summarize the evidence concerning the German intentions on the basis of what took place up to the signing of the Preliminary Treaty. What weight was given by those who determined that boundary to each of the following three factors: the strategic lowland of the Moselle bordered by the escarpment facing it on the west; the iron ores exposed in that escarpment and continuing underground for some miles farther west, together with the ironworks located at the base of the escarpment or in the stream valleys etched back into it; and the frontier of "German land" which crossed these two factors diagonally?

The evidence is in fact summarized, in most conclusive fashion, by the comparison on the map of the boundary as drawn at successive stages, with each of the factors named (Figs. 1 and 2). If one considers the line pronounced as approximate in the decree of August 21, under the condition that one was limited to using existing administrative units, the following conclusions may be drawn.

(1) Anyone whose aim was to include the strategic area based on Strasbourg, Metz, and Belfort would necessarily name exactly those districts that were named in the decree.

(2) If the concern had been primarily the nationality factor, one might have excluded two of the arrondissements named as largely French in culture, though a small part of each was German.

(3) If concerned with both factors, one would have to agree

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that the districts included involved the minimum of French area if one were to secure the full strategic aim.

(4) The inclusion of the German-speaking district of Thionville necessarily included a small but important portion of the iron area; and the inclusion, in addition, of the strategically important, though French-speaking, district of Metz necessarily resulted in giving Germany almost exactly that portion of the iron area that was in fact taken.

(5) If the major aim had been to include all the known area of iron ore and iron mills, the area to be annexed would have been described more simply in terms of the entire areas of the two departments rather than in terms of particular arrondissements within those departments.

(6) If it seemed undesirable to include such a large area of French culture, but one still wished to obtain the maximum of the iron area, one could have secured a larger number of mines and blast furnaces and a smaller number of French-speaking people by demanding Briey rather than Metz.

(7) The changes made by the Germans between August and the opening of negotiations with the French in February slightly reduced the number of French-speaking people to be annexed, eliminated two obviously inconvenient salients in the line, and notably strengthened the German control of the strategic route of the Moselle lowland, but ignored the opportunity to secure a major addition of iron land by a relatively minor change in the boundary.

(8) The opportunity to secure changes in the boundary in Lorraine in compensation for the return of Belfort was not used to secure concessions in the iron lands but rather to acquire two communes containing battlefield cemeteries.

(9) If one is to believe that the German leaders were seriously concerned with securing the iron mines and iron mills of Lorraine, one must conclude both that they were at great pains that there be no mention of this concern in any of their discussions among themselves and that they pursued their objective with extraordinary stupidity, while they were simultaneously securing with notable efficiency the objective which they had

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announced and most consistently discussed—the maximum strategic advantage.

Significance of Changes in the Boundary in the Final Treaty

German Discussion of Changes

In adding to the territorial provisions of the Preliminary Treaty the statement that the city and fortifications of Belfort should remain to France "with a radius to be determined later," both the French and German leaders appear to have supposed that this was a well-understood technical term whose precise definition could be left to the Mixed Boundary Commission. Almost immediately, however, it became apparent that the language was open to various interpretations and that the French would not feel that the fortress they had saved would be secure in terms of the minimum interpretation insisted upon by the Germans. Consequently there was opportunity for consideration of possible additional changes.

Representatives of the house of Wendel, the leading mining and manufacturing concern in Lorraine, made repeated efforts in Germany to have the line changed, presumably to the advantage of France, so that their works in Moyeuvre in the Orne Valley would not be separated from their mines on the west. The French inhabitants of the mining district in Aumetz were convinced, Laussedat reported, that these representations had aroused the cupidity of the German authorities to move the line westward, rather than eastward.[59] No doubt industrialists in the Saar area, such as Freiherr von Stumm, were able to bring their special interests to the attention of high government authorities. Quite possibly they were influential in securing the appointment of Wilhelm Hauchecorne, the author of the report on the Lorraine iron industry which we discussed previously, as one of the three German members of the Franco-German commission, charged with determining the exact delimitation and demarcation of the new boundary and the division of properties which it cut.[60]

[59] Laussedat, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 f., 47 f.; cf. Kiepert, *op. cit.*, p. 280, footnote 2.

[60] Roesler states that "the boundary set for Lorraine was decided upon by strategists after consultation with the metallurgist Stumm and the mining engineer Hauchecorne"

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Did the appointment of Hauchecorne, regardless of the source of the recommendation, indicate that the German leaders had belatedly realized the value of the iron properties and were determined to secure more than was included by the line of the Preliminary Treaty?[61] Supporting evidence for such an inference is lacking and there is no need to look for special significance in the appointment. Obviously the work of a commission to draw a boundary through an area where important mining concessions existed would require the services of someone familiar with the problems involved. The French members of the commission could presumably count on the assistance of the engineers of the mining companies in an area that had been French territory. Actually one of the commissioners, Colonel Laussedat, was trained in topography, had a keen awareness of the value of the mineral deposits, and was further assisted by an engineer who volunteered his services.

On the German side, even had no one known of Hauchecorne's report of the previous summer on the Lorraine industry, he would have been correctly judged as particularly well qualified to serve in the demarcation of a boundary through the Lorraine iron area. He had command of the French language from his youth; as mining inspector in the adjacent Saar area he had acquired some familiarity with the Lorraine properties and the French administrative system; and as Director of the Academy of Mines in Berlin he commanded high respect in his technical field. It was also natural that with the completion of the commission's work on the section of the boundary through the mining area, Hauchecorne did not continue with it in its work along the remainder of the line in Lorraine and Alsace, but returned to his administrative post in Berlin.[62]

(Roesler, *op. cit.*, p. 56), but I have not been able to find a source for this statement. Stumm, who had inherited his family's ironworks in Saarbrücken, would presumably have known Hauchecorne during the latter's service in that mining center. As a member of the Prussian *Landtag*, and a colonel in the army during the war, he would have been able to recommend Hauchecorne's name either to Bismarck or to the army authorities. But the suggestion might also have come from either the Civil Commissioner or the Military Governor of Alsace, or from government officials in Berlin who were familiar with Hauchecorne's career.

[61] Cf. Engerand, *Les Frontières Lorraine . . .*, p. 288.

[62] Friedrich Beyschlag, "Gedächtnisrede," in *Jahrbuch des Königlichen preussischen geologischen Landesanstalt und Bergakademie zu Berlin*, XXI (1900), pp. xcvii-c; Laussedat, *op. cit.* Hauchecorne was not, as some French writers assumed, a renegade Frenchman, but a descendant of a French Huguenot family long established in Berlin.

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There can be little question however that Hauchecorne made every effort in his position on the Commission to further the evident purpose of his lengthy report of the previous August, *i.e.*, to increase the portion of the Lorraine iron area to be annexed by Germany. A later reference to "the oral instructions" he had received presumably indicates that he had the opportunity to discuss the boundary question with Bismarck.[63] There is no evidence however to show that either he or any others concerned over the ore deposits were able to convince Bismarck that the deposits should be given more than secondary consideration in delimiting the boundary. In the specific instructions that Bismarck wrote for the German boundary commissioners he recommended that some minor change be made in the boundary near Thionville where "the terrain conditions favored smuggling." The French should be offered some communes (French-speaking) near Belfort in exchange. But if the French were averse to the exchange, one should not insist on it.[64] In considering such a change on the north, the commissioners were referred to a report variously described as the *Denkschrift Boeckh* or the *Boeckhsche Projekt*.[65] This would appear to have been a memorandum drawn up by Boeckh, with the assistance of the geographer Kiepert, recommending changes in the line that would bring back into Germany "a number of insecure pieces of land whose German character was on the road to disappearance."[66]

Confirmation of this purpose is to be found in Bismarck's explanation of the concession made in the Belfort area and

[63] The communications between the German members of the Commission and Bismarck have been published by Hans Goldschmidt in *Bismarck und die Friedensunterhändler, 1871: Die deutschfranzösischen Friedensverhandlungen zu Brüssel und Frankfurt, März-Dezember 1871*, Berlin, 1929, reference on p. 78.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 49. This clearly disproves Laussedat's suggestion, followed by some later French writers, that Bismarck had intentionally made the radius from Belfort indefinite in the preliminaries of peace so that he might have a basis for bargaining for additional territory in Lorraine. Nothing is clearer from the record than the fact that Bismarck was anxious to have the definitive treaty signed as soon as possible.

[65] Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[66] To quote only the smaller part of Kiepert's sentence: "einige unsichere Parcellen . . . deren Zurückerwerbung den von Boeckh und mir betreffenden Ortes für die Grenzlinie gemachten Vorschlägen entsprechend durchgesetz wurde," from "Der Sprachgrenze in Elsass-Lothringen," p. 308. No doubt the contents of that memorandum was foreshadowed in the press articles which Kiepert notes that he and Boeckh published late in February, 1871.

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the change made in the northern part of the line, in his address to the Reichstag of May 12: "It was desirable for us to secure a few communes along the northern boundary near Thionville in which German was spoken, in part exclusively, in part predominantly."[67]

Hauchecorne, however, was not content with the additional territory recommended in the Boeckh project and was given an opportunity to ask for more by the French demands for territory to be included under the term "radius from Belfort." These exceeded, not merely the minimum area that Bismarck recognized as included under the term, but also the additional area he was prepared to grant in exchange for the strip in the north included in the Boeckh project. A communication signed by the German members of the commission therefore reported that "since, according to the instructions that had been given orally to *Bergrat* Hauchecorne, material considerations even somewhat beyond the Boeckh project can also be determinants in the territorial exchange, the following circumstances have been taken into consideration. Close outside the Boeckh boundary line are to be found rich ore beds in which concessions had previously been granted, from the French, to German industrialists. If the latter are not to lose these, the winning of the communes concerned . . . is necessary" (omission is by Goldschmidt). Their report requested instructions as to "what value is to be placed on the land to be won in the north and how far that overweighs the considerations that come to mind in making concessions in the south."[68] There is no record of an answer from Bismarck to his boundary commissioners, presumably because the negotiations at Brussels, having bogged down over other, nonterritorial, questions, were abandoned in favor of a direct meeting between Bismarck and the French foreign minister at Frankfort.

It appears clear that during these two months of negotiations through the Commissioners, Bismarck regarded any change in the boundary in Lorraine as of minor importance and that if any change was to be made, he was following not Hauchecorne's

[67] Quoted in full in Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 323.
[68] Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 78 f.

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urgings, but the proposals that had been drawn up by Boeckh and Kiepert, primarily on the basis of the linguistic division, secondarily to eliminate the difficult salient west of Thionville.[69]

Determination of the Boundary in the Final Treaty

In his first proposals to the French at Frankfurt, Bismarck appears to have gone somewhat beyond the Boeckh line, presumably on the recommendation of Hauchecorne and the other boundary commissioners (the easternmost line on Fig. 2).[70] In exchange for the territory sought by the French around Belfort, he demanded in the north a strip of land averaging about four miles in width, extending almost from the Franco-Belgian-Luxemburg corner south some 16 miles, nearly to the Orne Valley at Moyeuvre. The effect of this change would have been to give Germany all the area called "German land" on the ground that it had been German-speaking in previous centuries, though only a small part was thought still to be predominantly German. It also included two or three small districts recognized as entirely French. Almost all the area had valuable ore deposits. It did not however include the Chiers Valley, with its concentration of iron works at Longwy.[71]

[69] Kiepert had not only pointed out the difficulties this irregular salient would make in the control of smuggling but also noted correctly that it would leave to France a portion of the bluffs overlooking Thionville by nearly 700 feet, at a distance of five miles, a fact that appears to have been overlooked or ignored when Moltke's "green line" was drawn in the fall of 1870.

[70] The following discussion is based on the very detailed description by Colonel Laussedat (a member for France of the boundary commission who was at Frankfort as adviser to the French representatives) based on full notes taken at the time and on a copy of the map Bismarck showed the French, on which Laussedat indicated clearly the specific proposals (*op. cit.*, pp. 39-51). Jules Favre's account of the boundary discussions at Frankfort is far from complete and in part inaccurate (*Government de la Défense Nationale,* Pt. 3, Paris, 1875, pp. 372 f.). The lines on Laussedat's map have been compared with the data on language given by Boeckh and Kiepert and with three maps published successively in *Petermann's Mitteilungen,* 1870, Tafel 22; 1871, Tafel 8 and Tafel 15.

[71] Nor did it quite eliminate French contact with Luxemburg. Whether the German leaders regarded it as significant to cut the connections between France and Luxemburg is not known. Ignoring Kiepert's suggestion of the danger of French desires to annex Luxemburg, the leader of the German members of the boundary commission, General von Stranz, may well have known of complaints made by the military during the war that French soldiers had used Luxemburg as a route of escape from the German forces back into France and that the French in Metz had been supplied, at night, with provisions from Luxemburg. Bismarck himself had sent a formal note of complaint to the Grand Duchy (quoted in Hahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-181). On the French side certainly, Colonel Laussedat regarded this separation as a serious handicap, presumably from the military point of view. For economic purposes, Bismarck appears intentionally to have left a small bit of common boundary,

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Whatever may have been Bismarck's purpose in making his first proposal, strong French opposition, apparently based on statements drafted by Colonel Laussedat, led him to make three consecutive concessions in as many days. The line proposed on the basis of the first two concessions—with a minor exception the final line—was probably in major part based on the original Boeckh memorandum. Kiepert, subsequently described this line as one that would "correspond to the natural terrain," a line "along the heights which here form the divide between the Meuse and the Moselle, almost coinciding with the [former] language boundary, so that the surfaces and valleys sloping to the Moselle and its tributary, the Alsitz, including particularly the deep-cut valley of the Fensch to its source in the [French-speaking] village of Fontoy, would be left in their natural association with the Moselle Valley."[72]

The areas thus conceded by Bismarck restored to France nearly half the length of the common frontier with Luxemburg, approximately five miles, as well as valuable ore properties and villages that had once been German-speaking but had become largely French-speaking. On the other hand, a few purely French communes, in the central and southern part of the strip, including the valuable ore properties of Aumetz, were added to Germany. Kiepert argued subsequently that this was necessary to provide a relatively straight boundary,[73] but study of the local map does not fully support this supposition.

The acquisition of Aumetz and one neighboring commune represents probably the maximum result of all the efforts made by Hauchecorne, during the year 1870-71, to persuade the German authorities to secure a larger part of the Lorraine iron area.

In a dispatch to the foreign office and to the Emperor, intended to secure acceptance of this presumably final compromise, Bismarck refers to the strip in general as including "rich iron deposits."[74] But if the French refused to give up this

about half a mile, just where the valley of the Chiers offered a possible route, a route which was in fact later used for the construction of rail and highway connection.

[72] H. Kiepert, "Der Gebietsaustausch zwischen Deutchland und Frankreich in Folge des Frankfurter Friedens," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, VI (1871), 274.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

[74] From Bismarck's dispatches published in *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, in "Auftrage des Auswartigen Amtes," Berlin, 1922, Bd. I (1871-1877),

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strip and accepted the smaller area around Belfort, Bismarck would abandon the effort to change the boundary in the north rather than permit another breakdown in the settlement.[75]

Finally, at the last minute, the French minister of finance, Pouyer-Quertier, who was carrying on negotiations for the foreign minister, won from Bismarck as "a personal concession" the valuable commune of Villerupt with its ironworks located in the upper valley of the Alsitz; these works were therefore on the eastern or German side of the divide emphasized in Kiepert's discussion and in very close proximity to the mines and industries farther down the Alsitz, but were distinctly separated from the nearest developments on the French side.[76]

Change Made by the Treaty

The extra strip of territory thus conceded in the final treaty signed by the French representatives—in return for what was granted them around Belfort—consisted of twelve communes, of which the Germans regarded all but two or three as German in character, though they recognized that most of them had become predominantly French in speech.[77] It seems more than

dispatch of May 9, 1871. The Emperor's annotation on this point in the telegram is significant, not only for his own thinking, but, according to the German editors in 1922, for that of many others in Germany: "u(nd) Mars la Tour?" Mars la Tour was a commune immediately west of Vionville in the southwestern salient of the arrondissement of Metz, a part of the field of battle of August 16, 1870 (Mars la Tour-Vionville-Rezonville). Like Vionville it had been excluded by the alteration in the boundary made by the "green line" of February 21, 1871, but unlike Vionville had not been regained by the modification of that line made in the Preliminary Treaty. A Prussian cavalry division had lost over half its numbers there in an heroic sacrifice. Its addition, however would have notably lengthened the peninsular projection of the boundary at Vionville.

[75] *Ibid*, dispatch of May 8, 1871.

[76] This story has repeatedly been told as an example of the success of Norman wit in gaining points in diplomatic bargaining. Bismarck having stated that he would make no further territorial concessions, Pouyer-Quertier, a Norman who had planned his little stratagem overnight, said: "If you were the conquered party, I give you my word that I would not have forced you to become a Frenchman, and here you are making me a German." "How can that be?" said Bismarck, "Who is talking of taking your Normandy? I don't understand you at all." "It's very simple, Prince. I am one of the principal shareholders in the forges of Villerupt, and you see clearly that, in this quarter, you make me a German." "Well, well," said Bismarck, "don't weep about it. I leave you Villerupt; but do not ask for anything more, or I shall take it back again." (From the original account of the story by Laussedat, *op. cit.*, p. 51.) If Pouyer-Quertier gained a valuable point on this exchange, Bismarck could feel that he had finally got what he wanted—namely, a definite end to French requests for further concessions; after this exchange, he could properly expect Pouyer-Quertier to end the discussions and sign on the dotted line.

[77] Kiepert estimated in 1871 that of the total population involved (7,000) one-fourth were German-speaking (*op. cit.*, p. 280); on the basis of the official count taken subse-

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likely that had the French argued from the start, in these discussions at Frankfort, for a line approximating the linguistic boundary, they might have persuaded Bismarck, who was handling the negotiations essentially alone and without reference to the military,[78] to give up a larger share of the iron-ore area than they actually did secure.

Finally, if we grant that concern for the iron ore was one of several factors influencing the minor change made at Frankfort in the boundary in Lorraine, this change was not final. Because the French ministers claimed to have no authority to cede any additional French territory, and Bismarck wished to avoid any further delay, he inserted in the treaty an unusual clause that left to France, and France alone, the final decision whether to cede the additional strip in Lorraine in return for the larger area they wanted around Belfort, or to return to the line in Lorraine as established in the Preliminary Treaty and accept the minimum area around Belfort.

That there was a real possibility that France might accept the latter alternative, and thus completely nullify all the efforts of Boeckh, Kiepert, Hauchecorne and any industrialists interested in the iron ores, was demonstrated by the bitter debate on the question when the treaty came to the French National Assembly for decision.[79] The assembly was made fully aware of the loss in iron resources that was involved. The technical military commission appointed to consider the proposed exchange reported against accepting it, and two of the five generals who were members of the assembly strongly opposed it, in spite of the recognized strategic importance of Belfort. On the other hand, a member supporting the government insisted, "if Prussia acquires the ores estimated as indispensable for the factories it takes from us, we on our side retain the ore beds necessary for our fabrication."[80] Thiers, as head of the government, likewise argued that "what remains to us of these riches

quently, he concluded in his second article that only one-ninth were German-speaking, and only two communes, isolated in the extreme northwest, had a German majority (*op. cit.*, p. 309 and map).

[78] Haller, *op. cit.*, p. 92 footnote.

[79] Described by Laussedat, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-47; and particularly by Favre, *op. cit.*, pp. 404-20, 577-90.

[80] Favre, *op. cit.*, p. 581.

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is more than sufficient for the needs of our national work";[81] further, he claimed that the importance of the iron resources of Lorraine had been greatly exaggerated, since France had valuable iron deposits in other parts of the country. But Belfort, which he claimed to have wrested from the Germans in the difficult negotiations at Versailles, could be effectively secured only if France had command of sufficient territory surrounding it. After somewhat acrimonious debate, the assembly voted to accept the exchange.[82]

Demarcation of the Boundary

Hauchecorne's efforts to secure the maximum area of the ore field were resumed in the work of the boundary commission in the field. Having succeeded in securing in the treaty the mines of the purely French-speaking commune of Auschwitz, he endeavored to extend that area, on the basis of an omission in the text of the treaty, to include the adjacent commune of Crusnes, though that had been generally understood to have been left to France.[83] His German colleagues, however, did not support him in the face of Colonel Laussedat's opposition. The latter has described how Hauchecorne contended for the land, foot by foot—and, one may add, how he, Laussedat, opposed such efforts with no less tenacity, and apparently with success.[84]

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 431.

[82] Many French writers since have criticised Thiers not only for his underestimate of the importance of the Lorraine ores, but also because he as a civilian placed greater importance on the enlargement of the area around Belfort than did the military commission. But Haller's criticism of Bismarck for underestimating the military importance of Belfort, as demonstrated in the first World War, would appear to justify Thiers' judgment. Certainly the difference in the exact location of the boundary on the plateau west of the Moselle escarpment had little effect either on military tactics or on military potential as based on iron resources: during peacetime the two countries used ore from the same mines, and early in World War I the Germans conquered the entire area and utilized all its resources.

[83] Laussedat, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 ff.; compare the maps published immediately after the ratification of the treaty in *Petermann's Mitteilungen* (1871), Tafel 15, and in Kiepert, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI.

[84] We are dependent entirely on Laussedat's detailed account, written in 1887 (though not published until 1901) on the basis of a diary kept meticulously during the negotiations. Though Hauchecorne was the author of scores of technical papers in geology and engineering and was one of the co-directors of the International Geological Map of Europe, he appears never to have published a word concerning the work in which he left his mark on the political map of Europe and for which he was awarded the Iron Cross. The numerous memorials published at the time of his death refer to this work only in broad generalizations —including the somewhat exaggerated phrase of one writer who called him a *Mehrer des Reichs*. One wishes that he had written his side of the story, for it is hard to find the man described by Laussedat in any of the memorials written by his colleagues in Germany.

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Summary of Significance of the Final Changes

That those in Germany who were concerned about the iron area were able to have any influence on the change in the boundary originally determined upon was due to the coincidence of a number of unrelated circumstances.

Of these the first was the fact that the boundary drawn to include the strategic valley of the Moselle happened to pass through the iron-mining district, which made it desirable to have a mining expert attached to the boundary commission. Whether the fact that the engineer chosen was one who in the previous year had prepared a report evidently intended to influence the government to secure the maximum of the ore field, represented the success of efforts of interested parties, or was a matter of mere chance is not known. In any case, little could have been accomplished had it not been for the great concern of the French government to make the most of the concession of Belfort which it had won at Versailles and the uncertainty of meaning of the hastily written clause describing but not defining that concession. Further, the only location where Germany could seek territorial compensation in other than purely French territory happened to be in the ore field, where the linguistic boundary ran a few miles west of the political line proviously chosen for convenience, namely the western boundary of the arrondissement of Thionville. Finally, the existence of an unsuitable salient in this boundary clearly called for rectification.

Results of the Division of the Field

The end result of the annexation, in terms of the mining development of the time, was that Germany had apparently taken somewhat less than half of the Lorraine deposits then being worked. France retained a major part of the main field as well as the minor basin around Nancy. In 1873, when production first reached the prewar peak of 1869, French Lorraine produced half again as much as Lorraine Annexée; in fact the French portion of the northern field produced more than the portion annexed to Germany.[85] The production in French Lor-

[85] Production figures from Robert Parisot, *Histoire de Lorraine*, Paris, 1924, p. 68; and from Roesler, *op. cit.*, p. 56. The *Moniteur des intérêts matériels* estimated, in April 1871,

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raine continued to exceed that in Lorraine Annexée until 1885.[86] The introduction of the Thomas-Gilchrist process in 1878, which made it feasible to use the minette ores for steel production, led to the exploitation of enormous deposits previously regarded as of little or no value. These were largely in the Briey basin, on both sides of the boundary. Because of the dip of the beds, westward, the deposits in France were at lower depths and development there took place more slowly though the total resources were much greater. By the outbreak of the first World War, the trend in production indicated that output in French Lorraine would shortly surpass that in Lorraine Annexée.[87]

Germany was more fortunate in respect to the location of blast furnaces and rolling mills, of which many, particularly the larger ones, were situated in the valley of the Moselle. Germany acquired somewhat over half the number of blast furnaces of the northern field, with perhaps a larger proportion of the total productive capacity, together with the most important fabricating plants.[88] The industry however was in process of rapid development so that it was not long before new works were built on the French side of the line, both in the Longwy basin and, later, in the Briey basin along the valley of the Orne, immediately west of the new frontier.[89]

Finally, in considering the results of the boundary location, one should not assume that a difference of the international boundary by a few miles, shifting the political location of iron production from one country to the other, would necessarily have made a difference in the economic situation of the two

that the area annexed accounted for three-fourths of the production of the northern field, over half of the total for Lorraine; but this estimate was based on the production figures of 1867, "Influence de la cession de l'Alsace-Lorraine . . ." p. 243. Apparently the rapid increase in development by 1869 had been concentrated in the Longwy district.

[86] Roesler, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Engerand, *Les Frontières Lorraine . . .*, p. 301; "Influence de la cession de l'Alsace-Lorraine . . .," p. 242. The data in the latter reference requires correction because the author, writing in April 1871, understood that Villerupt would go to Germany. With this correction his data show that Germany secured blast furnaces which in 1867 produced two-thirds of the entire pig iron production of Lorraine, perhaps a somewhat smaller proportion in 1869.

[89] Alfred H. Brooks and Morris F. La Croix, *The Iron and Associated Industries of Lorraine, the Sarre District, Luxemburg, and Belgium*, U. S. Geological Survey Bulletin 703, 1920, Plate I.

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countries. During the period 1871-1914 there was relatively free interchange of iron ore and pig iron between the three political components of the ore area—Lorraine Annexée, French Lorraine, and Luxemburg. On the balance, the French part exported nearly one-tenth of its total iron production to the German Customs Union.[90] At the outbreak of the first World War, the German forces marched promptly westward to take over the entire field and had full use of it throughout the war. Even after the first World War, in the 1930's when economic nationalism tended to diminish the freedom of trade across the boundary, the iron and steel industry of the Saar, after its return to Germany, continued to get all its iron ore from Lorraine, then entirely in France.

Conclusion

The verbal evidence found in the records of the discussions at the time, among the Germans and between them and the French, confirms the evidence from the maps of the boundary as drawn at various stages between August 1870 and May 1871. It is submitted that this evidence is more than ample to justify the following conclusions concerning the relative importance of the several factors involved in the area affected by the western boundary of Lorraine.

The dominant positive factor was the strategic concern to secure the fortress of Metz and the control of the Moselle route from Metz through Thionville toward Luxemburg and the Rhine. For the military authorities this was the all-important consideration. It was likewise of great concern to Bismarck and was widely understood in Germany as a major purpose of the war.

The German public was perhaps equally, if not more, concerned to secure the incorporation in the new Germany of all the "German land" of France. Bismarck tended to scoff at this nationalistic motive but was concerned over its opposite: he was disturbed at the addition in the new Reich of areas whose populations would remain intransigently opposed to annexation and presumed that this would be much more true of

[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

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French-speaking areas than of areas then German-speaking or which had until recently been German-speaking. In this he was supported by the Crown Prince and perhaps by representatives of some of the lesser German states.

There is no evidence that any of the responsible German authorities gave serious thought to the iron ore deposits and associated iron industries. They are not mentioned in any of the numerous accounts read of the question as to whether or not to include Metz, with the single exception of a comment by Bismarck after the decision had been made—a comment that indicates he was not entirely ignorant of the existence of the ore deposits and threw them in as an additional argument over and above the decisive argument of strategy. Similarly the only other time the Iron Chancellor mentioned the iron resources was just before the final decision in Frankfort, justifying a tactical concession he was making at Belfort by reference to rich iron deposits in the strip to be received in exchange in Lorraine. The reaction of the Emperor to this was to ask about a military cemetery. On the other hand, full information concerning the location and value of the iron resources and industry had been presented to government authorities as early as August 1870, and in all probability representations concerning its importance were subsequently made by leading industrialists. With the appointment of the Director of the Mining Academy in Berlin, a mining engineer personally familiar with the iron industry of Lorraine, to the boundary commission which took active part in the discussions over the determination of the final boundary line, the iron interest was strongly but belatedly represented.

Any boundary line drawn to meet the needs of any one of these three interests would inevitably meet part, but not all, of the needs of the other two. A line drawn with only the strategic and tactical considerations in mind had to include the bluffs bordering the Moselle Valley on the west and with them a part, but only a part, of the iron area. Such a line included nearly all of the "German land" but, in addition, necessarily included a major area of purely French culture around Metz.

A boundary determined primarily in terms of supposed na-

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tional character, broadly interpreted to include all the area that had been German-speaking until the previous century, would have included a slightly greater proportion of the iron resources than the line dictated by strategic considerations. The exclusion of Metz of course would make such a line unacceptable to the strategists.

A boundary drawn to include all of the iron resources, exclusive of the Nancy Basin, would have involved only a minor change, in the northwest, of the line dictated by strategic considerations. If strategic considerations had been held secondary and the political argument against inclusion of large numbers of French had been weighted heavily, the major French-speaking area in Metz and the Chateau-Salins could have been excluded with but minor subtraction of iron resources, whereas the change of the line in the northwest to include the important Longwy district would have added a much smaller number of French population.

The first line determined by the Germans represented the closest approximation to the line needed for strategic reasons that could be defined in terms of existing political divisions in France. In omitting the district of Nancy it excluded an area of secondary importance, both as a strategic center and as an iron district, presumably because of the purely French character of the area. In excluding the western arrondissement, Briey, of the department of Moselle, it left out an area of little strategic importance but which included nearly half of the main ore field, again in recognition of the purely French character of the district. Of the ore area included for Germany, the main part was in the German-speaking district of Thionville, a lesser part in French-speaking Metz, the district of greatest strategic concern.

The changes made in this first approximation during the following months, as marked by the "green line" presented as the German demand to the French at Versailles, improved the strategic and tactical value of the line and its utility as an international boundary for both sides, reduced considerably the amount of French area included, and added a very small amount of iron land.

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The major disagreement over this line among the German authorities was based on the conflict between strategic interests and political interests, focused on Metz and Belfort. The question of Metz was decided by the Emperor in favor of the strategic interests, with little or no mention of the iron resources involved. Belfort was reckoned as of lesser strategic value and that question was decided, in view of French pressure, in favor of the political interest. Compensation for this concession however was sought not in terms of further extension into the iron area but in terms of military cemeteries.

The portion of the ore-beds that was later to prove most productive, that lying beneath the plateau farther back from the escarpment, was divided by the boundary with the greater part left in France, not because its potential value seemed doubtful, which may have been a fact, but rather because of three factors independent of the iron ore: the population on the surface was French-speaking; the strategic concern did not extend beyond the margin of the bluffs; and the former arrondissement boundaries happened to run near the edge of the bluffs.

The specific concern for the iron of Lorraine became a factor influencing the location of the boundary only in the final stages of its determination, after it had been presumed to be fixed, and then only because of the French concern for the security of Belfort. Even then it was but one of several factors and actually determined the result in not more than three communes—two which might have remained in France but went to Germany, and one that would have gone to Germany but remained in France.

In sum, in determining the location of the Franco-German boundary of 1871, the concern for the iron of Lorraine was about equal in importance to the concern for military cemeteries. Germany secured a major part of the iron area chiefly because strategic considerations dictated the inclusion of the cuesta overlooking the Moselle that contained a considerable part of the iron resources; it took only this part and not the whole field because the remaining area was purely French in character.

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MICRONESIA – A CHANGING FRONTIER

By KARL J. PELZER

DEPENDENT areas under American administration have always been a heavy financial burden on the American taxpayer. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, comprising the whole of Micronesia except Guam, will certainly prove no exception. That Micronesia will prove an economic liability is, however, less important than the possibility that it will also be a heavy political liability.

The humanitarian conscience of the Western world would in any case be quick to enforce its highest standard upon a rich government like that of the United States. A country striving to assert leadership in the development of backward areas all over the world will itself wish to meet these standards in its sole trust territory. However, the material well-being of the Micronesians when under Japanese rule, the great devastation wrought by the war, and the predominantly strategic interests so far dominant in the United States policy in the area—all will make it difficult even for a benevolent American administration to win the approval of the Micronesians. For it to make a record there which will help it in its struggle to win the confidence of colonial peoples elsewhere will be even more difficult.

No tropical dependency has changed hands so frequently during a period of six decades as has Micronesia, now officially known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Micronesians sixty years of age have experienced the impacts of Spanish, German, Japanese and, most recently, of American rule on their own lives. No two colonial powers have had the same motivation, the same interests, pursued the same policy, or had the same attitude toward the Micronesians. No wonder that this succession of colonial rulers, each imposing its own values and administrative procedures, often without consideration of Micronesian culture, has at times been confusing to the Micronesians.

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Micronesia consists of three island groups, the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas. It lies north of the equator between the meridians 130° East and 180° and comprises an estimated three million square miles. This territory, approximately the size of the United States, has a total land area of only about 700 square miles, scattered over ninety-six island units, which are either clusters of small islands or rather small isolated single islands. The islands of Micronesia are of two types, the so-called "low" coral islands and the "high" volcanic islands. The Marshalls are all low islands, whereas Truk, for example, is a combination of high volcanic islands surrounded by an enormous barrier reef.

The indigenous population of the trust territory is about 50,000. Three-fifths of the Micronesians live on the islands or island groups of Majuro in the Marshalls, Kusaie, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and Palau in the Carolines, and Saipan in the Marianas. The peoples of the Marianas, known as Chamorros, differ considerably from the other Micronesians in that they are mostly of a mixed ancestry resulting from the intermarriage of Spanish, Filipino, Mexican, and, to a lesser degree, German and Japanese immigrants with local peoples. The population of the Marshalls and of the Carolines is, on the whole, more homogeneous, although here too we find families of mixed ancestry, who are often socially and politically of considerable influence. The peoples of Micronesia differ greatly from island group to island group in their culture, but within an island group we often observe a remarkable homogeneity, as, for instance, in the Marshalls. The culture of the various Micronesian groups has undergone both material and ideological changes, but there are considerable differences in the degree to which the acculturation process has been effective. Such differences are especially noticeable from island group to island group, as for instance between Yap and Palau or between Palau and Truk, but they can also be observed within a single island group, such as Truk.[1]

A comparison of the colonial policies and activities of Spain,

[1] In 1946, the writer spent several months on Truk and had ample occasion to observe these differences. They seem to depend in no small measure on the geographic location of the communities in relation to the administrative centers. The nearer the community is to the administrative center the greater is the acculturation process.

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Germany, Japan, and the United States brings out the fact that Micronesia has had a different significance for each successive power.

A Missionary's Frontier

Although Spain considered all of Micronesia as her sphere of interest from the time of its discovery in the sixteenth century,[2] only the Marianas came under effective Spanish rule and then not until the second half of the seventeenth century. They served as a way station on the galleon route between Acapulco and Manila. Until 1815 the Marianas were administered as part of the Viceroyalty of Mexico. After that date the representative of the Spanish crown in Manila administered the Marianas. The Carolines and the Marshalls were also regarded as a part of Spanish possessions in the Pacific, but they remained virtually independent until 1874, when Spain became alarmed over German and British expansion in the Pacific and formally proclaimed her sovereignty over the Carolines. Germany, supported by Great Britain, protested against this proclamation, pointing out that Spain had no representatives in the islands. The dispute was submitted to Pope Leo XIII, who confirmed the Spanish claim to sovereignty but stipulated that Spain would have to maintain an orderly government in the Carolines and to protect all western traders. During the period from 1886 to 1898 Spain endeavored to establish her rule over the Carolines, but she was only partly successful in Ponape and in the Palaus.

Spain's interests in Micronesia were rather limited; the centers of her economic activities were located west and east of these islands, in the Philippines and in the New World. Besides serving as a stop-over point on the galleon route, the Marianas were primarily a missionary's frontier. Spain never seriously attempted to utilize the economic resources of Micronesia, yet, with her customary religious zeal, she did not rest until the Chamorros had been completely converted to Catholicism. The Spaniards applied the same colonization techniques in Micronesia that they used in the New World and

[2] Guam, for example, was discovered by Magellan in 1520; Palau was discovered by Villalobos in 1543.

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in the Philippines. The Laws of the Indies were extended to the Marianas. The Chamorros were compelled to give up their custom of living scattered in isolated farmsteads and small hamlets and were brought together in villages organized around a Catholic church, where it was relatively easy for the Catholic priest to guard over his community. Spanish Jesuits were in charge of the missions in the Marianas from 1668 to 1769, when they were replaced by Augustinians, who remained in Guam until 1899.[3] The Spanish missionaries succeeded in suppressing much of the old Chamorro religion and in introducing new beliefs and religious practices, which took the place of the old ways. But it seems that although the Catholic Church has become powerful as an institution it was not able to eradicate such deep-rooted practices as magic, traditional methods of treating sickness, or beliefs regarding death and ancestral ghosts.

A Trader's Frontier

Germany's interests in Micronesia were primarily of an economic and more specifically of a trading nature. In the middle of the 1860's German traders came to the Marshalls and the Carolines to exchange consumer goods for copra.

Germany established a protectorate over the Marshall islands in 1885 and purchased the Carolines as well as the Marianas—with the exception of Guam—from Spain in 1899. From that year on the political history of Micronesia is the same, except for Guam, which has been an American possession since 1898. Germany attached Micronesia administratively to her possessions in New Guinea and controlled it until the beginning of World War I.

The chief German trading center in the Marshalls was at Jaluit, from which the Jaluit Co. took its name. This company was formed in 1888 by a merger of three private German firms trading in the area. In its desire to keep administrative costs down to a minimum the German government

[3] It is interesting to note that Spanish Capuchin monks carried on the tradition of Spanish Catholicism from 1901 on. According to Laura Thompson, the Spanish padres "were propagating in prewar Guam a southern European type of Catholicism and culture," a fact which slowed down the Americanization of Guam. Laura Thompson, *Guam and Its People,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 186.

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entered into an agreement with the Jaluit Co. under which the latter assumed responsibility for any deficit in return for the right to claim all unoccupied land and to exploit any guano or phosphate deposits found in the Marshalls. Although the Jaluit Co. expanded its activities into the Marianas and the Carolines, it did not obtain the monopoly there that it had in the Marshalls. This so-called Marshalls System guaranteeing the Jaluit Co. great advantages drew protests from Great Britain, as a result of which it was abolished in 1906.

During the German period Micronesia was a trader's frontier. Missionary activities were definitely of secondary importance and not always favored by officialdom. On the other hand the administrators were determined to expand the copra trade, and brought pressure to bear on Micronesian communities to enlarge their copra production. Every adult male was obliged to plant eight coconut palms per year. Everywhere coconut groves became more numerous and extensive as the Micronesians, especially on the larger high islands, cleared the forest and planted palms. The only other resource utilized during the German period was the phosphate of Angaur.

The number of German nationals always remained very small, consisting largely of employees of the trading companies and government officials, whose number never exceeded twenty-five for all of Micronesia. In addition, there was a handful of individuals who settled down, married Micronesian women, and carried on as small independent traders or worked as agents for some large trading company.

Germany applied the system of indirect rule, utilizing Micronesian chiefs to administer the islands. The chief task of the German administrators was to supervise the activities of the chiefs, to suppress warfare between island communities, and to foster copra production. Micronesians generally remember the German period favorably because the Germans interfered much less than the Japanese with their traditional ways and because they initiated the copra trade and stimulated copra production, which became the basis for a higher standard of living and enabled the Micronesians to acquire consumer goods previously unknown to them.

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Strategic and Settlement Frontier For Japan

Japan, having become keenly aware of the potential strategic value of Micronesia, lost no time in occupying the German possessions north of the equator in October 1914. She met with no resistance, since Germany had no military forces in the islands. Japan's next move was to obtain British, French, and Russian commitments to support her claim to Micronesia in the final peace settlement. These secret agreements strengthened Japan's position in Paris, but she was not able to reach her goal without compromise. Instead of being permitted to annex Micronesia outright, as she had expected, Japan was able to keep Micronesia only by accepting a mandate over the islands from the Principal Allied and Associate Powers, in whose favor Germany had renounced all rights over her former overseas possessions. On December 17, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations confirmed the mandate. The terms of the "C" mandate gave Japan "full power of administration and legislation over the territory . . . as an integral part of the Empire of Japan," but in return Japan was obliged (1) to promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants; (2) to prohibit slavery, traffic in arms and ammunition, and the sale of alcoholic beverages to native inhabitants; (3) to refrain from building fortifications and military bases or from giving military training to the inhabitants; (4) to permit freedom of worship and missionary activity; (5) to submit an annual accounting to the League of Nations.

This political setback was chiefly the result of determined American opposition to the demands for annexation of German territory expressed by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The United States did not agree to the Japanese mandate until after the Washington Conference. The limitations to which Japan was subjected must have come as a severe blow to her naval planners since the clause against fortifications of "C" mandates considerably decreased the strategic value of Micronesia to Japan. This was completely offset, however, by the American concession not to strengthen or increase the fortifications or naval bases in the Philippines, Guam, the Aleutian Islands or any other American possession in the Pacific, except Hawaii, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone.

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Although Japan left the League of Nations in 1935, she kept Micronesia and continued to report to the Mandate Commission until 1938. After that she treated it as a closed military area.

During the 1920's and 1930's it was repeatedly rumored that Japan was fortifying the major islands in violation of the terms of the mandate. Up until 1938 Japanese representatives denied such accusations during hearings of the Mandate Commission. Evidence which has become available since Japan's surrender supports the Japanese contention that she did not violate the terms of the mandate, at least until 1938.

Remembering the reputation that Truk possessed in the United States during the early days of the war, when it was considered to be the strongest naval base in the Pacific next to Pearl Harbor, I questioned both Trukese and European missionaries regarding the date of construction of military installations in Truk during the course of an economic survey in 1946. All informants agreed that military preparations, even on a small scale, did not begin until early 1940 and that the construction of fortifications did not start until either late 1940 or early 1941. I was able to determine the date of construction of airfields because it involved the transfer of communities holding the land needed for such fields. There was not a single airfield in operation in Truk by December 1941, except for a commercial seaplane base on Dublon island. During the war three airstrips and one combined seaplane base and airstrip were constructed in Truk.

A team of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey assigned to Truk came to the conclusion that Japan observed the restrictions against fortifications so long as she was in the League, and even upon withdrawing from the League she "apparently made no attempt to fortify Truk although at the same time she made every effort to develop a Navy which would use Truk as its advanced base."[4] Fortunately for Japan Truk provided a perfect natural anchorage inside its lagoon and could serve as an advanced base without any improvements either to the natural defenses or to the anchorage.

[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Reduction of Truk*, Washington, 1947, p. 2.

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The Japanese Navy organized the Fourth Fleet on November 15, 1939, and charged it with the mission of protecting Micronesia. Truk, on account of its central location and its excellent anchorage, was chosen as location for Fourth Fleet headquarters. The Fourth Fleet commanded (a) the Fourth Base Force at Truk, charged with the control of naval garrisons and installations in the Carolines, (b) the Fifth Base Force at Saipan in charge of all the Marianas, and (c) the Sixth Base Force at Kwajalein in charge of the Marshalls.

From the above it becomes apparent that Japan did not attempt to strengthen the natural strategic value of Micronesia until late 1939 or early 1940. However, the development of air power and the use of land-based airplanes in naval warfare gave Micronesia a strategic value that had not been foreseen in 1920. The use of the islands as "stationary aircraft carriers" did not involve the costly installations that are entailed in the construction of first class naval bases.[5]

From the Micronesian point of view the economic development of the islands under Japanese rule is more important than the question of the strategic value of the islands to Japan. After 1920 Micronesia changed from a trader's into a settler's frontier. The Japanese were not content with the limited trading activity that had been carried on by the Germans; instead they carefully analysed the resources and proceeded to develop them intensively. Geographic proximity, population pressure in Japan, an ample supply of manpower accustomed to a low standard of living, a demand at home for every kind of product available in the islands, and a desire to develop a market for Japanese goods all made for a type of economic activity that neither Spain nor Germany had even contemplated.

It is true that Micronesia could not make a really important contribution to the economy of Japan. The economic potential of the islands is limited; but Japan made the fullest possible use of this limited potential by bringing in settlers and by investing substantial sums of capital.

Wherever there was unutilized land suitable for agricultural development roads were built to open the area for Japanese

[5] For a discussion of the limitations of "unsinkable aircraft carriers" see Bernard Brodie, *A Guide to Naval Strategy*, 3rd ed., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 228-229.

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settlers. Extensive tracts were cleared and planted with sugar cane on the thinly populated islands of Saipan, Rota, and Tinian in the Marianas, during the 1920's. The sugar industry employed Japanese immigrants as tenant farmers. During the 1930's the Marianas continued to occupy the key position in Micronesian economy, but Palau, Truk, Ponape, and Kusaie were also developed.

At the outbreak of the war the Japanese civilian population considerably outnumbered the Micronesians, and it is known that the Japanese had ambitious plans of further expanding the size of the Japanese community in Micronesia by transferring the population of Ponape to Kusaie and settling Ponape exclusively with Japanese pioneers.

The Japanese realized early in their administration that although the agricultural possibilities of Micronesia are limited by the size of the land area, the marine resources of the area are plentiful. During the Spanish and German periods, while the Micronesians carried on their traditional subsistence fishing, commercial fishing was unknown. The Japanese, however, made every effort to foster a commercial fishing industry. Just as they engaged in agricultural research, so they carried on intensive marine research, covering such fields as oceanography, types of fish found in the waters of Micronesia, seasonal migration of fish, fishing methods, and the processing of fish. Bonito and tuna were the two most important fish commercially. With the growth of a commercial fishing industry, at first in Saipan and later in the Palaus, Truk, and Ponape, processing plants equipped to dry or can fish, especially bonito, were built in many places, together with ice plants and cold storage facilities. Not content with exploiting the available marine resources, the Japanese endeavored to increase them. For example, they planted trochus (*Trochus niloticus*) on the reefs of the Truk islands, Ponape, and Kusaie, where trochus shells were not previously to be found. On the Palau islands they engaged in the raising of cultured pearls.

These economic activities on the part of the Japanese entailed not only the immigration of some 80,000 settlers, who engaged primarily in agriculture and commercial fishing, but also the investment of a considerable amount of capital. This resulted

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in a trade between Micronesia and Japan that greatly exceeded that between Germany and the islands. The main export products were sugar, processed fish, and copra. The first two, products of Japanese enterprise, far exceeded copra, which was primarily a Micronesian product.

The Micronesians benefited greatly in both a direct and an indirect way from Japanese rule. The harbors, wharves, and jetties which were constructed to facilitate communications between the islands as well as with Japan served several purposes. They were a *sine qua non* for effective administration; they aimed to improve the economic and social welfare of the islanders; and they helped to make the pioneering of Japanese nationals successful. Schools were established on all major islands. The buildings were substantial and well-constructed; trained teachers were brought from Japan.

Through the schools the Japanese set out to modernize the life of the Micronesians by discouraging old habits and customs such as tattooing and time-consuming ceremonies and dances which disrupted the daily work schedule. They disapproved of the old-style houses and subsidized the construction of houses with corrugated iron roofs, doors, windows, raised floors, water tanks, and baths. The wearing of western-style cotton clothing became almost universal.

The relationship between Japanese and Micronesians was a much closer one than had existed between Germans and Micronesians, although the Japanese considered themselves superior to their charges. Many Japanese and Okinawans came as poor immigrants to Micronesia and lived very much like Micronesians. Not a small number married local women. Micronesian families welcomed Japanese and Okinawan sons-in-law, especially if they were skilled craftsmen, because of the prestige they gave the family.

There is little evidence that the Japanese farmer and fisherman who settled in Micronesia felt that he had to keep up the prestige of the ruling power. The Japanese did not limit their activities to management and supervision, the way Westerners do in the tropics. The living standards of the Micronesians and the Japanese did not differ greatly; as a matter of fact, well-to-do Micronesians enjoyed a far higher standard of living

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than many Japanese and Okinawan immigrants. But the Micronesians greatly resented the Japanese policy of barring them from high schools and from positions of power and prestige in the central administration. Whereas the Germans had employed the technique of indirect rule and made use of Micronesian leadership, the Japanese applied the principle of direct rule. Micronesian chiefs were stripped of their traditional authority while Japanese officials themselves dealt with even minor local problems.

Despite these shortcomings, there can be no doubt that on the whole the Micronesians appreciated the work of the Japanese because of the economic prosperity which they enjoyed prior to the war. The Trukese stress the fairness of the civilian officials and still remember the protecting hand that some civilian officials of the South Seas Government held over them during the war years, when Japanese Army and Navy officers tended to ride rough-shod over the human and economic rights of Micronesian individuals and communities.

An American Strategic and Prestige Frontier

During World War II a number of islands in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines were taken by American troops, while others were by-passed and subjected to blockade and bombing. These were eventually occupied by American forces after the surrender of Japan.

The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 states that ". . . Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914." This declaration was reaffirmed at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, and incorporated in the surrender documents. With the United States in possession of Micronesia by the end of 1945, certain pressure groups argued for outright annexation while other groups wished to see the islands placed under United Nations trusteeship. After a period of prolonged discussion between government agencies holding divergent views, the United States government submitted a draft trusteeship agreement to the Security Council on February 26, 1947. During the deliberations that followed, the draft underwent only minor revisions and, after the Ameri-

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can representative had stated that the United States would withdraw the agreement from the Security Council should amendments be made that the United States could not accept, it was unanimously approved on April 2, 1947. In contrast to the other trust territories, Micronesia was made a strategic area trust territory. This device is definitely a compromise. On the one hand, it partly satisfies those favoring outright annexation for reasons of national security, and, on the other hand, it partly satisfies those who wished the United States to live up to her commitment to abstain from "territorial aggrandizement" and who wished to see Micronesia placed under U. N. trusteeship. Under the terms of the strategic area trusteeship agreement the United States has the right to close specific parts of Micronesia for security reasons even to observers of the U. N. Trusteeship Council. The United States made use of this right on December 2, 1947, by notifying the Security Council that Eniwetok had been closed for the purpose of conducting atomic experiments.

Whereas the old mandate system of the League of Nations ruled out any military activity on the part of the mandatory power within the boundaries of the mandate, the terms of all trusteeship agreements permit a wide range of military activity, excluding only the conscription of islanders, although the latter may volunteer their services. The United States has the right: (1) to establish naval, military, and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory; (2) to station and employ armed forces in the territory; and (3) to make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and maintenance of law and order within the trust territory. Nothing stands in the way of exploiting to the fullest extent the strategic possibilities of Micronesia. Students of strategy, however, are divided on the question of the strategic importance of the islands under the present circumstances. In the overall planning, Micronesia seems at present to receive a rather low rating.

After the approval of the trusteeship agreement by the Security Council, President Truman submitted it to Congress

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on July 13, 1947 and asked for a joint resolution approving the agreement. Both Houses acted speedily, and on July 18, 1947 the President signed the joint resolution which thereby became Public Law 204 of the 80th Congress. At the same time the President signed Executive Order 9875 terminating military government in the trust territory, establishing a civil administration and delegating it "on an interim basis" to the Secretary of the Navy.

Since then the President has twice indicated his intention to designate the Department of the Interior as the civilian agency to administer Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territory.[6] As late as May 14, 1949 he stated: "It is the announced aim of this Government to accord civil government and a full measure of civil rights to the inhabitants of its Pacific territories. The accomplishment of this objective will be furthered by the transfer of these territories to civilian administration and the enactment of organic legislation at the earliest practicable date." Despite such statements the advocates of naval administration keep on arguing against a transfer of the islands from the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior.[7] However, in the light of the record of Navy administration of Guam and Samoa it can only be hoped that Congress will enact organic acts for the various Pacific territories and that the actual transfers can be made speedily. There is the precedent that the Japanese Navy, which had administered Micronesia after 1914, was replaced by a civilian agency, the South Seas Government, in 1922. Since the Navy Department will maintain some installations in the islands because of their strategic character, it would seem economically advisable for a civilian agency administering the islands to depend upon the Navy for communications and transport facilities in order to avoid costly duplication of services.

The discovery that Micronesians did not generally regard the incoming Americans as liberators came as a disappointment to many Americans, who expected that the Micronesians would share their own opinion of the Japanese. The initial

[6] Letter of February 11, 1948 to the Secretaries of State, Army, Navy, and the Interior. Letter of May 14, 1949 to the Secretaries of the Interior and Navy.

[7] See Roy E. James, "The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" in *America's Pacific Dependencies*, by Rupert Emerson and others. New York, 1949, pp. 109-134.

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attitude of many Micronesians of "wait and see" is, however, understandable. This was the fourth colonial ruler to descend upon them in sixty years. The transition from Spanish to German rule and again from German to Japanese rule had been a peaceful and uneventful one as far as the Micronesians were concerned. As a matter of fact, in some instances the outgoing administrators had helped the incoming ones with the task of setting up a new administration. But extreme destruction and desolation had ushered in the American rule.

Obviously, the responsibility for this calamity falls on Japan, which drew Micronesia into her war of aggression after having used at least the period between 1938 and 1941 to prepare these islands for their role in the coming conflict. Not only did the war lead to the complete destruction of the Japanese sugar industry in the Marianas and Japanese commercial fishing in all parts of Micronesia, but it also seriously affected Micronesian agriculture. Some of the most valuable agricultural land was forever destroyed through the construction of airfields. This frequently had involved the filling in of taro fields with coral and sand, which was packed down and then covered with cement. Many of the islands also lost a high percentage of their economically most valuable trees—coconut palms and breadfruit trees. In Truk the Japanese requisitioned land for the construction of several airfields. The blockade of Truk had forced the 40,000 soldiers stationed there to become part-time farmers in order to stave off starvation. Knowing that sweet potatoes and cassava yield more food per acre of land than do breadfruit and coconut, the Japanese ordered the destruction of large stands of these breadfruit and coconut trees in order to convert the orchards into sweet potato, cassava, and vegetable fields. Because of the time that it takes for coconut palms and breadfruit trees to reach the height of their productivity, it will be years before this type of war damage can be repaired.

The most important question for the Micronesians is: What will be the character of American rule? They have realized by now that the United States is not interested in a rebuilding of the sugar industry of the Marianas or in settling its nationals on the land vacated by Japanese settlers. To this we may add that the United States is not, as were Germany

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and Japan, interested in the copra of Micronesia. In times of low copra prices it will prove too costly to collect the small quantities of copra that are scattered over literally hundreds of islands separated from each other by great distances, when quantities of copra that exceed the total annual production of Micronesia can be picked up in one month in a single port of the Philippines.

The nature of the Japanese administration, the remarkable development of Micronesia between 1920 and 1940, and the total economic collapse during the war present the American administrators with some difficult problems. Their aim is not a reconstruction of what existed in Micronesia prior to Pearl Harbor but a reconstruction according to a new plan that takes into consideration the functional change of Micronesia from a frontier of settlement, plantation agriculture, and commercial fishing to a strategic frontier deliberately closed to large-scale development or utilization of the resources by American citizens.

There can be little doubt that the economic progress of Micronesia and the extensive modernization of the material culture of all but the smallest, most isolated, sparsely populated islands of Micronesia, were at least partly due to the presence of Japanese farmers, fishermen, merchants, and skilled craftsmen. The economy of Micronesia meshed well with that of Japan. Every product found a ready market in Japan, and in return the islands received cheap textiles, household utensils, tools, and a few other manufactured products. The Micronesians could more easily afford these Japanese goods than they can afford American products today. The islanders interpret it as a lowering of their standard of living and a sign that their economy has deteriorated since pre-war days when they have to work longer hours today than they formerly did in order to earn the purchase price of a specific commodity.

On the credit side, a vigorous and intensive medical program undertaken by the United States Navy medical personnel since the end of the war has improved health conditions greatly and it can be said that no previous administration did as much for the islanders in this respect.[8]

[8] Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Handbook on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*, prepared at the School of Naval Administration, Hoover

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The naval administration has undertaken similarly vigorous programs in the field of education, ranging from elementary education, through vocational training and adult education to the training of Micronesian teachers, medical assistants, nurses, and dentists. The American educational program also goes far beyond those of previous administrations. It was the policy of the Japanese to rely on imported personnel from the home islands, which was economically feasible since the pay scales were rather low. For economic reasons, if for no others, it is the aim of the American administration to make the islands as self-sufficient as possible by training skilled and semi-skilled workers, by preparing the islanders to conduct their own local government and carry on their own trade and industry, and by providing the communities with teachers and medical practitioners recruited from the local population.

It is quite obvious that the resources of the islands are so limited that economic considerations did not contribute to America's determination to control Micronesia. For the United States, Micronesia is neither a missionary's nor trader's, nor settlers' frontier, but primarily a strategic frontier. However, it is not sufficient to consider the islands only as a strategic frontier because of the strategic military value of certain islands. It must be realized that this territory has also to be regarded as a prestige frontier, since every phase of American administration of the trust territory is subject to close scrutiny by members of the Trusteeship Council, some of whom are not too favorably disposed toward the United States. The 120-odd questions raised by members of the Trusteeship Council after studying the first American report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands[9] and the ensuing discussions during the fifth session of the Trusteeship Council in July, 1949, indicate how important it is that the United States discharge its obligations as trustee in an impeccable manner.

Institute, Stanford University, Washington, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1948, Chap. XVI, "Health and Sanitation."

[9] *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.* Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands transmitted by the United States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 88 of the Charter. Prepared by the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., July, 1948 (OPNAV-P22-100E).

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REVIEW ARTICLES

THE AIR, A CHARTERED LIBERTINE*

By COLONEL SIDNEY S. GIFFIN, USAF

Stefan T. Possony, *Strategic Air Power: the Pattern of Dynamic Security*, Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1949, pp. xii, 313, $5.00.

THE American taxpayer has reason—almost obligation—to feel confused about the state of the nation's defenses. His collective bill on their behalf this year approaches fifteen billion dollars. The responsible civilian authorities have placed a substantial part of these chips on the Air Force, thus suggesting that the Navy is not altogether our first line of defense. Naval experts have indicated skepticism that the Air Force can carry the ball. And everybody knows that the Army makes no pretense at being first in the fray. What, then, does fifteen billion buy?

It buys, in fact, about all the military security that the United States, or the peaceful world, can expect at present, and this security is considerable if relative. The striking fact in all the debate between the Services is that the real point which has been at issue is a question of how best to project American military power *elsewhere*. It is not we thus far, but presumably our potential enemies, who must plan against possible full-dress campaigns at or very near the home base of power. Unless one credits the opposition with a vaster atomic-*cum*-aerial capability than sober sense should indicate, this happy relative security has yet a few years to run.

The contribution which air power can make to our relative security, now and later, becomes a little clearer as a result of Dr. Possony's most recent effort. *Strategic Air Power* is no book for the summer hammock reader. It is wordy, repetitious, weighted with Germanic gravity, and even occasionally ungrammatical. But it is nevertheless the best, most careful and thorough treat-

* From Henry V, Act I, Scene 1.

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ment now in print of the significant new extension in the art of war. The pity is that it was actually written some years ago, and suffers somewhat (although less than might be expected) from a failure to consider information that has since become available.

Possony is a professional military theorist, a geopolitician whose seminars at the Graduate School of Georgetown University are attended by Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. He has been and is an Air Force civilian expert on the selection of targets for air attack. There is thus a suggestion of authority in his presentation, particularly of the detailed chapters on target systems.

The purpose of his study, he indicates, is "to establish the general principles, possibilities and limitations of strategic bombing. It discusses the position of air power within the general framework of national defense. It examines the dependence of military aviation upon land and sea power. It does not limit its considerations to the purely military side—that is impossible in the age of total war—but tries to combine the military with the economic aspects of bombing, working as far as possible with quantitative terms." Possony nearly succeeds in this purpose.

Like Lord Tedder,[1] Possony begins his discussion with a study of what the RAF Marshal called "the unities of war," that is, the relationship of air power to the other major elements and broad considerations of modern warfare. His conclusion, based on specific references to the history and progress of the last war, is the familiar one—that command of the air, or "air superiority," is a *sine qua non* to the conduct of any full-scale war. "*Since the advent of the atomic bomb,*" says Possony, "*the battle for aerial control has become the decisive battle of any war. The air force that wins and retains command in the air has virtually decided the conflict.*" He adds this sober warning, pointed principally at technological aspects of air warfare: "To a large extent, battle for command in the air is being decided during the peace that precedes a war—at a time when very few citizens may realize their country is in danger." Neither in this conclusion, nor explicitly elsewhere, is the effort made to establish whether bomb-

[1] Sir Arthur Tedder, *Air Power in War*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1948.

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ing alone can win a war or whether it is "effective." Such questions, he maintains, are essentially hypothetical, unanswerable by scientific methods. Possony contents himself at the outset with the conclusion quoted above, expressed in terms of *all* the elements of air power. It is basic to the further consideration of his subject.

He turns next to a discussion of the role of the atomic bomb. Unlike Professor Blackett,[2] he makes no attempt to deprecate the bomb, but treats it, as Lapp[3] has done, with a sober respect. Much of his discussion of defensive measures against atomic attack has been covered at greater length by others.[4] It suffers to some extent, as have earlier discussions, from the nature of the technical data released thus far only on the destructive power of the earlier bomb. To this extent his treatment may err on the conservative side.

The most telling part of Possony's discussion of the bomb is his treatment of its offensive potentialities. Fully recognizing its destructive power, he agrees with such civilian experts as Dr. Vannevar Bush[5] that it is not an absolute weapon, particularly when it is the property of both sides in a prospective war. Its very destructiveness, he maintains, "makes it not an absolute but a very relative weapon" where the possibility of large-scale retaliation exists. This thought is not a novel one, but it may possess greater cogency now that the lush days of an atomless Russia are conceded to be past.

The possibility of large-scale retaliation implies, though Possony does not make this clear, a sufficient number of bombs on hand and the means to deliver them. Given adequate means of delivery, the total number, as Dr. Harold Urey[6] has recently pointed out, need not be too great, since the number of targets of retaliation is essentially limited. There is not required a bomb-for-bomb balance—only a sufficiently great destructive potential. The bombs themselves, however, must be sufficiently perfect from a technical point of view to insure a controlled explo-

[2] P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb*, New York, Whittlesey House, 1949.
[3] R. E. Lapp, *Must We Hide?* Cambridge, Addison-Wesley Press, 1949.
[4] D. J. Bradley, *No Place to Hide*, Little, Brown, 1948; Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon*, Harcourt, Brace, 1946.
[5] *Modern Arms and Free Men*, Simon and Schuster, 1949.
[6] *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. V, No. 10 (October 1949), p. 265.

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sion on appropriate targets. The same is true of the bomb carrier.

In terms of the present position of the United States, Possony suggests this means two things. While the bomb was in our exclusive possession it was much more nearly an absolute weapon in war than it will ever be in the future, and its effectiveness as a means for maintaining the peace will decrease, not in a simple arithmetic bomb-for-bomb progression as the Soviet stockpile grows, but in a rapid geometric progression, as the total destructive power is built up. The reverse of the coin, however, is also not without significance, since the promise of instant retaliation by the United States may conceivably preclude the possibility of indiscriminate atomic attack upon the United States.

The political balance, at the same time, is becoming more and more precarious as the Soviet potential increases, since we are slowly exchanging the cogent threat of atomic retaliation to conventional attack for a situation in which this threat will be offset by that of Soviet counter-reprisals in kind. It follows from Possony's theory that our current political advantage may be waning, though still buying time. How much time, in any case, will depend not on us, but on the progress of Russian scientists and technicians. What to do with the time is of course another, though not wholly unrelated, question.

While Possony may seem to suggest on this basis that atomic weapons will not be used in future wars between two powers thus fully armed, he draws a more subtle distinction in fact. It is the *indiscriminate*, "city busting" use of atomic weapons with preclusion of which he is concerned. Their use in a more limited sense against selected targets, he suggests, is not precluded by any manner of means. In fact, it is the bombing of selected target systems, rather than indiscriminate area bombing, which is meant, at least in American military theory, by "strategic bombing." This is a matter which should be clarified once and for all, and Possony fails to make it wholly and finally incapable of misunderstanding. People in the vicinity of selected segments of target systems are bound to be hurt, but the normal objective of American strategic bombing has been and continues to be the individual and selected physical target, *not* the civilian population.

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Implicit throughout the book is the immediate meaning of the atomic bomb to warfare, that is, that a powerful industrialized nation may strike crippling long-range blows at the outset of a war. Even the democratic United States might possess this capability, which conceivably Hitler could have possessed *without* the atomic bomb, but which henceforth another Hitler could scarcely hope to possess in terms only of conventional explosives. The reasoning here is less obvious than may appear, hinged in part on the certainty of air defense weaknesses in the initial phase of a war.[7] Considering the resulting immediate threat to civilians at home, it seems reasonable to suppose that not the most complacent democracy hereafter could permit a potential aggressor to build *thousands* of heavy bombers or rockets (which could hardly be done with real secrecy by any power) without adopting at least minimum adequate countermeasures.

A crippling future attack at long range with conventional explosives would thus have as prerequisite something resembling that sustained battle for aerial supremacy which characterized the war against Germany. But if Hitler had envisaged the real possibilities before the event, while others had not, he might in World War II have apportioned greater resources to an immediate aerial onslaught on Britain, and the course of the war would have altered. Mass bomber attacks in the first days or weeks while Britain's defenses were yet confused and inexperienced could, and probably would, have been highly successful. This capability is now lost for conventional explosives: they could be as comparably effective in the end, and in mass, as ironclads in naval warfare, but their "quick return" possibilities have been compromised as thoroughly as were those of ironclads after the "Monitor" and the "Merrimac." The atomic bomb restores this "quick return" capability to the bomber. Not several thousands of bombers, but only hundreds are required to place extremely heavy atomic blows on an enemy's resources for war. This could be done in a matter of days—certainly in a few weeks—and no matter what the enemy's *potential* for effec-

[7] Louis Ridenour, Jr., "U. S. Physicist's Reply to Professor Blackett," *Scientific American*, Vol. 180, No. 3 (March 1949), pp. 16-19.

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tive air defense, it could not be brought into play except with an experience bought, perhaps, too late.

It is possible, and even fashionable, to speculate endlessly on the permutations and combinations which might mean that atomic bombs would or would not be used in war. Possony makes not too spirited a contribution to this speculation. The "quick return" possibilities are so great as to suggest to this reviewer that the bomb is likely to be used, and at once, in a war involving its possessors. Neither side might be able to tolerate the possibility of becoming a poor atomic second. If not used at once, it would seem that the bomb might then be employed only in the final stages of a war, perhaps as the desperate last-gasp effort of the potential loser or perhaps as a "save the boys" expedient of the prospective winner. The reader is perfectly free to play his own speculative game here, equipped with glass and comfortable fireside: his conclusions will be at least equally valid.

The thoughtful student may wonder at this concentration upon atomic bombs, for the presumption exists, at least in United Nations terminology, that there are other "weapons of mass destruction." No thorough analyst could ignore chemicals and biologicals in a treatment bearing the title *Strategic Air Power,* and Possony has ignored neither. Perhaps because of the prevailing secrecy in both fields, his contribution has but limited and provocative value. The general inadequacy of speculation here suggests, in fact, that as yet there may be no "mass destruction" weapons whose effectiveness compares at all with that of the bomb.

Even without instruments of mass destruction, air power now plays the dominant role in strategic thinking. Possony goes on to analyze the elements of air power, pointing out the technical requirements for an effective military use of the air. Some of his conclusions in this respect may be open to question. None can deny the tremendous expense of maintaining an air force in being, but Possony may overemphasize both the total and the relative costs. His estimates as to the size of possible opposing forces tend to be high; and he neglects, except by implication, to point out the even more tremendous cost of a failure to maintain potential control of the air in these most parlous times.

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Possony is at his best, however, when he develops the question of what air power can and cannot do. Without attempting a moral judgment, he points out the practical ineffectiveness of indiscriminate area bombing, basing his conclusions on a careful analysis of actual results in the last war. Conversely, he makes an extremely strong case, using the same data, for the type of selective bombing which is basic to American strategic bombing theory.

Possony is among the first writers in this controversial field to treat impartially the often-misquoted *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*. He is concerned, moreover, not so much with reporting the mistakes of the last war, which are used primarily as examples, as with developing and expanding the lessons from successes. He errs, if anything, on the conservative side, since his observations on bombing accuracy do not reflect recent advances in equipment and techniques, and in at least one technical instance appear factually incorrect. But these limitations tend only to make a strong position stronger.

The use of the atomic bomb on limited and selective targets, in his view, clinches the argument.

> If the limited number of available atomic bombs is not used, in a future war, for indiscriminate bombing or "city busting," but is directed against the limited number of targets skillfully chosen according to the principles of selective bombing, it may be expected that the enemy will become "totally" unable to continue fighting, even though a large part of his cities and his industries remain standing.

Possony's treatment of bombing applications is sound and thorough. Of particular interest in this connection is his analysis of the time and geography factors in their application to the ancient military principle, economy of force, which explains the *raison d'être* of strategic bombing and dictates the principles for its application. His reference to strategic bombing as "a trucking rather than a fighting mission" should have some significance for those who deplore the lack of glamour in the Navy's essential, but perhaps equally grisly, convoy mission.

The chapters on targets and target systems are eminently useful, but heavy reading for amateur strategists interested primarily in the "big picture." Theory and practice may be placed in capsule form, however, as follows. Selective bombing

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is aimed at the destruction of one or more key elements of an enemy's war economy. A typical example would be electric power. By eliminating essential elements of this power—plants, hydroelectric installations, transformer stations, etc.—basic segments would be effectively deleted from other key industrial systems which depend on electric power for their continued operation, thus insuring a "multiplier effect" return on the bombing effort. Possony holds no brief for any such system in particular, pointing out that target selection varies in accordance with such factors as time, location, vulnerability, relative economic or military importance, and the availability of attacking forces. But his analysis underlines the necessity both for accurate intelligence data and for detailed and thorough study of the economic life of a potential enemy.

Possony's long argument concerning attacks on life and means of subsistence, on the contrary, is trite, and his data questionable. More time might have been spent on the discussion of morale as a target (which he rightly discounts, especially as applied to a modern police state) by pointing out the correlation between industrial production figures and the state of German and Japanese morale in various stages of air attack. What he does say might well be heeded by those psychological warfare enthusiasts who would substitute leaflets for bombs at that initial stage of war when enemy morale is highest.

Possony anticipated the recent argument over the capabilities of heavy bombers, pointing out that the heavy bomber, like the capital ship, is in a continuous state of obsolescence in the continuing technological race. He makes two important points, however, with regard to the heavy bomber's future. One concerns its method of propulsion. The greatest single advantage, he maintains, will accrue to that country which is the first to develop a long-range heavy bomber powered with aero-atomic engines, the next major technical improvement to be expected in aerial warfare. The other point concerns the heavy bomber and guided missiles. "There is room for considerable doubt," he says, "whether the heavy bomber will ever be replaced by the long-range rocket," which will be more expensive, usable only once, and may actually, in the rigidity of its behavior, prove in the end more vulnerable than the bomber to enemy defenses. No

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such cavalier treatment is accorded the short-range guided missile, however, which may greatly increase the bomber's accuracy and hitting power, but which, as an air defense weapon, may prove the bomber's greatest enemy.

Three long and tedious chapters are devoted to considering whether either the army or navy should be abolished. The answer in each case is no, as of course it should be.

Too much has already been said or written about the reasons underlying the recent inter-Service squabble. Possony has, nevertheless, anticipated General Marshall's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in singling out the underlying element: namely, the competition for public funds which each service believes necessary to satisfy minimum security requirements. As a partial solution, Possony advocates a joint staff of expert planners, drawn from all Services and assisted, or supervised, by competent neutral civilians. Members of the joint staff would cease to be members of any particular service during their tour of duty—a "general staff" concept which is apparently anathema to the American people. Meanwhile, as a means of combating entrenched interests of individual officers, free transfers in grade between the Services would be permitted. But this last measure has long been before Congress, and no action has thus far been taken.

Possony's civilians would be neutral "technicians and logicians,"—an idea not without its comical aspects. Technicians, in and out of uniform, have been and are employed by all three Services, the problem being to obtain enough who are good enough. If logicians are available to spare, the Services could undoubtedly utilize more of them, in uniform as well as out. How these commissars of Possony's conception could be both useful and neutral is a matter for puzzlement, however. In order to deal effectively with military problems, they would presumably have to acquire some experience in dealing with such problems. Thus far, in the national scene, it is a select few indeed who have undergone this experience and preserved a stolid neutrality. Again, in a similar connection, Possony suggests the need for an Office of Military Epistemology, in view of the Service miasma which seems to exist concerning the meaning of such phrases as "balanced forces." It is here submitted that

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semantics is no such problem. The problem is not what "balanced forces" *means*, but what "balanced forces" *are*, a matter having both budgetary and prestige implications.

As a sort of gratuity, *Strategic Air Power* completes its generally excellent course with three chapters the reader may profitably postpone to a happier day. On that occasion, when the tepid war is peacefully concluded, it will prove useful to consult Possony and numerous others on the matter there presented, which deals with the possibility of an international air force and similar current abstractions.

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ANTHROPOLOGY, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By GABRIEL A. ALMOND

Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949, pp. ix, 313. $3.75.
Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in A Changing World,* New York, E. P. Dutton, 1949, pp. 354. $4.50.

THESE two books, published in the past year, are general statements of the contemporary anthropological credo. They reject the earlier conception of anthropology as the study of prehistoric and primitive culture, and assert strong claims to its relevance in the solution of crucial problems of modern politics. Clyde Kluckhohn is a psychoanalytically trained anthropologist. Alexander Leighton is an anthropologically trained psychiatrist. Both have had distinguished academic and governmental careers. Leighton was chief and Kluckhohn co-chief of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War Information, an organization which pioneered in the application of psycho-anthropological insights and methods to problems of government policy. Leighton's general views are based on a detailed analysis of his experiences during the war in the Office of War Information and the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan. Kluckhohn's book is a general statement of the nature and significance of modern anthropology directed at an informed lay audience.

Special interest for students of international relations attaches to propositions advanced by these writers about the usefulness of the modern anthropological approach in the study of problems of foreign policy and international order. While there is some difference in the treatment of these themes in the two books, there is such substantial agreement between them that there is no need for our purposes for a separate statement of individual views. We review these propositions in brief form.

1. Cultural-psychological differences are largely unconscious in character. The peculiar sentiments, values, and attitudes of

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the various cultures, in addition to being deeply embedded in the individual are perpetuated by the pressure of the cultural institutions. As a consequence, efforts to change culture and personality cannot be soundly based on a simple faith in human reason and expectations of quick results.

2. The political behavior manifested within cultures, subcultures, nations, social classes, and similar groups, is not only to be understood as rational effort directed at objective problem-solving, but as affected by these largely unconscious, culture-bound "views of the world," and the emotional tonus of the social environment.

3. The proposition that human nature is instinctively destructive has not been established. Present-day psychology leans more to the theory that situational and cultural factors provoke aggressive impulses which may spill over into the international sphere. Present-day psychology also demonstrates that aggressive impulses can be directed into "constructive" channels. Thus psychology cannot support propositions about any simple relationships between human instincts and organized aggression.

4. The proposition that war is an inherent element of intercultural or international relations is not supported by anthropological research. There are known instances of long-run intercultural stability. For the modern era these writers cite Switzerland, Sweden, and similar nations which have lived for long periods at peace with their neighbors. In other words, there is nothing inherent in human psychology and culture which makes organized violent conflict inevitable.

5. The efficiency of foreign policy in achieving peace, international order, or other national aspirations would be greatly increased through knowledge of one's own and other cultures. The tendency to project one's own cultural assumptions and expectations upon other cultures and nations is a common source of international misunderstanding. Genuine conflicts of interest might often be resolved "were not irrational emotional forces mobilized through culture-bound misinterpretations of motives."[1]

6. Cultural values are so deeply embedded that any adequate solution of the problem of world peace and world organi-

[1] Kluckhohn, p. 272.

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zation has to be based on the principle of unity in diversity, "agreement on a set of principles for world morality but respect and toleration for all activities that do not threaten world peace."[2]

The modern student of politics and international relations has for the most part fully accepted these propositions. While he might find them to be substantially less than clear directives for contemporary policy, he will offer wholehearted support to the efforts on the part of anthropologists to reach policy-makers and the public with these basic insights. Furthermore, he can only offer the fullest support to anthropologists in their efforts to apply their hypotheses and methods in the analysis of the social-psychological factors which affect policy-making in modern nations. The anthropologists are fully justified in stressing the overwhelming importance of thoroughgoing knowledge of comparative culture if we are to avoid the gravest policy errors. Certainly no serious scholar in the field of international relations would deny the enormous improvements in the observation, analysis, and understanding of individual and group behavior which have resulted from discoveries made by these newer social science disciplines.

But unfortunately even such modest and sober psycho-cultural practitioners as Kluckhohn and Leighton appear to be affected by the all too human tendency toward overselling. Thus Kluckhohn argues that "Its all-embracing character gives anthropology a strategic position for determining what factors will create a world community of distinct cultures and hold it together against disruption."[3] To be ardent in love is not the same as being successful in love, and to be all-embracing is not the same as having embraced all. In the sense in which Kluckhohn uses his term in the foregoing quotation there is no "all-embracing" anthropology. To say nothing of "all the distinct cultures," the anthropologists have not made a thorough analysis of a single modern culture, and furthermore with their present equipment they are probably incapable of doing so. The social sciences in their modern manifestations—with the exception of history—are all new sciences. The oldest and most

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

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complacent among them, economics, has only recently become aware of how much it failed to embrace. The psycho-anthropologists are newest among the new—vastly promising—but like the young they sometimes find it difficult to distinguish between aspiration and achievement.

The infancy of the kind of anthropology to which this discipline aspires becomes apparent at a number of points at which these writers draw inferences from their general hypotheses for the solution of crucial contemporary policy problems. Both writers make occasional references to the problem of East-West relations. Thus Kluckhohn touching for a brief moment on the problem of alleviating the American-Russian conflict argues:

> Even now there is common ground which could well be brought nearer the center of bitter political discussion. For example both the American people and the peoples of the Soviet Union are remarkable among the nations of the world for their faith in man's capacity to manipulate his environment and control his fate.[4]

Assuming that this proposition is true, how could it be "brought nearer the center of bitter political discussion?" Discussion between whom, and by what means? This is not to suggest that Kluckhohn's proposition is totally lacking in relevance. But the suggestion is made without reference to the problems of communication and political structure, which in this case are the critical factors.

Leighton, similarly concerned with Russian-American relations, states:

> . . . when suspicious and hostile feelings are in the air, as they are with Russia, there is a trend toward "leaning over backward" in selecting persons who will not in any way favor the other party. This means that more and more individuals are chosen who are least likely to mitigate suspicion and develop understanding and most likely to be prejudiced and uncompromising and to make a bad situation worse. A sort of automatic social syphon is established that draws to the surface, interacting with Russia, a large percentage of those who have a high potential for anti-Russian decisions.[5]

This proposition is based on a simple assertion of fact; even casual memory suffices to raise serious doubts as to its truth.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[5] Leighton, p. 196.

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That it should be made by one of the ablest and most highly respected of the anthropologically trained psychiatrists is indicative of the state of anthropology as a policy science. In making applications of their hypotheses to the international relations of modern nations (as distinguished from their highly relevant contributions to policy toward "dependent areas" and non-Western cultures) the anthropologists simply lack professional knowledge of modern politics. They cannot make relevant policy proposals without such knowledge. Unless they acquire it they will have to be content with the formulation of general propositions such as those listed above, and leave to others the urgent task of applying them to policy problems. This would represent a serious loss, since there is urgent need for the introduction of psycho-cultural insights in the analysis of the policy-making process itself, a need which cannot be adequately served by political scientists familiar with comparative government and politics but untrained or half-trained in anthropology and psychology.

It would be possible to add other dubious political observations of this kind from the two books under review, and many more of them are to be found in other less cautious anthropological writings. There is a stage in the development of a science in which attention is necessarily focused on "what we have to offer the world," like the younger sibling striking out for conversational *Lebensraum* at the dinner table. Things will really begin to click when the students in these disciplines turn from an excessive preoccupation with the virtues and skills of the self, and direct attention at what they have to learn from the world. They will discover when they turn to the sober task of analysis of modern society and international relations that there are other workers in the vineyard of the Lord who, though lacking in modern tools, have nevertheless developed certain rude formulae about when to come in out of the rain.

This overzealousness, however, is the merest by-product of a challenging career of discovery. The work of the anthropologists taken together with that of the social psychologists reflects a development of increasing significance for future research in international relations. Perhaps the most promising research in the field of political behavior has been carried on by

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these "younger brothers" of the social science disciplines. The political scientist today has only one foot in the door of a house which he formerly occupied in secure tenure. In their first test of strength during the recent war, anthropology and social psychology won recognition alongside the other disciplines. And from this battle they have moved rapidly on a broad front attempting to provide answers to questions which the political scientist, operating with primitive theoretical and methodological tools, had given up asking.

Both Leighton and Kluckhohn properly reject the criticism that anthropology is *in principle* incompetent to deal with advanced and complicated cultures. And yet they seem to miss the point of the legitimate criticism which can be made of practically all of the specific psycho-cultural interpretations of modern peoples thus far produced. In dealing with a "primitive" culture a single psychiatrically trained anthropologist can readily grasp the characteristics and meaning of the various cultural functions. The social structure, the economic and political processes, the symbols and practices of religion, and the mode of training and apprenticeship to the culture are on the whole rather simple and traditional systems. On the level of primitive culture the anthropologist can perhaps claim to be a social scientist; he can see the interdependence of the cultural variables, and he is less likely to rest his over-all cultural interpretations on the analysis of a single factor. Similarly the anthropologist in his study of primitive communities has a relatively simple sampling problem. In his field work he "lives with his statistical universe," and he can make rule-of-thumb judgments about the adequacy of his sample of informants. When he undertakes the analysis of the political characteristics of a modern nation by means of psycho-cultural methods and hypotheses, it is difficult to see how he can proceed without a thorough knowledge of its history, social structure, economy, government, politics, religion, and without the most scrupulous regard for sound sampling procedures.

None of the existing anthropological studies of modern peoples have been based on such thoroughgoing analysis of the factors of social behavior, or anything approximating it. It is not that the anthropologist is incompetent to deal with modern

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cultures. His integrative concepts and hypotheses are of great fruitfulness, and his methods—combined with those of the social psychologist and the psychiatrist—have an enormous potential value. But the specific interpretations of modern culture thus far made are significant not for their accuracy, but for their suggestiveness.

These observations are in no sense applicable to the works of Kluckhohn and Leighton, both of whom recognize the limitations as well as the potentialities of anthropology in dealing with problems of political behavior. Progress in the developing science of human behavior is to be achieved not by one-sided efforts to achieve total interpretations by means of a narrow body of data, but by an integration of the stock-in-trade of the anthropologist and psychologist with that of the already existing social science disciplines. It is not a matter of great importance whether this is done by anthropologists and social psychologists who have assimilated history, political science, sociology, or economics; or by sociologists, economists, political scientists, and historians who have assimilated anthropological and social psychological hypotheses and methods; or by a convergence of both the older and the newer disciplines toward a common body of hypotheses, methods, and theories. What is of importance is the simple truth that any analysis of the psychological and behavioral phenomena of modern culture has to be made on the basis of a knowledge of that culture—and this means knowledge of social structure, institutions, and processes as well as cross-sectional or intensive analyses of mental states and patterns of individual and group behavior. The tendency on the part of some of the students in this field to offer one-to-one propositions concerning the relations between cultural values and personality tendencies on the one hand and political behavior on the other has tended to delay acceptance of this new approach among the older disciplines.

The books under review are also of interest in that they reflect the theoretical state of psycho-cultural research. To those who have been somewhat awed by the emergence of these new disciplines, some comfort may be taken from the fact that it is not difficult to grasp their essential conceptions. Their hypotheses as to the uniformities of personality in cultures and subcultures

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and the personality differences related to specific social statuses and roles are of considerable usefulness for political science. The political behavior of cultures, social classes, and elite groups of one kind or another can only be adequately understood in terms of these modal patterns. The conceptions of the interdependence of the factors of culture and personality, and of the strategic importance of the apprenticeship of the child to the culture, similarly are theories of great productiveness. This is hardly an inventory of significant anthropological hypotheses, but if one adds to these propositions the hypotheses of the psychoanalytic schools and of the psychology of learning, one has perhaps come to an end of the essentially original elements of the psycho-cultural approach. It is a promise rather than a realization. Even the combination of relevant skills is only in its beginnings.

The work thus far carried on in these fields has been highly empirical. One is impressed again and again with the poverty of theoretical imagination in the approach to comparative culture and personality. Aside from the early and crude cultural-psychological classifications of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, there have been no significant efforts at a systematic typology of culture and social structure. Primitive and modern cultures are placed side by side on the same continuum,[6] as though the only essential difference was one of size, or relative complexity of technology. One may legitimately ask these disciplines to speculate about the types of variation of which cultures and social groups are capable, and to place their cultural analyses in some such framework. Typologies provide principles of order, isolate differences in a systematic way, and open the mind to the kind of disciplined speculation from which significant hypotheses are derived.

[6] Kluckhohn, p. 266.

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OLD WINE – SOVIET BOTTLES

By PERCY E. CORBETT

Diplomatichesky Slovar, vol. I, Ogiz, 1948.
D. B. Levin, "K Voprosu o Ponyatii Diplomatii," *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* no. 9 (Sept., 1948), pp. 14-28.[1]

BOLSHEVISM has been one of the blacker *bêtes noires* of conservative folk since 1918. But it was only the Second World War that revealed the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union. Until that revelation, it was the doctrine, with its insidious methods of penetration, that worried established authority. The problem was one of moral and political sanitation—how to prevent infection. For imperialism in the traditional sense the new Russia was thought too weak. The Second World War and its aftermath have changed all that. Bolshevism plus power have made the Soviet Union the chief anxiety of the Western World.

To many a Soviet citizen this development is doubtless gratifying. Becoming a terror engenders a sense of achievement, especially in the revolutionary mind. Non-Communists, on the other hand, surveying what has happened, are reduced to what is at best a wintry consolation. We are at last being driven to a ruthless re-examination of our ends and our means, to a diligent search for common ground among Parliamentary Democracies, and to concerted methods of safeguarding the things we jointly hold most precious. But this wholesome reaction is in many quarters distorted by a sense of imminent danger. In place of a flagrant under-valuation of Soviet potentialities, for which the "expert" in international affairs must surely acknowledge some guilty responsibility, we are prone to panicky exaggeration of Bolshevik might and its threat to our civilization. Present fright, hardly less than earlier contempt, confuses our adjustment to the new factor in the environment. The rarity of training for the study of Russian

[1] The English translations are: *Diplomatic Dictionary,* Moscow State Publishing House; D. B. Levin, "On the Concept of Diplomacy," in *Soviet State and Law.*

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life and institutions, combined with widespread failure to use available sources of information, contributes to the myth of impenetrable mystery which still surrounds Soviet policy. Conscious of the lack of knowledge, too many of us, both among the general public and in places of authority, are striking attitudes determined by hunch or prejudice.

One of the factors that have brought the Soviet Union to its present eminence is its diplomacy. Here again, we in the West have grossly under-rated the proletarian capacity to master the tricks of an old and aristocratic trade. What could farm, forest, and factory bring to the subtle maneuverings of ambassadors and envoys plenipotentiary? Bluntness, of course. Impassivity, possibly. These had their place in the traditional arsenal. Certainly the formally sensitive (though substantially tough) give-and-take of diplomatic intercourse would be invaded by manners associated with a less official kind of horse-trading. But would not such rude simplicity be easy game for the Metternichs and Talleyrands of the twentieth-century West?

In the event, we have seen brought into diplomatic conference a brutality of expression which seems an unnecessary irritant in international relations. We have also been impressed by a breed of poker-face which yields nothing on the score of inscrutability to the best classical models. But some time ago we began to suspect that the less obvious skills of the diplomatic art were by no means a closed book to the Kremlin's representatives. Apparently the hierarchy of special training-schools attached to various ministries, and most highly developed under the Foreign Office, has been doing an effective job. In any event, though there is evidence of an inadequate supply of skilled personnel for the multifarious foreign service of the Soviet government (and only mass production could begin to furnish the swarms of *attachés* required in the dissemination of Marx-Leninism), there is also increasing reason why our missions in Moscow should study and report upon the developing Soviet system of diplomatic instruction.

Some account of how, from the rough and makeshift beginnings of 1917, the Soviet Foreign Office developed into its present form and magnitude is to be gleaned from Potemkin's

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Diplomatic History. Those three volumes also demonstrate that the power to unravel tangled skeins of events and decisions, and to apply the resulting lessons in the achievement of Soviet purposes, is by no means lacking in revolutionary Russia. The bias displayed is only a little more obvious than that which marks other diplomatic histories. There is a French translation; but the fact that no English equivalent has yet been published is another manifestation of Anglo-Saxon complacency.

The work edited by Potemkin brings us only to 1939. It is moreover a continuous narrative, written with style and proportion, not a handbook of miscellaneous information for students and practitioners of the diplomatic art. The need for such a *vade mecum* was recognized some years ago by the Soviet authorities, and Volume One of a *Diplomatic Dictionary*, published last year, is the first half of their response. In addition, within the scope of A to K, and in the disconnected manner inseparable from its arrangement, it carries the story of Soviet diplomacy up through the war and the first three years of a troubled peace.

The title, *Diplomatichesky Slovar*, is somewhat misleading, for this official production, as I have already indicated, is a great deal more than a glossary of diplomatic terms. The 855 tightly packed but well printed pages of Volume I are at once a history of diplomacy, with the emphasis on present and recent times, a biography of persons who are or have been prominent in international relations (Gromyko gets 32 lines against 51 for Grotius), a summary of treaties, and a manual of international law. The importance attached by the government to the enterprise is apparent from the editorial list. A. Ya. Vyshinsky and S. A. Lozovsky are Editors-in-Chief, while the committee includes such familiar figures as E. A. Korovin, I. M. Maisky, and A. A. Troyanovsky. Still other well known names are to be found under some of the signed articles, though for reasons not immediately apparent, many of the contributions are anonymous.

Most readers are now familiar with the stern rule that everything published in the U.S.S.R., whether the field be politics, belles-lettres, the plastic arts, or genetics, shall be uni-

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formly imbued with official doctrine. No one, therefore, will be surprised that so political a topic as diplomacy should be expounded to a refrain that glorifies Soviet objectives and methods. An extensive sampling of the contents indicates that few opportunities for propaganda have been missed. The tone is, however, a great deal more restrained than that of contemporary press and platform. The reader is never left in doubt about the translucent purity of Soviet diplomacy and the sinister corruption of all other, but at least he is spared the more vulgar forms of abuse. The design imposed limitations of space.

The key-note of the work is struck in the long article on diplomacy itself. The entire text of this is well worth translation, even if the volume as a whole escapes such treatment. In what follows, my object must be to communicate the substance of the article, which presents the official and ostensible Bolshevik theory of diplomacy; but I shall provide as much direct translation as space permits.

We begin with a statement of the relation between diplomacy and foreign policy:

"Diplomacy is related to foreign policy as the execution of a plan is related to the plan itself. In a certain sense it is an instrument of foreign policy. Foreign policy essentially determines not only the content but also the character and methods of diplomacy. This becomes sufficiently clear if, taking the most telling examples, we compare the bandit diplomacy and robber foreign policy of fascism with the peace-loving and honest diplomacy of the Soviet Socialist State, based on the principle of respect for the rights of other peoples.

". . . But, however close the connection, we must not confuse foreign policy and diplomacy. Foreign policy is determined in slave-holding, feudal and capitalist societies by the commanding classes, in socialist society by the interests of the whole toiling people. Diplomacy, though by no means independent of the social structure, is merely the technical means of carrying out foreign policy."

In broad strokes the anonymous writer traces the development of diplomacy from its most primitive form in the relations of uncivilized tribes, through Babylonia and Egypt, with their active intercourse with foreign communities and their

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written agreements so surprisingly like those of our day; through Rome, for which, Machiavelli believed, diplomacy won more than war did; through Byzantium, whose brilliant diplomacy was a factor in keeping life in the Eastern Empire for a thousand years; through the papal diplomacy of the Dark and Middle Ages; on to the practice, which began in the fifteenth century and was accelerated after the Peace of Westphalia, of maintaining permanent missions in the principal capitals.

The writer then turns to what he calls the "social physiognomy of diplomacy." By this he means the character and provenance of the persons engaged. Greece and Rome used actors and professional orators to make their diplomatic missions effective; the cities of Renaissance Italy drew upon their scholars and poets; France, Spain, and to some extent England, relied upon their jurists. The jurists or "legists" were on the side of the kings in their struggle with the feudal, hereditary aristocracy, and in great part owed their employment to this circumstance. The rest of the story shows a penetration for which we are doubtless indebted in some degree to the revolutionary prejudice of the writer.

"However, having transformed the feudal aristocracy into a court-and service-nobility, the monarchs began to select their diplomatic cadres from it. From that time to our own day, in spite of the bourgeoisie's attainment of power, diplomacy in the West has been a privilege of the aristocracy—a privilege which neither the French Third Republic, nor the classically bourgeois England, desired or was able to abolish. Doubtless the preoccupation of the bourgeoisie with profits and with business affairs demanding all their attention is one reason for so strange a phenomenon as the assignment of this vital field of public administration to another and in principle antagonistic class. The explanation, it is important to observe, lies in the interweaving of the big-landowning and big-capital interests. This began in the first half of the nineteenth century, finding expression in such decisive political compromises as the so-called parliamentary reform of 1832 in England and the establishment of the citizen monarchy in France under the aegis of the Orleanists in 1830. It has gone very far since that time. . . .

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Needless to say, the aristocracy cling tenaciously to their privilege: it gives them a conspicuous position even in the bourgeois state and, besides, offers a good career for younger sons. Of course, in countries like the United States and the Latin American Republics, where there is no hereditary aristocracy, diplomatic personnel is recruited either from the intellectuals (especially lawyers) or, with increasing frequency, from representatives of big business, who exchange their posts as directors of economic enterprises for posts in diplomacy. This somewhat alters the 'physiognomy' of diplomacy, and is clearly reflected in its methods and manners. Diplomacy becomes more businesslike, in a sense open ('Shirt Sleeves Diplomacy'), though the substance of it remains unaltered. The one entirely new type is the Soviet diplomat, from the ranks of the working people, alien to aristocratic and bourgeois traditions, carrying out foreign policy by methods outwardly analogous to the traditional techniques but inwardly not identical and in some respects in direct conflict with them."

The writer will return to some analysis of these methods and the difference introduced by the "new" Soviet type of diplomatic personnel. But first he wants to add to his account of official agents a note upon the unofficial individuals and groups that have been influential or even determing factors in the definition and execution of foreign policy. Among the secret groups that have operated in this field in all capitalist countries, including Czarist Russia with its succession of Court cliques ending in that of Vyrubova and Rasputin, he makes special mention of the Cliveden set. This group, he says, "inspired the anti-Soviet and pro-Hitler diplomacy of Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet—a diplomacy which led to the Second World War."

Approaching a closer scrutiny of function and methods, the author writes:

"It is accepted doctrine that the first task of diplomacy is to create and ensure by non-military means conditions for the peaceful existence and development of the State which it serves. This is absolutely true of the Soviet Union, which by its very nature as a Socialist State does not compete with other States for commercial markets, outlets for capital, colonies,

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or conquests of any kind, but concentrates its thought and energy on the economic and cultural organization of its internal life, seeking only to win security and immunity from outside intervention."

There follows a list of Soviet efforts to ease strained relations with other powers by trade agreements and "advantageous orders and deliveries," to effect disarmament, to resist the aggression of the fascist countries even in states as remote from Moscow as Ethiopia and Spain, and to build a network of non-aggression pacts. A novel feature of the non-aggression pacts is their mutual obligation of neutrality in a war involving either party, together with the undertaking not to participate in hostile coalitions. Such, according to the author, have been the new methods devised by Soviet diplomacy to preserve peace. He concludes this section with a tribute to the success with which the Soviet foreign service has performed its arduous daily task of removing friction, preventing potential disputes and peaceably settling those that have actually developed.

Then we turn to the objectives and methods of traditional diplomacy, and the contrast is painted in suitably lurid tones. This is inevitable in view of the major premise unquestioningly subscribed to by the writer in the following terms: "It is in the very nature of class societies and their political organization, the State, to grasp at the land of others and seek to broaden the field of exploitation for their ruling classes. Naturally this is only admitted in private correspondence. Publicly, it is always 'balance of power,' 'natural boundaries,' 'freedom of the seas,' protection of small nations, and other laudable objects."

The catalogue of shifting alliances and counter-alliances of capitalist states, their treaty violations, and their thinly disguised interventions and aggressions, reaches its climax in the orthodox Bolshevik condemnation of Anglo-American military and financial assistance to the "anti-democratic" forces in Greece, Italy and China, and the alleged cynical disregard by the United States and Britain of the solemn undertakings of Potsdam.

Throughout the article there is a constant harking back to the hyprocrisy, pretense and falsehood of traditional diplo-

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macy. Obviously the balance would have been improved if, instead of relying so exclusively upon Machiavelli and his imitators, the author had shown some respect for the testimony of such witnesses as the seventeenth-century Frenchman, de Callières, or the twentieth-century Englishman, Harold Nicolson.[2] But the Soviet writer is of course in duty bound to dismiss such authors as henchmen of capitalism and interested defenders of their own profession.

The repeated rhapsodies on the virtues of Moscow's foreign service are tiresome; but the reader must have patience enough to glance at the alleged specific departures from traditional modes, and the explanation offered. There is, moreover, some interest in the very hyperbole of the claims made on behalf of Soviet diplomacy, especially in the matter of prescience. The basic characteristic of Soviet method in this domain, according to our author, is the study of social factors. Blest with the Marx-Leninist science of society, the representatives of the Politburo can understand the inner connection of events and discern not only present but future trends. The strength of Soviet diplomacy, so brilliantly exhibited throughout the whole period of its operation, lies in this discernment rather than in deceits and intrigues. "For its honorable aims—to secure peace within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and in all the world on principles of friendship with neighbors near and far—honorable means are sufficient."

The paper by Levin in *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* for September, 1948, contains some mild criticism of the theory outlined above, and adds some further thought on the subject.

Levin is not satisfied with the description of diplomacy as merely the method of carrying out foreign policy, related to it as the execution of a plan is to the plan itself. He holds that the metaphor of tactics and strategy is more apt. Foreign policy is the grand strategy of the state's external relations. Diplomacy is their tactics. These tactics do not constitute a separate science any more than international relations in general do. Recent attempts to construct a special science of international relations have, he thinks, been a failure. "Diplomacy," he

[2] François de Callières, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*, Brussels, 1716; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, London, Butterworth, 1939.

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concludes, "as an art of statesmanship, the rules of which are based on the findings of science, has its foundations not in any special scientific discipline, but in a wide complex of knowledge forming the subject of a number of sciences." But no art can be reduced to the mere application of impersonal rules. In the adjustment of techniques to particular situations, personality necessarily plays an important part.

There follows a scathing comment on the foreign services of contemporary capitalist states. According to Levin, bourgeois diplomacy has not in recent decades brought out a single figure rising above the level of mediocrity. But this, he thinks, is not the chief reason for its repeated failures. These can only be explained by failure to understand the new historical trends. The so-called non-interventionist policies of France and England before World War II would scarcely have been followed if the French and British governments had been able to appreciate accurately the real situation—above all, the might of the U.S.S.R. and the strength of its diplomacy. In the same way now the United States, with its "atomic diplomacy," together with England, France and the other American satellites in Europe, may be on the brink of even more serious catastrophe, because they refuse to reckon with the growth of "new democratic forces" and failed to understand Molotov's reminder that new imperialist adventures are dangerous for capitalism.

After World War I the diplomacy of the bourgeois states remained basically unchanged, says Levin, in spite of talk about "transformation," "democratic control," "open diplomacy" and the "victory of moral principles." The sole new element was in reality the use of the new peace organizations, such as the League of Nations, to serve the foreign policies of capitalist member-states. In contrast, Levin repeats the standard eulogies of Soviet foreign policy and its methods which we have already noticed in the article from the *Diplomatic Dictionary*. Like the author of that article, he pays fervent tribute to the miracles of Marx-Leninism, particularly in the revelation of things to come.

Under the heading of "Diplomacy and International Law," Levin recalls with approval the citation in the *Diplomatic Dictionary* of the non-aggression pacts with Turkey and with

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West-European neighbors of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union is, he says, justly proud of the clauses in these pacts which promise neutrality and non-participation in hostile coalitions. In the hands of absolutist and bourgeois states alike such devices were employed to create military-political blocs and other tools of balance-of-power politics. Soviet diplomacy, he asserts, has transformed these institutions of the capitalist law of nations into guarantees of the peace and security of the peoples. As further Soviet contributions he cites the elevation of support of general peace and security into a principle of international law, new criteria for establishing the fact of aggression, equal rights of the capitalist and socialist systems of ownership, recognition in the Statute of the United Nations of national self-determination, and the new status of trade missions.

In these specimens of Soviet writing on diplomacy, as in other fields, the long-suffering reader finds an admixture of fact in the turgid propaganda of self-righteousness. Moreover, true and false, here is an important part of the general picture of us which the Bolshevik paints, perhaps for himself, but certainly for his countrymen. The *Dictionary of Diplomacy,* with the additional commentary of the faithful, should be a handbook for our diplomatists too.

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RESEARCH NOTES

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

By LEO PASVOLSKY

AT the close of the Second World War, it was clear that the years immediately ahead would be a crucial period in history. It was also apparent that the United States, in its new position of world leadership, would exercise a profound influence in shaping the course of events, and that its foreign policies would, therefore, be a decisive factor in determining the direction in which the world would go.

In this situation, the United States would no longer be able to afford—as it had believed it could in the past—to wait on events, to assume a generally passive atttiude toward world affairs, and to conduct its foreign relations on the basis of intermittent and often unrelated policies. If it was to use its immense influence in shaping international events toward the attainment of its proclaimed basic aims—the creation of conditions of peace, security, and well-being for itself and for all peace-seeking nations—the country would need increasingly in the future a consistent and flexible framework of basic foreign policies.

The immediate responsibility for the formulation of foreign policies and for the execution of measures necessary to give effect to those policies would, of course, rest with government. But, in the final analysis, the continuing effectiveness of the government of the United States in conducting the nation's foreign relations in a manner consonant with its position of world leadership would depend upon the existence of an informed, intelligent, alert—and, therefore, responsible—American public opinion. The government's effectiveness would also depend, to a very important degree, upon the availability of a growing reservoir of adequately trained specialists in inter-

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national affairs, from which the government could staff its expanding operations in foreign relations at home and abroad.

In order to contribute toward the meeting of these two great national needs—the development of an informed public opinion and the training of an adequate supply of American specialists in international affairs—the Brookings Institution of Washington, D. C. embarked, in the summer of 1946, upon a new program of research and education in international relations directed to that end. The program has been carried on ever since on a slowly expanding scale by a sizable staff, specially recruited for this purpose and organized into a unit of the Institution known as the International Studies Group.

I

The Brookings program is focused on a continuing examination of the major problems of international relations that must be dealt with by the government of the United States in the conduct of the nation's foreign relations; and on an analysis and appraisal of governmental policies involved in meeting these problems. In our work, we try to make clear what these problems are, what their importance is to the United States, and why and how they have arisen or are likely to arise. We then proceed to select some of these problems and to consider in each case the various ways in which the particular problem might be solved—either by single-handed American action, or by international action in which the United States participates, or by a combination of national and international action—and what the consequences are likely to be of each particular course of action. Finally, where appropriate, we indicate our judgment on the most effective and desirable course. We chose this "problem approach" because we believe that it provides at this time a fruitful and realistic basis for the study of international relations geared to the purposes of our program.

The policies and actions which nations adopt to meet the problems that confront them are constantly being shaped by many factors operating both within and among them. Trends in political, economic, and social thought, as well as historical and traditional drives, when translated into national action, constitute forces that are at times decisive in international

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relations. These forces are continuously at work, and they frequently affect not only the concept of the kind of world in which Americans want to live but also their capacity to influence its achievement. The same is true for the peoples of other nations. An understanding of these forces is necessary in any adequate appraisal of the content and direction of the foreign policies of any country.

But this is not enough. The manner and processes by which national or international action is taken are also of the utmost importance. For example, great emphasis is currently being placed upon international organizations, agencies, and conferences as instruments for the conduct of international relations. The growing use of these instruments presents many advantages, but it also raises difficulties. Too much reliance on the newer methods alone may well hamper the flexibility of foreign policy, since all countries must continue to conduct a large part of their foreign relations through the more usual diplomatic channels. Hence it is of the utmost importance that there be sufficient perspective for an appreciation of the relationship of these various methods of making foreign policy effective.

In brief, the approach and emphasis of the program are designed to facilitate and stimulate a more careful consideration and a better understanding of the factors involved, and of the alternative courses that might be followed, in a given international situation. The activities under the program fall into two broad groups: those that are primarily of a research nature, and those that are mainly educational in character.

II

We at Brookings can deal, of course, with only a few of the innumerable problems of foreign relations that confront this country. We do attempt, however, in our annual publication, *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy,* to indicate the vast range and complexity of these problems, as well as some of the factors that condition American action with regard to them.

Three annual volumes of the *Major Problems* have appeared to date, in 1947, 1948, and 1949. Each of them contains a brief account of the world situation in the midsummer of the year

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of publication and an analysis of the position of the United States in the world. This is followed by a review of some fifty principal problems confronting the United States at that time in the United Nations, in the different regions of the world, and in such functional fields as economic and social relations, basic human rights, and national power. Finally, each volume contains comprehensive analyses of three or four major problems, presented in the form of "problem papers" similar to those used in the Department of State and other government agencies in connection with the formulation of foreign policies. Thus far, we have dealt in these "problem papers" with the following topics: American economic assistance to Europe and to Latin America; Point IV of the President's Inaugural Address; the peace settlements for Germany and Japan; the veto in the United Nations; control of atomic energy; European integration; China; and Indonesia. We now plan to publish some "problem papers" in pamphlet form and have in mind at this time, for publication early in 1950, papers on American military assistance to other nations and on the recent developments in China.

Because the information contained in the *Major Problems* volumes quickly gets out of date, we publish ten times a year a summary of events, entitled *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy*, which is now in the third year of publication. The summary is intended to be a supplement to the larger volume, as well as, apart from the latter, a readily available source of information on world events. As a further supplement to the *Major Problems* volume, we published last fall a pamphlet entitled *Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations*, which presents a brief description and analysis of the vast and complicated machinery of government through which the foreign relations of the United States are carried on today. It is our intention eventually to expand this pamphlet into a comprehensive analysis of the subject.

Apart from these continuing projects, we have been working on a series of individual studies, of which the following are in advanced stages of preparation:

1. The origin of the United Nations Charter, especially as

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regards American initiative and participation in the negotiation of that document.

2. The International Trade Organization as an instrument of American foreign economic policy.

3. The Rio and North Atlantic treaties in terms of an analysis and appraisal of the two mutual assistance pacts into which the United States has entered.

4. The international regulation of national armaments, especially from the standpoint of American views and desires on this subject.

5. The United States and the peace settlements, both those already concluded and those still in the process of negotiation.

In our research and publication program we have also projected a number of studies of even broader scope. These include treatises on the foreign policy objectives of the major nations; on the new concepts in the fields of national security and international economic behavior; and on the American foreign economic aid programs.

It is our hope that research activities based upon the approach described above, which approximates that required of responsible governmental officials in coping with both current and long-range problems of foreign policy, will help develop a realistic public understanding of foreign relations. Such an understanding is requisite to any fair and intelligent appraisal of the government's aims and action and, therefore, to the effective conduct of foreign relations in a modern democracy.

In presenting the results of research, care is taken to avoid the formulation in each case of a single conclusion or suggestion for action. The aim is rather to explore various possibilities of action and thus to provide a basis on which the reader can reach his own conclusions. This does not preclude the expression of the authors' own views, but always in the framework of a fair presentation of other possible conclusions.

III

The educational activities under the program are designed to stimulate the use of the "problem approach" in the teaching of international relations and the training of specialists in that

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field. This has been carried out through the holding of discussion meetings of several kinds.

During the past three years, annual seminars were held on problems of United States foreign policy—at Dartmouth College in 1947; at Stanford University in 1948; and at Lake Forest College in 1949. Each seminar lasted two weeks. The participants—usually about 130 in number—comprised teachers of history, political science, government, international law, international relations, economics, and geography from universities and colleges in many parts of the country; officials of the Department of State and other government agencies; officers of the armed services of the United States; American representatives in international organizations; businessmen, labor leaders, writers, and leaders in adult education activities. Another seminar will be held at the University of Denver in 1950.

Each seminar attempts to reproduce outside the government the type of discussion that takes place within the government in the formulation of foreign policies. It is conducted in round tables and plenary sessions on the basis of "problem papers" prepared and distributed in advance of the meetings by the staff of the International Studies Group. These papers are subsequently revised as a result of the discussions at the seminars and included in the current *Major Problems* volumes.

Each paper contains a succinct statement of the problem and a brief analysis of its nature and origin. This is followed by a discussion of its development, with special emphasis on the nature of, and reasons for, the existing official policy with regard to it. Finally, there are set forth the various specific issues that need to be resolved in order that the existing policy can be put into effect. Under each issue, there is an indication of a number of alternative courses of action open to the United States in dealing with that issue, together with an analysis of the probable consequences of each course.

The participants at the seminars are asked to consider each issue, and the alternative courses of action presented, in terms of the following questions:

(a) How significant is the issue as stated for the attainment of the objectives sought by the United States in connection with the problem under review?

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(b) Do the alternative courses of action listed under that issue constitute the most feasible possibilities from which a choice should be made in arriving at a decision? If not, what other possibilities should be listed?
(c) Are the main implications of the various alternative courses of action, and the principal arguments for and against each, adequately brought out in the problem paper? If not, what other considerations should be taken into account?
(d) Which of the alternative courses of action suggested should be regarded as the preferred one?

Following this discussion, and in the light of the considerations brought forward, the participants are asked to review the wisdom of the existing official policy and the likelihood of attaining through it the objectives toward which it is directed. The whole idea is to make it possible for the participants to put themselves in the position of responsible government officials charged with the duty of making recommendations to the President, or the head of an executive department, on policy decisions pertaining to the particular problem. The main purpose is to suggest the use of this type of approach in the classroom and adult discussion groups.

During the spring of 1949, three briefer—regional, rather than national—conferences of the same character were held jointly with Harvard, Princeton, and Duke Universities respectively. These meetings were conducted on the same plan as the larger seminars and on approximately the same basis of participation. Similar conferences are projected for the future.

The *Major Problems* volumes and the publications supplementary to them have been found useful as teaching aids in developing the application of the "problem approach" to instruction in international relations. During the last academic year, the current *Major Problems* volume was used as a textbook in 95 universities and colleges, in a number of high schools, and by many adult discussion groups.

Experience has shown that the use of the "problem approach" requires considerable flexibility in its actual application. It is, of course, only one of many approaches to the teaching of international relations, and even it can be—and, in fact, already has been—applied through a considerable variety of techniques, depending on the circumstances of the particular institution of

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learning. In order to examine recent experience in the use of various approaches and teaching techniques in this field and to encourage the development of new methods, small conferences, consisting exclusively of teachers, are now projected as a part of our program. The first of these will be held in January 1950.

IV

The annual volumes and the other studies are, in varying degrees, the product of cooperative research. The International Studies Group, which consists of specialists in the various branches of international relations and of American foreign policy in particular, is itself in a position to bring to bear on the separate studies—whether they are done by the Group as a whole, as in the case of the annual volumes, or by individual staff members—a considerable variety of knowledge, experience, and judgment. Aid is frequently sought from other members of the Institution's staff who work primarily on domestic economic and political problems. Finally, a still greater measure of general and specialized knowledge, experience, and judgment is brought into play through the use of consultants and through collaborative arrangements with other individuals and research groups. All this on occasion slows the tempo of the work, but we are completely satisfied that it greatly improves the end product.

The annual seminars and the other conferences are, in a real sense, joint undertakings of the Institution and the participants. In planning, arranging, and conducting these meetings, we have had most valuable collaboration of a large number of both governmental and academic specialists.

Our experience to date has strengthened our belief in the usefulness of the cooperative method in both the conduct of research and the improvement of teaching techniques. We are also more convinced than ever that these two types of activities should be closely integrated. We have found that research work, especially of a continuing character and wide coverage, is necessary to provide a solid basis for conducting discussions designed to improve teaching and training techniques and for the preparation of the necessary teaching materials. At the same time, the meetings have proved useful in stimulating and enrich-

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ing research activities at the Institution and elsewhere in the country, since many of the participants are persons doing research work both inside the government and in universities and private research agencies.

Our experience has brought home to us the pressing need for more activities of both types all over the country, especially as regards research in the international field, and for greater contact among persons working in that field. This situation is increasingly recognized by such donors of funds as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, both of which, by their substantial and generous grants to us, have made possible the present scope of our work. The efforts of the Social Science Research Council in the field of coordination of international studies hold much promise for the future. But there is still a vast field that requires plowing, and the task is, indeed, urgent.

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